

INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND FOREIGN POLICY CHOICES:
BRITAIN FACES THE DICTATORS, 1931-1941

By
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the University of Florida
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To My Parents

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This study attempts to identify and explain variations in British conflict behavior toward Germany, Italy, and Japan between 1931 and 1941. The general hypothesis in the investigation is that British conflict behavior varies according to the decision maker's definition of the international situation. Specifically, changing perceptions of cross-pressures, relative military capabilities, and diplomatic stakes account for variations in the intensity of British conflict behavior and its potential for rapid escalation.

In an examination of the principal diplomatic documents and memoirs for the period, eighty-five British decisions and their determinants were identified, coded, cross-tabulated, and subjected to Pearsonian correlation analysis. The analysis confirmed the following propositions. Regarding the intensity of British conflict behavior for the entire period, 1931-1941: (a) if cross-pressures existed, then the intensity of British conflict behavior was likely to be low; (b) if British military capabilities were low, then the

intensity of British conflict behavior was likely to be low; (c) if British diplomatic stakes were low, then the intensity of British conflict behavior was likely to be low; (d) if the number of these international restraints was high, then the intensity of British conflict behavior was very likely to be low. Regarding the escalation potential of British conflict behavior for the entire period, 1931-1941: (a) if British diplomatic stakes were low, then their conflict behavior was likely to escalate rapidly; (b) if the British were simultaneously involved in several conflicts, they were likely to experience cross-pressures; (c) if the British experienced cross-pressures, they were likely to perceive their available military capabilities per conflict as low; (d) if British perceptions of available military capabilities were low, then their conflict behavior was unlikely to escalate rapidly.

These propositions fit two general theories, respectively: the cumulative effects principle and the principles of international systems theory. The findings regarding conflict intensity express the cumulative effects principle, namely, that each of the independent variables separately influences the intensity of British conflict behavior, and the cumulative impact of these variables is greater than their individual effects. The findings regarding escalation potential conform to the principles of international systems theory, which are as follows: (a) no matter what the diplomatic stakes are, the greater the number of members in the international system, the more likely it is that each member becomes simultaneously involved in several conflicts; (b) cross-pressure from simultaneous involvement in several conflicts lowers the members' perceptions of available military capabilities per conflict; (c) perceptions of low military capabilities

restrain conflict behavior and thereby maintain the international system.

Two major conclusions emerge from the study. First, international considerations offer a powerful, empirically-based, and theoretically-acceptable explanation of British conflict behavior. Second, the results support the contention that international relations theory based upon the perceptions of individual decision makers may be more productive than theory based upon the characteristics of aggregate units, such as groups or nations.

PART I

CHAPTER I

THEORIES OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

Most scholars characterize the 1930's period as the era of appeasement in British diplomatic history. Some criticize British policy during this decade as unrealistic, shortsighted, naive, or even conspiratorial.¹ Both historians and actual participants in these British decisions have written numerous books to condemn or defend British policy toward the three fascist dictatorships, Germany, Italy, and Japan.² In view of the extensive and intensive treatment of this period by several eminent observers and participants, the examination of British policy by still another analyst calls for some justification.

¹ Some books on the period with particularly suggestive titles include Margaret George, The Warped Vision (Pittsburgh, 1965); Ian Colvin, None So Blind (New York, 1965); John L. Snell (ed.), The Outbreak of the Second World War: Design or Blunder (Boston, 1962); Donald N. Lammers, Explaining Munich: The Search for Motive in British Policy (Stanford, 1966); John F. Kennedy, Why England Slept (New York, 1961); Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (Boston, 1963); Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (New York, 1967); William Rock, Appeasement on Trial (Hamden, 1966).

² Snell, ibid., surveys the representative historical works on the period. A.J.P. Taylor's book, The Origins of the Second World War (New York, 1962), is probably the most controversial interpretation. A very critical review of Taylor's book by Hugh Trevor-Roper appears in Encounter, XVII (July, 1961), 88-96; a more balanced critique is the review by F.H. Hinsley in Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge, 1963), Chapter 15. The most informative and least polemical memoirs by British participants in my opinion are Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), Nine Troubled Years (London, 1954), which defends the appeasement decisions, and Anthony Eden (Lord Avon), Facing the Dictators (Houghton Mifflin, 1962), which criticizes them. Both men served as Foreign Secretaries in the 1930's.

A new look at a particular historical period is justified if new evidence becomes available, or if the analyst brings with him a new analytical perspective, one that increases the understanding of already available information. This study does not offer new sources of information as its justification. It does offer a new analytical perspective.

The purpose of this investigation is to re-examine British policy during the 1930's and attempt to fit it into a theoretical framework. Because of this focus the research is primarily an exercise in empirical political theory rather than diplomatic history. The distinction between empirical theory and history is an artificial one in that both the theorist and the historian deal with the same events in their analysis. Nevertheless, the distinction between a theoretical analysis and a historical interpretation is a viable one.³ A review of the principal historical interpretations for this period should help to illustrate this point and provide an introduction to the theoretical framework that guides this new look at an old topic.

Historical Interpretations

The historical interpretations of British foreign policy during the 1930's are difficult to separate from those interpretations that explain the occurrence of the Second World War. Historians often link them by relating the British policy of appeasement to the outbreak of the war. British policy becomes a "permissive" cause of World War II by allowing Hitler to rearm Germany, consolidate German western frontiers, and expand toward the east. The British failed to prevent Hitler from

³J. Watkins, "Historical Explanations in the Social Sciences," in Patrick Gardiner (ed.), Theories of History (Glencoe, Illinois, 1959), pp. 503-514, especially pp. 513-514.

occupying the Rhineland in March, 1936, and merely protested the German annexation of Austria two years later. Within six months after the Anschluss Prime Minister Chamberlain accepted the cessation of the Sudetenland to Germany at Munich. Finally, after Hitler conquered the remainder of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939, the British guaranteed the territorial integrity of Poland. When Hitler attacked Poland in September, 1939, the British government, with the French as their allies, came to Poland's defense. The British decision to honor this commitment belatedly but irrevocably reversed their earlier appeasement policy, which was to concede Hitler's territorial demands in an attempt to reach a peaceful European settlement with Germany.

Most historians agree with this description of appeasement, but they differ over its sources.⁴ Why did the British wait until 1939 to oppose Hitler with force? Some historians suggest that British policy did not take sufficient account of Hitler's personality. They believe that Hitler was either a madman or a revolutionary, or both, but certainly not an orthodox political leader. British decision makers, on the other hand, were reasonable men and expected Hitler to be reasonable and satiable in his demands, an unrealistic expectation according to this

⁴The following division of historians into schools is somewhat arbitrary. On the one hand, historical research is often very narrowly focused and does not pretend to offer more than a partial explanation of the phenomena in question. On the other hand, the historical research that synthesizes the monograph literature often either surveys it without really synthesizing it or gives a "balanced" interpretation that is somewhat ambiguous. A few scholars, such as George, op.cit., Gilbert and Gott, op.cit., and Taylor, op.cit., have attempted to definitively interpret Anglo-German relations, but the number of variables that they include in their analyses still makes classification risky. Therefore, the works cited as examples of the two schools below are approximations of "ideal types" of interpretations; these examples may not exactly fit the idealized interpretation, but do express their general themes.

interpretation. The British failure until after the Prague coup to see that Hitler was unappeasable, therefore, accounts for the duration of the appeasement policy.⁵ A second group of historians argues that the British government realized Hitler's unreasonable designs but were incapable of stopping him. They contend that the principal restraints upon the British elite were domestic political considerations and relative military capabilities. British public and parliamentary opinion would not support the measures necessary to stop Hitler before 1939. Painful memories of World War I and similar visions of World War II made it difficult for British leaders to justify policies of rapid rearmament, alliances, and military intervention when a policy of negotiations existed as an alternative. The futility of negotiations did not become completely clear until after the Czech coup.⁶

It is possible to synthesize these schools of thought. A theme that appears in both interpretations is the British disposition to view some of Hitler's publically-stated objectives as reasonable revisions of the Versailles Treaty; the British primarily opposed Hitler's heavy-handed methods of obtaining them. An integrated interpretation suggests that British policy makers responded to the reasonableness of Hitler's initial objectives and the climate of opinion in Britain by succumbing to

⁵William Newman, The Balance of Power in the Interwar Years, 1919-1939 (New York, 1968), pp. 19-32. Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (Boston, 1963), pp. 5-9. Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars: Conflicting Strategies of Peace From Versailles to World War II (New York, 1966), pp. 209-211, 226-228, 251-253.

⁶John F. Kennedy, Why England Slept (New York, 1961), xxi, xxii and passim. Margaret George, The Warped Vision (Pittsburgh, 1965), pp. 39-55. A.L. Rowse, Appeasement (New York, 1961), pp. 14-15, 116-117. Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948), pp. 71-77, 119-123, 141-142, 340-346.

unrealistic expectations about resolving Hitler's later demands through negotiations. Misperceptions of the international environment and domestic considerations reinforced one another to jointly account for the belated shift in British policy from appeasement to rearmament and the use of force.⁷

Balance of Power Theory

The different historical interpretations of British appeasement provide the details for an empirical theoretical analysis. Theoretical analyses attempt to explain historical events by explicitly subsuming them under one or more general principles: historical analyses do not usually explicitly attempt this task.⁸ Both the occurrence of World War II and British appeasement policy toward Germany are susceptible to

⁷This synthesis is most systematically expressed by George Lanyi, "British Foreign Policy Revisited: The Domestic Sources of Appeasement," a paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Meeting (Los Angeles, California, 1970).

⁸This distinction follows Ernst Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York, 1961), pp. 550-551.... "There is an important asymmetry between theoretical (or "generalizing") science and history. A theoretical discipline like physics seeks to establish both general and singular statements, and in order to do so physicists employ previously assumed statements of both types. Historians, on the other hand, aim to assert warranted singular statements about the occurrence and the interrelations of specific actions and other particular occurrences. However, although this task can be achieved only by assuming and using general laws, historians do not regard it as part of their aim to establish such laws." Underlining Nagel's.

This classification is based upon types of explanations, and implies that anyone who constructs theoretical explanations is a theorist while anyone who does not is a historian. Actually, some people who consider themselves historians do construct theoretical explanations and vice versa. Two examples of theoretical explanations by diplomatic historians are Edward Robert Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905 (Berkeley, 1965). James Rosenau, "The Games IR Scholars Play," Journal of International Affairs XXI (1967), 293-303, reviews the merits of these alternative styles of analysis within the discipline of political science.

analysis by the principles of balance of power theory. Balance of power theory is empirical in its treatment of international politics but normative in its analysis of foreign policy.⁹ The theory's empirical propositions describe international politics as a struggle for the protection or achievement of national interests by sovereign states. An increase in one state's military capabilities by armament, conquest, or alliances usually elicits corresponding increases in the capabilities of other states. If all states behave this way, wars are infrequent because no one state or group of states possesses the capabilities necessary to insure victory in a military conflict. The theory's normative principles of foreign policy specify first that individual states should not permit other states to change significantly the distribution of military capabilities, and second that a state should not go to war unless it possesses the military capabilities necessary to win.

William J. Newman's book, The Balance of Power in the Interwar Years, 1919-1939, clearly reflects the normative foundations of balance of power theory. Newman suggests four possible explanations for the occurrence of World War II and the British failure to follow balance of power principles.¹⁰

First, the principles of the balance of power may not have been understood or properly applied....(Second)....The principles of the balance may be inadequate to meet the really significant problems of aggression and expansion...(Third)....the specific historical circumstances of this period and especially of the 1930's made it impossible for the principles to be applied effectively. Specifically,...Hitler was such a special phenomenon

⁹The most comprehensive explication of balance of power theory appears in Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York, 1962); a shorter treatment is Ernst Haas, "The Balance of Power: Policy, Prescription or Propaganda," World Politics, V (July, 1953), 442-77.

¹⁰William Newman, The Balance of Power in the Interwar Years, 1919-1939 (New York, 1968), pp. 15-19.

that none of the normal rules of international relations would hold and that therefore none of the normal restraints of power or control could have prevented him from starting a world war.... (Fourth)....the failure in the 1930's was a manifestation and climax of a long-term historical trend of decline and decay of the whole system of the balance....World Wars I and II, from this point of view become part of the same evolution and have basically similar causes.

Newman accepts the first explanation as the most adequate one, while simultaneously admitting that "...aspects of the system changed during the 1930's in ways significant enough to warrant the use of the term 'watershed' for the cumulative effects of these changes on the balance of power."¹¹ Although the British did not correctly apply the balance of power strategy, there were extenuating circumstances. Hitler was a high risktaker who could not be restrained by the normal application of balance of power principles. The correct application of balance of power principles against an expanding state led by a risktaker required changes in the mix of coercion and negotiation, changes in the timing associated with the application of countervailing power against the expanding state, and changes in the role of the holder of the balance. As holders of the balance between France and Germany, the British failed to realize that a clear preponderance of power against Germany and the early use of coercion in response to minimal German attempts to overthrow the balance were necessary to deter a risktaker like Hitler and thereby limit German expansion.¹²

Newman's theoretical analysis does not contradict the historical interpretations elaborated earlier. His prescriptions simply state the steps that the British elite should have taken to avoid World War II -- if they had not been hampered by domestic considerations or if they had

¹¹Ibid., p. 38.

¹²Ibid., pp. 38-43.

correctly perceived Hitler as a risktaker. Together, the historical analyses and balance of power theory give plausible answers to questions that are significant for the 1930's period: Why did World War II occur: What should have been done to prevent its occurrence? Newman has also extrapolated lessons from the British experience with Hitler, which are intended to have significance for contemporary policy makers. He notes, "What might be called the Munich Syndrome...has become a model of what should not be done and of a particular type of foreign policy situation that is assumed to be true of international relations since Hitler."¹³ Evidence of the existence of the Munich Syndrome among contemporary policy makers appears, for example, in the writings of Truman and Churchill.

I recalled (at the outbreak of the Korean War) some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to go ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier....If this was to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second World war.--
Truman¹⁴

If we add the United States to Britain and France; if we change the name of the potential aggressor; if we substitute the United Nations Organization for the League of Nations, the Atlantic Ocean for the English Channel, and the world for Europe, the argument is not necessarily without its application today.--
Churchill¹⁵

The argument to which Churchill refers is the lesson that appeasement is not a viable foreign policy in a conflict situation between democracies and revolutionary dictatorships--a belief shared by many

¹³Ibid., pp. 34-35

¹⁴Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II (Garden City, 1956), p. 333.

¹⁵Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948), p. 211.

contemporary academicians as well as policy makers.¹⁶

The victims of the Munich Syndrome share several major premises. First, they assume that Hitler's Germany was easily recognizable as the principal foreign policy problem that faced the British, even if the precise nature of the problem was initially unclear. Second, they maintain that British decision makers could have and should have devoted most of their time to the German Question. Third, they attribute the failure to solve the German riddle to domestic distractions, inexperience in dealing with revolutionaries, or the limited nature of the German challenge in its outward appearances. These premises are incomplete, however, as still another analyst has noted:

Only close reading of several years of Cabinet papers can give one an accurate impression of how...various foreign policy problems crowded the policy makers and how they did not permit them to concentrate on the German danger, certainly not before the Spring of 1938. Only a few men, who were on the periphery of the elite, foremost among them Winston Churchill, were able to look at all foreign policies, certainly after 1935, from the point of view of the one, chief and main danger: the German challenge....This singleminded outlook was almost impossible to sustain for those whose daily business demanded a highly fragmented attention to a variety of foreign policies. That, one must conclude, is the inescapable destiny of any extensively committed, global power.¹⁷

If Lanyi's assertions are accurate, then historical and theoretical analyses that concentrate primarily upon British domestic considerations

¹⁶ See, for example, Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Garden City, 1957), Chapter IV, especially pp. 43-49, 58-64, and John Spanier, World Politics in an Age of Revolution (New York, 1967), Chapter III, especially pp. 69-76, 97-105. Two analysts who examine the difficulties of drawing such lessons from history are Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1961), pp. 63-72, and John Herz, "The Relevancy and Irrelevancy of Appeasement," Social Research, XXXI (1964), 296-320.

¹⁷ Lanyi, op.cit., p. 20. (Underlining Lanyi's).

and Anglo-German relations are parochial oversimplifications and may suggest misleading foreign policy prescriptions. A global examination of British foreign policy, therefore, seems desirable.

Systems Theory

International systems theory provides the conceptual framework necessary to achieve a theoretical perspective that is global in scope. Singer and Deutsch offer a systems theory that explains the intensity of conflict behavior and its potential for escalation.¹⁸ Its principles are more complex than the ones that constitute balance of power theory, although both theories focus upon features of the international situation and exclude domestic conditions. Figure 1 summarizes the systems theory model.




Figure 1. A Model of International Conflict Behavior
Based Upon Systems Theory

The solid arrows (→) in Figure 1 indicate that if there are several

¹⁸Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," World Politics, XVI (April, 1964), 390-407. The version of Singer and Deutsch's model that follows does not conform strictly to their original formulation, but its resemblance is close enough for them to share the credit for its strengths; I am willing to retain sole responsibility for its weaknesses.

members of the system and each of them interacts with the others, then these structural characteristics are likely to generate simultaneous involvement in several conflicts, creating cross-pressures and lowering the level of military capabilities available for each conflict. These conditions will tend to restrain conflict behavior, making the international system stable as the broken arrows (--->) in Figure 1 suggest.¹⁹ Stability, according to Singer and Deutsch, exists when the following conditions are met:²⁰

From the broader, or systemic, point of view, we shall define stability as the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur. And from the more limited perspective of the individual nations, stability would refer to the probability of their continued political independence and territorial integrity without any significant probability of becoming engaged in a "war for survival."

The two major criteria in this definition of stability are the intensity of conflict and the continued existence of the members. The model in Figure 1 states that these two characteristics are interdependent: the conditions created by a high number of members restrain the level of conflict; so long as international conflict remains limited the continued existence of the members is likely. These hypothesized relationships, in turn, correspond to what Kaplan calls, "A brief and nontechnical

¹⁹ An important underlying assumption of the model is that the interacting independent members are roughly equal in military capabilities. If this assumption does not hold, it is possible to imagine situations in which a strong member simultaneously confronts another strong nation and a weak member, or two weak members. Under these conditions cross-pressures on the strong member might be weak or non-existent, and the military capabilities may remain sufficiently high for military behavior toward both opponents.

²⁰ Singer and Deutsch, op.cit., pp. 390-391.

description of the objectives of systems analysis...the study of a set of interrelated variables...and of the ways in which this set is maintained....This definition emphasizes the articulation of the system and of its components and the behaviors by means of which it maintains itself over time."²¹

The proposition that the over-all stability of the international system is a function of its structure lies beyond the scope of inquiry for this study. However, the hypothesis that the system's structure influences the conflict behavior of its members does appear to be relevant. The British were members of a large set of independent nations and had a high number of interaction opportunities. They were simultaneously involved in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East where they interacted with several major powers, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the United States, plus the less powerful nations in each area. Among the Great Powers Germany, Italy, and Japan were the principal targets of British conflict behavior between 1931 and 1941. To what extent did the structural features of the international system and Britain's position in the system influence British conflict behavior toward these three nations? If Britain's behavior corresponds to the systems theory in Figure 1, then British policy makers (a) should very frequently have experienced cross-pressures; (b) the existence of cross-pressures should have co-occurred with low military capabilities; (c) these conditions should have correlated with low levels of conflict behavior and incremental changes in conflict behavior over time.

²¹Morton Kaplan, "Systems Theory," in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York, 1967), p. 150. Underlining mine.

Decision-Making Theories

The systems theory above is more elaborate than classical balance of power theory, but it may still be too simple as a valid empirical explanation of British foreign policy. Individual decision makers are often explicitly goal-oriented in their behavior and selective in their perceptions. To protect or achieve high-priority goals they may intensify their conflict behavior and ignore the existence of cross-pressures and low military capabilities. As Figure 2 illustrates, these latter variables plus the diplomatic stakes may each independently affect British conflict behavior.




Figure 2. A Model of Conflict Behavior Based upon Decision-Making Theories

There is ample justification for advancing these bivariate relationships as mini-theories of conflict behavior. Each one reflects a prominent theme in the literature on decision making. The cross-pressures hypothesis appears as a theory in the literature on voting behavior, interest groups, and international politics.²² Its most general formulation states that conflicting influences upon a decision maker may be a function of the differing positions that he takes on various issues or flow from the different social strata and social groups to which he belongs. Whether

²²Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, 1954), pp. 157-164; Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, 1963), pp. 211-226; David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York, 1951), pp. 157-167, 332-343; Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations (New York, 1967), pp. 5-10.

or not he is directly conscious of the conflict, "The essential element is the pull from two sides, felt or latent." In all formulations of the theory, the "conflicting pull" aspect is related causally to the dependent variable, the decision. Research based upon the cross-pressures model shows that the decision maker under cross-pressures limits his behavior to low levels of activity until or unless a third force resolves the restraints upon his behavior by either permitting or compelling him to increase the intensity of his activity.²³

The diplomatic stakes hypothesis stems from the national interests theory, which distinguishes between two types of foreign policy goals: vital interests and secondary interests. Vital interests are those goals that directly affect the nation's survival, while secondary interests are goals not so important to national survival. Critics of the national interests theory argue that this distinction is very vague and therefore of limited use for empirical theory-construction. The principal justification for distinguishing types of interests is that a nation in a conflict situation will presumably fight for vital interests but not for secondary interests.²⁴ National interests theorists often refer to the

²³ This general formulation is from Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York, 1964); for an inventory of research findings from different disciplines using this model see pp. 425-426, 434, 557-558, 575-584, 620 of their book.

²⁴ Defenders of the national interest concept include Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Third Edition (New York, 1961), pp. 8-9, 562; Hartmann, op.cit., Chapters 1, 4, 13; Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York, 1957), Chapter 8. Its critics include Robert Tucker, "Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political Realism," American Political Science Review, XLVI (March, 1952), 214-224; Tucker's review of Hartmann's book, "The Study of International Politics," World Politics, X (July, 1958), 699-747; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, 1962), Chapter 10. A recent attempt to use the national interests concept for systematic analysis is Thomas Robinson, "A National Interests Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations," International Studies Quarterly, XI (June, 1967), 135-175.

territorial integrity and independence of the nation as vital interests.²⁵ Beyond these examples the consensus regarding what constitutes vital national interests weakens among foreign policy analysts. However, Arnold Wolfers has developed a typology of foreign policy goals with sufficient empirical content to distinguish between vital and secondary interests.

One can distinguish goals pertaining, respectively, to national possessions and to the shape of the environment in which the nation operates. I call the former "possession goals," the latter "Milieu goals." In directing its foreign policy toward the attainment of its possession goals, a nation is aiming at the enhancement or the preservation of one or more things to which it attaches value. The aim may apply to such values as a stretch of territory, membership in the Security Council of the United Nations, or tariff preferences. Here a nation finds itself competing with others for a share in values of limited supply; it is demanding that its share be left intact or increased....Milieu goals are of a different character. Nations pursuing them are not out to defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of others but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond their boundaries....Milieu goals often may turn out to be nothing but a means or a way station toward some possession goal.²⁶

The equation of possession goals with vital interests and milieu goals with secondary interests reduces the ambiguity of the national interests theory and poses the hypothesis that the British are more likely to fight for their own possessions than someone else's.

Foreign policy theorists continue to debate the importance of national power as an explanatory variable for international conflict. The debates are multidimensional in that they deal with power as a goal of policy, power as an instrument of policy, the distribution of power as a

²⁵Hartmann, *ibid.*, p. 76, Morgenthau, *ibid.*, p. 562, and Wolfers, *ibid.*, pp. 154-155. The terms territorial integrity and independence connote the preservation of the nation's cultural identity, or "way of life," as well as the retention of its physical and political identity, i.e., its boundaries and a government.

²⁶Wolfers, *ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

problem for policy makers, and the ambiguity of power--both as a term and as a measurable phenomenon.²⁷ Nuclear weapons strategists, for example, focus upon one image of power, military capabilities. They construct military strategies based upon the concept of deterrence, emphasizing the use of military capabilities to deter an opponent from attacking in a conflict situation.²⁸ This emphasis is not new; balance of power theorists habitually note this feature in their analyses of international politics and foreign policy. This common theme from the classical balance of power literature and the contemporary works on nuclear weapons suggests the power politics hypothesis that decision makers are more likely to fight if their relative military capabilities are high rather than low.

The cross-pressures, national interests, and power politics theories imply a fourth theory, the cumulative effects principle. It attempts to explain conflict behavior for international situations where the first three theories either completely or partly reinforce one another as, for example, when cross-pressures exist and diplomatic stakes and relative capabilities are low, or when diplomatic stakes are high but cross-pressures exist and military capabilities are low. The latter situation

²⁷ See Claude, op.cit., and Haas, op.cit., for the use of power in the balance of power literature. Two interesting attempts to conceptualize and measure power, respectively, are Charles McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York, 1966), Chapter 3, and David Wilkinson, Comparative Foreign Relations: Framework and Methods (Belmont, 1969), Chapter 3.

²⁸ The literature on nuclear strategy is vast. The four books that have probably had the most impact upon academic thinking are Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, 1961); Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Garden City, 1958); Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, 1959); and Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York, 1963).

is more complex than the former, in which all three decision-making theories hypothesize the same behavior. The cumulative effects theory assumes that the relative potencies of its component principles are equal and hypothesizes that the greater the number of international restraints, the more likely is low conflict behavior. Consequently, if two (or all three) decision-making theories predict low conflict behavior, it will be more likely to occur than when two (or all three) decision-making theories predict high conflict behavior.

Summary

Systems theory and the mini-theories of decision making offer several explanations of British foreign policy decisions toward Germany, Italy, and Japan between 1931 and 1941. A basic distinction between systems theory and the mini-theories is that one of the latter, national interests theory, incorporates goals as explanatory variables; systems theory synthesizes the cross-pressures and power politics theories but excludes goals as determinants of conflict behavior. Although these theories include the same types of variables, they differ in the causal relationships that they propose as links between the features of the international situation and British conflict behavior. Systems theory hypothesizes a developmental chain of bivariate relationships, while the mini-theories postulate several bivariate relationships that show different causal variables independently affecting a common dependent variable. The actual relationships, if any, between these hypothetical determinants and British policy may resemble either of these causal patterns, or may approximate a hybrid version. Figure 3 illustrates the hybrid possibility and reproduces the developmental and additive types from Figures 1 and 2; the propositions that articulate the models also

appear in Figure 3.

The theories of conflict behavior in Figure 3 do not explicitly identify the decision maker who is the subject of each theory. It is possible to conceptualize the decision maker in each case as an individual, a group, or a nation. This study focuses upon the individual as the unit of analysis--a selection that implies a preferred solution to the "level-of-analysis problem in international relations," raised by


²⁹
J. David Singer:

In the vernacular of general systems theory, the observer is always confronted with a system, its subsystems, and their respective environments, and while he may choose as his system (i.e., as his unit or level of analysis) any cluster of phenomena from the most minute organism to the universe itself, such choice cannot be merely a function of whim or caprice, habit or familiarity....The responsible scholar must be prepared to evaluate the relative utility--conceptual and methodological--of the various alternatives open to him, and to appraise the manifold implications of the level of analysis finally selected. So it is with international relations.

International conflict is a theoretical problem that is amenable to analysis at several levels, but the results of conflict research based upon aggregate units, especially the nation-state, have not been particularly productive.³⁰ Conceptually, the individual appears to be a logical and desirable alternative level of analysis, because the unsatisfactory findings at other levels "can be interpreted as indicating the potential relevance of psychological variables in the explanation

²⁹J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International System (Princeton, 1961), pp. 77-78.

³⁰Richard A. Brody, "The Study of International Relations qua Science: the Emphasis Upon Methods and Techniques," in Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, 1969), p. 120.



a. Systems Hypotheses.

1a. The greater the number of members in the system, the greater the number of interaction opportunities and the more likely a member will become involved in several conflicts that will generate cross-pressures.

2a. The greater the number of conflicts that involve a particular member and create

b. Decision-Making Hypotheses.

1b. If cross-pressures exist, then the decision maker's conflict behavior is likely to be low in intensity and change incrementally over time

2b. If relative capabilities are low, then the decision maker's conflict behavior is likely to be low in intensity and change incrementally over time.

3b. If the diplomatic stakes are low (secondary interests), then the decision maker's conflict

c. Hybrid Hypotheses.

1c. All of the hypotheses from the systems model plus hypotheses 3b from the decision-making models (and possibly 1b as well) apply to the hybrid model.

- a. Systems Hypotheses.
- cross-pressures, the lower his available military capabilities for a particular conflict.
- 3a. The lower the member's capabilities, the less likely his conflict behavior will be intense and change radically over time.
- b. Decision-Making Hypotheses.
- behavior is likely to be low in intensity and change incrementally over time.
- 4b. The greater the number of international restraints, the more likely a decision maker's conflict behavior will be low in intensity and change incrementally over time.
- c. Hybrid Hypotheses.

Figure 3. Alternative Models of British Conflict Behavior

of international conflict."³¹ Methodologically, the utility of the individual level of analysis depends upon the researcher's ability to measure individual characteristics of theoretical interest. Because there are several problems associated with this task, it is legitimate to ask if it is worth the effort to solve them. By identifying such problems and outlining solutions, the next chapter argues in favor of the individual level of analysis for the British cases. Finally, in accord with Singer's prescriptions for responsible scholarship, the concluding chapter explicitly appraises the general utility of the individual level of analysis for the construction of international relations theory.

CHAPTER II

THE MEASUREMENT OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

In order to decide which propositions from systems theory and the decision-making theories empirically explain British conflict behavior, it is necessary to shift from the language of theory to the language of research.¹ The preceding discussion of systems theory and the decision-making theories excluded criteria that indicated who were the British decision makers, what constituted high and low levels of conflict behavior, and when British policy changed incrementally or radically. Nor were the empirical referents for the values of the different independent variables specified. Finally, the analytical procedures for fitting these observations to the different models were omitted. All of these problems need to be solved as part of the transition from the language of theory to the language of research.

The sources of research data for this study are the perceptions of British decision makers as reflected in government documents, personal

¹Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research (Chapel Hill, 1964), pp. 5-6. Blalock takes "the commonly accepted position that science contains two distinct languages or ways of defining concepts...One thinks in terms of a theoretical language that contains notions such as causes, forces, systems, and properties. But one's tests are made in terms of covariations, operations, and pointer readings....There appears to be no purely logical way of bridging the gap between these languages. Concepts in the one language are associated with those in the other merely by convention or agreement among scientists." Underlining Blalock's.

memoirs, and the historical works based upon them. The selection of these data sources implies a choice between the individuals-as-actors approach and the states-as-actors approach to foreign policy analysis. As the principal advocates of the individuals-as-actors approach point out:²

It is...one of our basic choices to take as our prime analytical objective the re-creation of the "world" of the decision makers as they view it. The manner in which they define situations becomes another way of saying how the state oriented to action and why. This is a quite different approach from trying to recreate the situation and interpretation of it objectively, that is by the observer's judgment rather than that of the actors themselves.

The states-as-actors approach, on the other hand, assumes that a decision maker's "definition of the situation" corresponds to its objective structure. This assumption permits states-as-actors analysts to focus upon the decision maker's environment as the data source and avoid the problem of identifying the British decision maker for a particular decision. Our selection of perceptions as a data source, therefore, raises the problem of identifying the "real" British decision makers in order to analyze the appropriate perceptions.

Identifying British Decision Makers

Decision making can be considered as a unified whole or separated into its components and viewed as a process.³ The focus upon decision making as a unified whole carries with it the risk of making certain

² Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York, 1962), p. 65. Underlining Snyder's. Comparison of these two approaches is the subject of Wolfers, op.cit., Chapter 1.

³ Ibid., pp. 90-91.

assumptions:⁴

Whenever writers on international politics get down to discussing the behavior of decision-makers usually one⁵ of five kinds of treatment results: (1) the same values and perspectives are assigned to all officials; (2) motivation is assumed to consist of a single drive; (3) the decision-makers' actions are regarded as determined by "conditions" and "resources"; (4) simple descriptions are made on a very low level of generalization; and (5) diplomats are often portrayed as isolated from any governmental organization.

Decision making viewed as a process, on the other hand, becomes a sequence of activities in which many small decisions by several individuals result in an organizational decision. From this perspective it is possible to strip the decision of motives and view it as the output of a quasi-mechanical organizational process or the outcome of a series of bargaining moves by bureaucrats and politicians. In either case the decision is no longer analyzed as a choice by an individual decision maker to protect or achieve certain ends; it becomes instead a product of interactions by a group, which may make it unintelligible from an ends/means perspective.⁶

The problems which these points raise for the investigation of British foreign policy are important. If British decisions toward Germany, Italy, and Japan are products rather than choices, then the measurement of British decisions involves either collecting data on the perceptions of several individuals in the British government⁷ or perhaps eliminating

⁴Ibid., p. 90.

⁵These treatments are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

⁶Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," APSR, LXIII (September, 1969), 689-691.

⁷For a discussion of this option, see Ole R. Holsti, "Individual Differences in 'Definition of the Situation'," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIV (September, 1970), 303-310.

perceptions as relevant data altogether. The communications patterns within the British elite and the resources available to different bureaucrats and politicians may better explain the pattern of British decisions. Perhaps the "real" British decision makers are not government officials at all, but an extra-governmental "power elite" who decisively influence British foreign policy from their positions as important British citizens.⁸

It is possible to resolve these problems by making two important distinctions: distinctions among different phases of the decision-making process and distinctions among different decision makers. Snyder suggests that for any policy the "point of final decision" should be distinguished from other phases of the policy process.

The point of final decision is that stage in the sequence at which decision-makers having the authority choose a specific course of action to be implemented and assume or are assigned responsibility for it. At this point the decision becomes official and thus binding on all decision-makers whether they participated or not.⁹

The point of final decision usually follows "predecisional activities" such as bargaining, "weeding out of information, condensation of memoranda...

⁸The "power elite" thesis of C. Wright Mills is currently experiencing a renaissance among students of American politics. See, for example, G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles (New York, 1970), Chapter 5, for an analysis of "How the Power Elite Make (American) Foreign Policy." The best discussion of the British foreign policy elite is D.C. Watt's essay "The Nature of the Foreign Policy-Making Elite in Britain," Chapter 1 in his book, Personalities and Politics (Notre Dame, 1965). During the early 1930's the "Cliveden Set," a group of upper-class British influentials, did intermittently attempt to impose their views upon the British Government through their spokesman, Thomas Jones, a close friend of Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin. An account of their efforts to influence British policy during the Rhineland crisis is in Thomas Jones, Diary With Letters, 1931-1950 (New York, 1954), pp. 175-181.

⁹Snyder, op.cit., p. 91.

(that) all involve decisions which must be recognized as such by the observer."¹⁰ Decisions involving more than a symbolic gesture of assent or dissent also have an implementation phase that follows the point of final decision and usually involves several decisions as well. At each of these phases of the decision-making process the identity of the decision makers may vary.

Between 1931 and 1941 the identity of the British decision maker at the point of final decision depended upon the organizational processes of the British elite and the relative authority of different participants in the pre-decisional activities. During the inter-war period two communications networks processed information and handled British foreign policy decisions.¹¹ The British Foreign Office processed most of the information, and its officials made most of the decisions. Incoming information to the Foreign Office fell into three categories:

- (1) "Unimportant" messages for which a junior level member of a regional department made the final decision, sometimes after consultation with his immediate superiors or with officials at his level in other ministries.
- (2) "Important" messages which, accompanied by consultation with other ministries, passed along (with memos) to higher levels in the Foreign Office; these messages did not necessarily

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Lord Strang, The Foreign Office (London, 1955), pp. 154-156, describes the formal communications network, as does Donald G. Bishop, The Administration of British Foreign Relations (Binghamton, 1961), pp. 108-109. Gordon A. Craig, "The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919-1939, I (New York, 1965), pp. 15-48, contains useful information about the origins of the informal network. Both networks are elaborated in the following pages.

reach the Foreign Secretary before the point of final decision.

- (3) "Very important" messages which either proceeded (with consultations and memos) through channels to the Foreign Secretary/Cabinet level or if "urgent" as well as "very important," went directly to the Foreign Secretary's desk.

The great majority of British policy choices were responses to "unimportant" or "important" messages and reached the point of final decision within the Foreign Office bureaucracy; the more multi-faceted the decision in its implications, however, the more likely that horizontal consultation occurred at various levels between Foreign Office officials and other ministries during the pre-decisional activities.¹²

The other communications network for British foreign policy combined the "very important" and "urgent" message channels of the Foreign Office with semi-official correspondence, plus conference and summit diplomacy. The face-to-face negotiations between chief executives at the Versailles Peace Conference set a precedent for continued conference and summit diplomacy during the interwar period, supplemented by semi-official correspondence between the chiefs and the appointment of representatives to carry their messages back and forth. These procedures often handled incoming messages from other capitals and transmitted outgoing decisions by the British Prime Minister and the Foreign

¹²Strang, *ibid.*, p. 156, estimates that 80 percent of the incoming messages are handled at the regional/functional department level without reference to higher authority within the Foreign Office; his estimate is not dated, but he served in the Foreign Office during the 1930's and accompanied Chamberlain to Munich in 1938.

Office staff.

Traditionally, the authority to conduct foreign relations belonged to the British monarch. With the evolution of parliamentary government in Britain the responsibility passed to the Cabinet, which became formally and collectively responsible for all Government policies. Since this transfer of power, the Prime Minister as coordinator of all Government policies and the Foreign Secretary as Chief minister of the Foreign Office have exercised the most authority at the point of final decision for very important foreign policy questions. Within the Cabinet the relationships of authority and influence between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have varied, ranging from a situation in which one man held both offices simultaneously or where one's views dominated the other's extensively, to situations where the two men either clashed bitterly or worked harmoniously on roughly equal terms. In the final analysis the Prime Minister can dominate the relationship if he chooses, since he selects the Foreign Secretary and the other principal officials in the Foreign Office and has access to all important Foreign Office documents and dispatches.¹⁴

¹³One example of this communications network in operation is the Anglo-American discussion between Chamberlain and Roosevelt in January, 1938, concerning an American proposal for a conference in Washington among Germany, France, Italy, Britain, and the United States to discuss current European problems; another is the Anglo-Italian talks in February, 1938, concerning British recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. In both cases Prime Minister Chamberlain sent and received messages without telling his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. These tactics alienated Eden, who resigned on February 20th. Full accounts of these incidents appear in John Connell, The "Office" (New York, 1958), pp. 258-274, and Eden, Dictators, op.cit., pp. 621-709. Chamberlain also used special emissaries to communicate with Hitler; his favorite choice was Sir Horace Wilson.

¹⁴Donald Bishop, The Administration of British Foreign Relations (Binghampton, 1961), pp. 69ff. gives an overview of this evolution and examples of different relationships between Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century the career diplomat appointed to the position of Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office has customarily operated as the link between the Cabinet members and the civil servants in the various sections of the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service.¹⁵ During and after World War I, however, the prestige and influence of the British diplomatic corps upon very important foreign policy decisions declined for a variety of reasons. This decline contrasted with an increase in the influence of two other groups, the news media and the Prime Minister's "inner circle" of personal friends inside and outside the government.¹⁶

The British patterns of communication and authority leading to the point of final decision, therefore, vary from decision to decision, but for very important and urgent decisions the perceptions of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are the ones most likely to reflect the international determinants of the policy choice. They occupy strategic positions at the top of the two communications networks and possess the authority to make the final decision. Whether their perceptions are the product of personal preconceptions, the influence of different advisors, or a first-hand knowledge of the international situation is not crucial. The decision maker's perception is an independent variable in this research and not a dependent variable. The primary objectives of

¹⁵Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 5-6.

¹⁶Discussion of these trends and their sources is in Gordon A. Craig, "The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain," Chapter 1 of Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919-1939, I (New York, 1965); Lord Vansittart, "The Decline of Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (1950), 177-188; Harold Nicholson, Diplomacy (New York, 1964), Chapters 3 and 4.

this analysis are to identify the decision maker at the point of final decision and relate his policy choices to his perceptions. For very important and urgent decisions the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are the key British decision makers.

Scaling the Dependent Variables

Since the theoretical orientation of this study is conflict behavior, very important and urgent British decisions in conflict situations are the ones that require systematic measurement. Conflicts between Britain and one or more of the Axis nations, Germany, Italy, and Japan, provide the British decisions for analysis. Their selection reflects two methodological assumptions: that British behavior toward this trio of nations generated a sufficient variety of decisions for meaningful theoretical analysis; and that British involvement with these countries in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East represented the global scope of British foreign policy during the 1930's. The list of conflict situations for this period includes the Manchurian conflict (1931), the Italo-Abyssinian conflict (1934), the German re-occupation of the Rhineland (1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936), the Sino-Japanese War (1937), the Austrian Anschluss (1938), the Sudetenland conflict (1938), the German intervention in Czechoslovakia (1939), the Italian occupation of Albania (1939), the German invasion of Poland (1939), and the Japanese encroachment in Indo-China (1940).

In these conflicts British decision makers could choose military or non-military behavior to protect British diplomatic stakes; within these two broad categories British policy could be essentially symbolic or involve physical actions of one kind or another. These distinctions combine to make a typology of four policy choices: symbolic non-military,

actual non-military, symbolic military, and actual military behavior. Examples of behaviors that fall within each category include a diplomatic protest (symbolic non-military); withdrawing diplomatic or economic relations (actual non-military); an ultimatum threatening the use of force (symbolic military); and sustained use of military force (actual military). Finally, it seems empirically justifiable to distinguish a fifth category, quasi-military behavior, such as a demonstration of military force, mobilization, or a border clash that is not sustained; this type of behavior appears to differ significantly from both the purely symbolic threat of force and its sustained, actual use. In Figure 4 these five categories form a conflict behavior scale to measure British involvement in a conflict situation.




Figure 4. Different Cutpoints for the Conflict Behavior Scale That Measures British Involvement in Conflict Situations

This scale dichotomizes conflict behavior into high and low values. There are several additional cutpoints in order to make any theoretical generalizations from the scale as specific as possible. For example, if British decision makers under cross-pressures do tend to select low conflict policies, the additional cutpoints help determine more precisely in what sense the British select a low policy: a low (non-military) policy, a low (symbolic non-military) policy, or a low (actual non-military) policy. The conflict scale's additional cutpoints also measure the degree of change in British conflict behavior over time. British policy either changes incrementally (low) or radically (high), depending upon whether it shifts one position

(incremental change) or two positions (radical change) on the scale.

To operate the scale it is necessary to establish which observations of British behavior fall into the different positions. The terminology in Figure 4 indicates the broad criteria for fitting observations into scale categories. These criteria are crude in that they do not permit systematic ranking of different British behaviors within each category. For example, there appears to be a difference of intensity between a carefully worded, polite expression of concern and a bluntly worded grave expression of concern, but both diplomatic notes fall into the symbolic non-military category. Furthermore, the methodology of scaling can assume more complex forms; it is possible to use scaling techniques that differentiate and rank such items.¹⁷ From this perspective the cutpoints question discussed above changes from the problem of narrowing broad categories to the opposite one of grouping data into broad categories.

The rationale for using broad categories rests upon both pragmatic and theoretical considerations. First, as a practical matter a single analyst can operate a broad scale without resorting to the validation procedures necessary to operate a refined scale. The Q-sort and pair-comparison scaling methods, for example, require panels of expert judges to rank subtle types of behavior; the intersubjective consensus of these panels determines the final ranking of the behaviors.¹⁸ Such validation procedures are beyond the scope of the resources available

¹⁷Robert North, Content Analysis (Evanston, 1963), Chapters 4 and 5, discuss two such techniques, the Q-Sort and Pair Comparison methods.

¹⁸Ibid.

for this study. Second, from a theoretical perspective there would appear to be more doubt about the comparability of items from a re-fined scale than from a crude one. The context in which an item occurs as a historical act may vary and is not always identical to the context that a panel of judges imagines in order to rank the item. To the extent that this criticism is justified, the cruder, broader scale is more likely to be valid for analyzing historical data.¹⁹

The broad criteria for scaling British conflict behavior, therefore, are as follows:²⁰

- | | |
|-------|---|
| s/n-m | 1) Symbolic non-military behavior is a verbal statement unaccompanied by higher activity, proposed or actual, violent or non-violent. |
| a/n-m | 2) Actual non-military behavior is an activity that is more than verbal, either proposed or actual, but which is non-violent. |
| s/m | 3) Symbolic military behavior is a verbal statement that proposes the use of military force. |
| q/m | 4) Quasi-military behavior is the deployment of |

¹⁹ Robert Jervis, "The Costs of the Quantitative Study of International Relations," Chapter 10 in Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, 1969), discusses this problem with respect to North's research on the 1914 crisis; North's rejoinder also appears in this volume. An extended discussion of the theoretical and strategic implications of this question is the concern of Jervis's own major work, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, 1970), especially Chapters 2, 6 and 7.

²⁰ The military/non-military and symbolic/actual dichotomies below are essentially identical to the violent/non-violent and bid/commission dichotomies labeled by North as encompassing the "four broad categories of action," which a decision maker may choose in pursuing goals and which...may also be viewed (sic)---and measured---by the investigator as 'objective' behavior." The term objective refers to the high consensus among foreign policy analysts and decision makers that these behaviors are easily distinguishable and have the same meaning to both analysts and decision makers, i.e., they form a continuum of conflict behavior according to the positions assigned to them in Figure 4. North, Content Analysis, op.cit., Appendix A, pp. 152-154.

military forces without a complete commitment to their use.

- a/m 5) Actual military behavior is the sustained use of military force.

Even the operation of such broad scale categories creates problems for the analyst. Two that appear in this study are the problem of multidimensionality and the problem of distinguishing symbolic from actual behavior.

The first problem, multidimensionality, arises because of the variety of foreign policy options open to decision makers in conflict situations. Decision makers can adopt different degrees of either conciliatory or hostile behavior during a particular conflict, but the conflict behavior scale above does not necessarily distinguish between these two dimensions of conflict behavior. In the symbolic and actual non-military categories the problem is most conspicuous. Here diplomatic protests (hostile behavior) and offers to negotiate (conciliatory behavior) scale indiscriminately as symbolic non-military behavior, while economic sanctions (hostile behavior) and efforts to mediate (conciliatory behavior) both appear as actual non-military behavior.

It is permissible to lump such opposites only if the objectives of the research make the distinction between them irrelevant or the distinctions themselves appear to be intrinsically unimportant. The latter contingency generally applies to the British cases, a situation that also illustrates the scaling problem involving the comparability of historical acts mentioned in an earlier paragraph. British offers to negotiate with Germany, Italy, and Japan often occurred under duress, or at least when the British thought themselves to be on the defensive; their offers were not only conciliatory moves but also attempts to buy

time or minimize their losses. British decisions to mediate occurred during conflicts between strong nations and weak nations, which meant that British intervention defended the smaller nation from a settlement dictated by the larger one--something that British decision makers realized. Under these circumstances attempts to negotiate and mediate are really subtle forms of opposition rather than conciliation. Under other historical conditions, however, these same behaviors might be genuinely conciliatory.²¹

The second problem differentiating between symbolic and actual behavior, occurs at both ends of the scale. At the non-military end the decision to mediate is not clearly different from a policy of supporting negotiations that may be already taking place. In both instances verbal forms of conflict behavior occur. However, in view of the historical circumstances mentioned above in connection with British decisions to mediate, such decisions appear to be similar to actual non-military behavior in reflecting the level of British involvement in a conflict. Consequently, British offers to mediate and mediation itself both scale as actual non-military behavior in this study.²² At the military end of the continuum it is questionable

²¹Treatment of these problems from a wide frame of reference, in addition to the works by Jervis, op.cit., include Stanley Hoffmann, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," World Politics, XI (April, 1959), 345-377; Hayward Alker, Jr., "The Long Road to International Relations Theory: Problems of Statistical Non-Additivity," World Politics, XVIII (July, 1966), 623-655; John Mueller (ed.), Approaches to Measurement in International Relations (New York, 1969), pp. 217-225.

²²On the other hand, British offers to negotiate and British negotiations are not readily distinguishable from other symbolic behavior, since in this situation, Britain is directly involved in the conflict itself rather than indirectly as a third party, as is the case in mediation. Therefore, negotiations and offers to negotiate are both scaled as symbolic non-military behaviors.

whether quasi-military acts are closer to symbolic or actual military behavior. Do such acts manifest a real increase in the commitment to fight or merely dramatize a commitment already made at the symbolic level? The decision to deploy troops, planes, or ships appears to alter significantly the conditions of the conflict situation and the perceptions of the conflict by decision makers. The decision maker who performs such an act generally looks upon it as a significant increase in his level of involvement; analysts interpret it this way and so do policy makers. Even if its intent is merely to dramatize a previous verbal commitment, its impact seems to justify combining the quasi-military and actual military categories for the statistical analysis in later chapters.²³

One other important methodological problem regarding the dependent variable is how to decide when a new foreign policy decision occurs. For example, does a new decision happen when a new decision maker reaffirms an old policy? Does one occur when British policy continues unchanged after another government changes its policy? The answers to such questions are somewhat arbitrary and therefore should be made explicit. A new foreign policy decision occurs regarding a given diplomatic stake when one or more of the following events take place:

- a) British conflict behavior changes from one scale type to another.
- b) Another government's policy changes scale types toward

²³Support for this decision, based upon the folk axiom, "Actions speak louder than words," appears in Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York, 1963), pp. 119-162; Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy (New York, 1956), Chapters 7 and 10. Jervis, The Logic of Images, op.cit., also offers qualified support for this position.

the British or toward other actors involved in the conflict, and British behavior either changes or remains the same.

- c) The identity of the British key decision maker changes, and British behavior either changes or remains the same.
- d) The identity of a target's decision maker changes, and British behavior either changes or remains the same.
- e) If the British pursue a multiple policy toward the same diplomatic stakes, such as employing economic sanctions or mobilizing troops while simultaneously negotiating, the policy choice that scales highest is ordinarily considered to be the "real" British policy.

Lastly, the relationship between British conflict behavior and the British decision-making process needs elaboration. The decision to adopt one of the five broad categories of conflict behavior or to change from one type to another is almost certain to be a "very important" decision, i.e., one made by either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary. Some nuances in the formulation of the policy and its implementation may not be the tasks of these officials, but the final key decision to select, continue, or change one of these broad courses of action falls within the realm of grand strategy and the establishment of policy guidelines. In the British political system these latter tasks are Cabinet-level functions, customarily performed by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.²⁵ Consequently, the explanation

²⁴The most famous exception to this rule is the Hoare-Laval Plan, which temporarily undermined the League of Nations policy of economic sanctions toward Italy during the Italo-Abyssinian conflict.

²⁵This generalization holds true for the 1930's. For a description of Cabinet operations during this period, see Hans Daalder, Cabinet Reform in Britain, 1914-1963 (Stanford, 1963), pp. 66-86; Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government, Third Edition (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 241, 306-313.

for policy choices of this magnitude lies in an analysis of the perceptions of these two officials.

Scaling the Independent Variables

The perceptions of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary contain the calculations that act as reasons for choosing a particular foreign policy. Part II of this study presents the reasoning associated with eighty-five British decisions in the 1930's and, for complexly reasoned choices, ranks the reasons by their relative influence upon policy selection.²⁶ These reasons come from British documents and private papers written at the time of the decision, and from memoirs and secondary sources that have appeared since then. Where feasible, extensive quotations that contain the evidence for judging the type of reason and its rank appear in the text of Chapters III and IV. Whether supported by quotes or not, the sources for such judgments are footnoted. Finally, although the Prime Minister's and Foreign Secretary's calculations appear, the reasons offered by their supporters and opponents inside and outside the government are ignored on the grounds that the latter are not the "real" British decision makers.

Two steps are necessary to analyze the reasoning behind a particular foreign policy decision. First, the British diplomatic stakes must be identified and coded as either milieu or possession goals. Second, the primary reason or reasons associated with each decision must be classified as one of the following types.

- (cross-pressures) a) because of British involvement in another conflict with a different target, indicating cross-pressures are present.

²⁶International reasons only, and not domestic reasons, are ranked.

(cross-pressures/
relative capa-
bilities

ab) because of British military commitments in another conflict with a different target, which makes British capabilities insufficient (low) for exercising actual military behavior.

(relative
capabilities)

b) because of British military capabilities regarding this conflict or another conflict with the same target; the decision maker judges his military capabilities as either sufficient (high) or insufficient (low) for actual military behavior without reference to conflicts with other nations.

A foreign policy decision's rationale contains cross-pressures if the primary reasons for the policy include type a or if the primary reasons include type ab; in the latter case cross-pressures and relative capabilities combine to explain the decision. The relative capabilities variable also influences a decision if a primary reason for the policy is type b.

Figure 5 summarizes the observations necessary to scale a British foreign policy decision, including the measurement of both dependent and independent variables. The figure presents two hypothetical decisions, X and Y. Decision X is an actual non-military behavior and an incremental policy change (one scale type or less) from the preceding decision regarding the milieu goals at stake. The rationale for the decision reveals the presence of cross-pressures and indicates that the decision maker's perception of his relative capabilities is low. Decision Y, on the other hand, is an actual military behavior and involves a radical degree of policy change (two scale types or more) from the preceding decision concerning the possession goals at stake. The

<u>Dependent Variables</u>						<u>Independent Variables</u>							
<u>Policy Intensity</u>						<u>Policy Change</u>		<u>Dipl. Stakes</u>		<u>Cross-Press. Rel. Cap's.</u>			
<u>Decisions</u>	<u>s/n.m.</u>	<u>a/n.m.</u>	<u>s/m</u>	<u>q/m</u>	<u>a/m</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Poss.</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
X		X				X		X		X		X	
Y			Y				Y		Y		Y		Y

Figure 5. Pattern of Observations for Hypothetical Foreign Policy Decisions X and Y

rationale for this decision indicates the absence of cross-pressures and the existence of high relative military capabilities. Appendix I records these observations for the eighty-five real British decisions that constitute the cases for analysis. For some of these decisions the policy maker did not calculate military capabilities as either high or low. This absence suggests that two fundamental definitions of the conflict situation exist among the cases, non-military and military situations, distinguished by whether the decision maker considers military capabilities as relevant or not.

Analytical Procedures

It is possible to construct several other definitions of the situation from the independent variables in Figure 5, in addition to the ones defined for hypothetical decisions X and Y. Decision X is an example in which all the independent variables act as international restraints, while Decision Y exemplifies a situation where none of them restrain conflict behavior. Figure 6 contains the seven logically possible definitions of the international situation, arranged according to the type of situation and the number of international restraints. The diagonal arrow represents the cumulative effects theory: as the number of international restraints upon British conflict behavior decreases in both non-military and military situations, the more likely British conflict behavior will increase its intensity and degree of change. Non-military situations are presumably less prone to high conflict behavior than military situations. In the absence of military considerations the maximum number of international restraints for non-military situations is two (cross-pressures and milieu stakes); military situations may have three (cross-pressures, milieu stakes, and low capabilities).




Figure 6. Seven Alternative Definitions of the Situation and the Theoretical Direction of British Conflict Behavior

The cumulative effects hypothesis assumes that the potency of each independent variable is equal; the number of international restraints rather than their identity influences British behavior. This assumption is questionable. The causal relationships between conflict behavior and cross-pressures, relative capabilities, and diplomatic stakes, respectively, may vary in strength. Statistical tests of association can rank these relationships if they differ. Similarly, the hypotheses from systems theory, which state a developmental causal relationship for the independent variables, are susceptible to verification by statistical analysis. "Dummy variable" analysis, a form of regression analysis applicable to dichotomous variables, can test the direction and the strength of the causal hypotheses from systems

theory and the decision-making theories.²⁷ Dummy-variable analysis produces Pearson's r coefficients between pairs of variables, which indicate the degree of association between them. The value of r varies between -1 and $+1$. A high positive or a high negative value indicates a strong relationship between the variables, while a low positive or a low negative value indicates a weak relationship.²⁸

Two brief examples, based upon the cross-pressures and power politics theories, illustrate how the Pearson's r statistic interprets the possible relationships between pairs of variables. The power politics hypothesis associates low conflict behavior with low capabilities and high conflict behavior with high capabilities. A dummy variable statistical analysis of this pair of dichotomous variables would confirm the hypothesis if it produces a high positive Pearson's r . A high negative Pearson's r , on the other hand, would suggest that the counter-hypothesis is true, i.e., that low conflict behavior correlates with high capabilities and high conflict behavior correlates with low capabilities. Either a positive or a negative Pearson's r close to


²⁷An exposition of the logic behind "dummy variable" analysis is in Hayward Alker, Jr., Mathematics and Politics (New York, 1965), pp. 80-88; the technique of linear regression analysis is explained succinctly in William Buchanan, Understanding Political Variables (New York, 1969), pp. 257-265, 275-277, 281-287, and extensively in Hubert Blalock, Social Statistics (New York, 1960), pp. 273-301, 326-351.

²⁸Dummy variable analysis generates Pearson's r 's by assigning the value of 1 to a case where an attribute is present and 0 to a case where it is absent. Research examples that have used this technique for analyzing dichotomous variables include Masakatsu Kato, "A Model of U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation," in John E. Mueller (ed.), Approaches to Measurement in International Relations (New York, 1969), pp. 198-216, and Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of the Contest for the Presidency," APSR, LX (March, 1966), 19-28. According to Alker, ibid., p. 81, "Such a technique is as operational, reliable, and valid as the observer making the prior qualitative assessments."

zero would indicate almost no relationship between conflict behavior and military capabilities.

A comparison of the Pearson's r coefficient for the power politics hypothesis with the r coefficient for the cross-pressures hypothesis yields a preliminary evaluation of the relative potency of each hypothesis. For instance, if the power politics r -value is $+0.71$ and the cross-pressures r -value is $+0.45$, then there exists a stronger relationship between relative capabilities and conflict behavior than between cross-pressures and conflict behavior. Therefore, if one assumes that each of the independent variables in the hypotheses from decision-making theory independently affects British conflict behavior, a comparison of Pearson's r 's can indicate their relative potencies in explaining British policy. But there are other possible relationships among these variables. They may fit the systems theory hypotheses; they may only appear to be causally related; or they may be related in a fashion that is a hybrid of decision theory's additive causal model and system theory's developmental causal model. Pearsonian correlation analysis can also confirm or refute the existence of these more complex possibilities, according to the rules of causal analysis summarized in Figure 7.²⁹

²⁹These rules are adapted from Alker, "The Long Road to IR Theory," op.cit., pp. 645-653, and Alker, Mathematics and Politics, op.cit., pp. 119-126, and Blalock, Causal Inference, pp. 71-87. The use of partial correlation coefficients is also sometimes necessary in causal analysis; their use in Chapter V of this study is based upon Blalock, Causal Inferences, op.cit., pp. 65-87, and Hubert Blalock, "Four-Variable Causal Models and Partial Correlations," American Journal of Sociology, LXVIII (September, 1962), 182-194.



Causal Rules

<u>Additive Model</u>	<u>Developmental Model</u>	<u>Spurious (No Cause) Model</u>
NI If RC FP, then CP	If CP RC FP, then: $r_{CFPF} = (r_{CPRC}) * (r_{RCFP})$.	RC If CP , i.e., RC FP, then: FP
$r_{NICP} = 0$ $r_{NIFP} = 0$ $r_{NIRC} = 0$ $r_{RCFP} = 0$ $r_{CPRC} = 0$ $r_{CFPF} = 0$	If RC CP FP, then: $r_{RCFP} = (r_{RCCP}) * (r_{CFPF})$.	$r_{RCFP} = (r_{CFPF}) (r_{CPRC})$. CP If RC , i.e., CP FP, then: FP $r_{CFPF} = (r_{RCFP}) (r_{RCCP})$.

Figure 7. Rules for Fitting British Policy Choices to the Different Causal Models Suggested by Systems Theory and the Decision-Making Theories
 *The Pearson's r-values for CPRC and RCCP are identical by definition.

Figure 7 states that the relationships among r-values in a four-variable situation vary predictably for different causal models. If the analyst knows the Pearson's r coefficient for every pair of variables, he can determine which causal model best fits the data by comparing the predicted values with the actual values.³⁰

³⁰For an example of this technique applied to international relations problems, see Alker, "The Long Road to IR theory," *op.cit.*, p. 651-653. Charles Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior," *APSR*, LX (March, 1966), 66-72, also use this technique.

Two principal disadvantages accompany this type of analysis. The first one is the necessity to collapse the categories of the dependent variable (conflict behavior) into a dichotomy, which limits the generalizability of the findings to distinctions between military and non-military behavior. The other drawback is the difficulty in visualizing the analysis itself, i.e., being able to see which British decisions distribute where, in order to generate the Pearson's r-values that summarize the analysis. To compensate for these limitations the chapters in Part II and Part III adhere to the following format. Chapters III and IV of Part II present a historical narrative of each decision and the reasoning behind it, accompanied by tabular analysis as in Figure 5, which should provide the reader with a sense of continuity and an appreciation for the nuances surrounding each decision.

Part III analyzes the decisions collectively, but in a way that permits the reader to identify individual decisions. The first section of Chapter V gives an overview of the decisions. The second and third sections separate the decisions for analysis by cross-tabulation of 2x2 and 2x4 tables, accompanied by commentary. These tables permit the reader to inspect visually the distribution of individual decisions; the commentary identifies the decisions by name and interprets the tables. The final section of Chapter V condenses and refines these findings by using dummy variable analysis and the rules of causal interpretation. Chapter VI concludes the study by assessing its implications for interpreting British foreign policy and building international relations theory.

PART II.

CHAPTER III

BRITISH CONFLICT BEHAVIOR, 1931-1936

Between 1931 and 1941 the British became involved in several attempts to revive the status quo. From the beginning of this period they had to focus their attention upon the demands of three revisionist nations: Germany, Italy, and Japan. These next two chapters trace the patterns of British involvement in the series of frontier disputes that became the foci for revision. The analysis of British behavior in these conflicts deals with each dispute separately, although there is considerable overlap, chronologically, among them. This chapter analyzes British involvement between 1931 and 1936. The next chapter covers the period 1937-1941.

Between 1931 and 1936 the principal British decision makers were the Foreign Secretaries, Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare, and Sir Anthony Eden.¹ Of the three, Eden was the most independent in his thinking about foreign affairs. Simon and Hoare appear to have relied considerably upon the views of Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, an ironical situation considering their later membership in Neville Chamberlain's Inner Cabinet of Appeasers and Vansittart's anti-appeasement views. The two Prime Ministers for these years, Ramsey MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin, did

¹The Marquess of Reading was Foreign Secretary from August to November, 1931 and Arthur Henderson was his predecessor.

not initiate concrete policy and rarely vetoed the proposals of their Foreign Secretaries.² However, as the narrative in the next chapter shows, the Prime Minister did initiate most of the key decisions after Neville Chamberlain replaced Baldwin.

The Sino-Japanese Conflict

The first major challenge to the status quo came in the Far East. Between September, 1931, and May, 1933, an "incident" between Chinese and Japanese troops in the Chinese territory of Manchuria exploded into a large-scale military conflict between China and Japan. It ended with the establishment of an independent Manchuria (Manchukuo)--under Japanese tutelage.

Britain's diplomatic stakes in the Manchurian dispute included the following objectives. First, as a member of the League of Nations and as a signatory of the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power treaty, Britain was committed in principle to collective security, the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, and the territorial integrity of China. Second, the British government became concerned with protecting British investments in Manchuria, especially the Peking-Mukden Railway. Third, as a member of the International Settlement at Shanghai, the British were involved in maintaining Shanghai's neutral status and protecting the Settlement from damage by fighting Chinese and Japanese troops. Together, these three areas of involvement outline the British diplomatic stakes in the conflict between China and Japan. To protect these stakes the British made several key decisions.

² Baldwin's veto of the Hoare-Laval Pact in December, 1935, is perhaps the outstanding example.

With respect to the diplomatic stakes of international peace and China's territorial integrity, British policy initially operated at the symbolic non-military level, changing to the actual non-military level only in the Spring of 1933. From September, 1931, to January, 1932, the British government supported a series of League of Nations resolutions which requested both China and Japan to adopt a cease fire and make troop withdrawals to the status quo ante bellum. To complement the League's position the British government also made numerous direct representations to the Japanese government to stop expanding its military operations throughout Manchuria, and especially in the Chinchow district.

A minute by Sir John Simon on December 25, 1931, regarding the likely Japanese invasion of Chinchow,³ summarizes the international restraints that conditioned British policy choices during this period.⁴

I confess that I should have been glad if we had made a representation about Chinchow rather earlier and more firmly but that is not our Ambassador's fault as the instructions I had in mind were not sent. Ultimately, we merely said ditto to the French. The important question now is as to the outcome...I quite agree that good relations with Japan are of the first order of requisite, and must be safeguarded: but we must, consistently with this, play our part as a member of the League, and use such influence as we have.

The primary emphasis upon good relations with the Japanese reflects the realization among British policy makers that Japan potentially threatened the British position in Manchuria, Shanghai, and throughout the Far East by virtue of her superior military capabilities and future

³The Japanese took Chinchow the following week.

⁴Her Majesty's Stationary Office, Documents On British Foreign Policy (thereafter D.B.F.P.). Second Series, IX, #21, pp. 31, 33. Underlining mine.

policy options.⁵ The secondary, although important, emphasis upon British obligations to the League is best illustrated by two incidents.

The first one concerns the tone of the original British representations to the Japanese regarding the Manchurian conflict in September, 1931. The Marquess of Reading, who was the British Foreign Secretary at the time,⁶ thought that the French government was going to make "strong and unpalatable representations" to the Japanese government and instructed the British Ambassador to Japan, F.O. Lindley, to follow the French line. The British subsequently discovered that the French had not consented to jeopardize their relations with Japan by such strong representations.

In the words of a British Foreign Office Memorandum which reviewed the misunderstanding:⁷

His Majesty's Government, thus isolated, reaped the full odium which the Japanese...would otherwise have distributed among European nations generally, or at least divided between us and the French, and Sir F. Lindley's position became painfully difficult.

When the Marquess of Reading discovered what had happened, he instructed Lindley to explain to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, "the important fact that His Majesty's Government...acted...on the understanding that other friendly Governments were acting similarly and on the initiative of one of them."⁸ The rationale which lay behind

⁵Ibid. See also #238 and #239.

⁶Sir John Simon replaced him on November 5, 1931.

⁷D.B.F.P., Second Series, IX, #21. Cf. also Second Series, VIII, #'s 520, 523, 538.

⁸D.B.F.P., Second Series, VIII, #538.

these maneuvers was that good relations with Japan could be maintained while fulfilling League obligations, if the latter were fulfilled jointly and therefore diffusely.

The second incident concerned British reactions between January and March, 1932, to the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition of "any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris."⁹ Stimson, the U.S. Secretary of State, attempted to persuade the British to support this non-recognition doctrine, which he intended as a tacit warning to the Japanese. Sir John Simon responded by expressing his desire to support the U.S., but only within the limits permitted by British membership in the League. He wanted a British endorsement of American policy to be supported by the other League members. The League Assembly's Resolution of March 11, 1932, endorsing the principle of non-recognition, met this requirement.

The League resolution did not name Japan as a violator and, when the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo asked for recognition the following day, Simon expressed the carefully phrased British position that it would be "premature" to recognize Manchukuo.¹⁰ The public rationale behind these maneuvers concerning recognition was that they were consistent with the League's policy of waiting for the Lytton Commission's report in order not to prejudge the issues involved in the Manchurian case. More importantly, British policy concerning

⁹Cited from official text in Dorothy Borg, The U.S. and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge, 1964), p. 9.

¹⁰Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs (hereafter cited as Survey), 1932, pp. 552-554.

recognition was compatible with the private rationale, which Simon had expressed earlier, of not offending the Japanese.

The League Assembly finally met in late November, 1932, to consider the Lytton Commission's report. After several months of debate the League Assembly voted on March 24, 1933, to endorse the Lytton Commission's conclusions that Japan was violating Chinese territorial integrity and that the Chinese were not to blame. Britain voted with the majority. On the same day the Japanese delegate stated that his government disagreed with the League's decision and announced the Japanese intention to withdraw from the League.¹¹ The League's March 24th resolution did not impose sanctions upon the Japanese; it merely instructed the Japanese government to take conciliatory measures to resolve their dispute with the Chinese. As a symbolic non-military policy it did not greatly risk a military response from Japan that would threaten other British interests. The British government could support it without abandoning their original strategy of minimizing Japanese hostility toward Britain by diffusing it among the other League members.

Three days later British policy shifted from the symbolic non-military level to the actual non-military level, as the British government imposed an arms embargo against both Japan and China. Simon explained to the House of Commons that the policy depended upon the support of other nations to be effective. The decision to include China in the embargo would prevent potential collisions on the high seas between British ships attempting to supply China and Japanese

¹¹Ibid., 1933, pp. 504-509. The Lytton Commission was a League body set up to investigate the Manchurian conflict and report to the League.

warships. The embargo was also subject to the maintenance of existing contracts and the opportunity for international consultation about a joint embargo.¹² Approximately two weeks later the British abandoned the arms embargo policy, due to lack of support by other nations during the subsequent international consultations at Geneva.¹³ During its short tenure the arms embargo policy was subject to the same international restraints as the previous British policy; these were British relative military capabilities and the future policy options of the Japanese, plus the policy choices of the other League members and the United States. Simon's public rationale of requiring support by other nations to make an effective embargo was consistent with the private "diffusion strategy" regarding Japanese hostility. The inclusion of China in the embargo and the commitment to honor existing contracts also minimized Japanese hostility.

Fighting between Japanese and Chinese troops continued until May 31, 1933, when the two disputants signed the Tangku truce. By this time the Japanese controlled all of Manchuria, part of Inner Mongolia (Jehol), and the area just inside the Great Wall above Peiping. During this period the British government operated at the actual non-military level with a policy of not recognizing Manchukuo. The Tangku truce stabilized the frontiers between China and the Japanese sphere of influence in Manchuria and northern China until 1937.¹⁴

¹²Ibid., pp. 512-514.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 514 ff.

TABLE 1.

INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD JAPAN
DURING THE MANCHURIAN CONFLICT

Decision			Stakes		Primary Reasons	
Date	Anal.	Empir.	Anal.	Empir.	Cross-Press.	Rel. Cap's.
9/31	s/n-m	Protest	Milieu	China Terr. Integ.		Low
3/32	s/n-m	Premature to recognize Manchukuo	Milieu	China Terr. Integ.		Low
3/33	s/n-m	League resolution	Milieu	China Terr. Integ.		Low
3/33	a/n-m	Arms Embargo	Milieu	China Terr. Integ.		Low
4/33	a/n-m	Non-recognition of Manchukuo	Milieu	China Terr. Integ.		Low

The Sino-Japanese dispute over Manchuria also potentially threatened Britain's economic position in China. During the course of the conflict the British government pursued a policy primarily designed to protect this position. Soon after the fighting began to spread throughout Manchuria the British government reminded the Japanese government of British investments in that area and received assurances from the Japanese that they would respect them. Throughout the conflict British policy regarding these diplomatic stakes in Manchuria operated at the symbolic non-military level. The international

restraints which influenced this policy choice were primarily the Japanese policy of respecting British interests and secondarily the superior military capabilities of the Japanese and their future policy options.¹⁵

Although the Sino-Japanese conflict over Manchuria never seriously threatened British interests there, the position of the International Settlement at Shanghai did become precarious. In response to Japanese military activity in Manchuria the Chinese population in Shanghai organized an economic boycott against Japanese goods and services. By January, 1932, the resulting tension between Chinese and Japanese in Shanghai had led to a series of violent clashes between Chinese and Japanese civilians. After the deaths of several Japanese Buddhist priests in one such incident the Japanese demanded that all anti-Japanese movements in Shanghai be suppressed. On January 28th, the Japanese government sent a note to the British government, which stated that grave measures might be necessary to check anti-Japanese movements in Shanghai.¹⁶

The British government responded on the same day at the symbolic non-military level. Sir John Simon personally expressed his "grave concern" to the Japanese Ambassador in London that such grave measures might be necessary, and instructed the British Ambassador in Tokyo to tell the Japanese government that Britain could not approve of the International Settlement's use for other than defensive purposes. However, in the late afternoon of January 28th the local Japanese commander

¹⁵D.B.F.P., Second Series, VII and IX, passim.

¹⁶D.B.F.P., Second Series, IX, and Survey, 1932, pp. 498 ff.

demanding that the Chinese remove their troops from the Chapei section of Shanghai. During the night of January 28-29th, Japanese marines landed at Shanghai from warships sent earlier from Japan.¹⁷ By the next morning Chinese and Japanese troops were fighting in Chapei.

The British response to these events was a two-level policy. At the symbolic non-military level the British and American Ambassadors in Tokyo made repeated demarches to the Japanese government concerning the neutral status of the International Settlement. At Geneva the British supported League resolutions asking for the creation of a neutral zone and a ceasefire while in Shanghai the British Consul worked to obtain a ceasefire. To protect British lives and property in case the fighting spilled over into the International Settlement from Chapei, British decision makers also adopted a policy at the quasi-military level. Simon ordered several warships with artillery and infantry aboard to Shanghai between February 1-5th, including H.M.S. Kent, the flagship of Admiral Sir Howard Kelly.¹⁸

On the evening of January 29th, a cease fire began as the result of British mediation, but the Japanese ended it on February 2nd. Thereafter, British policy during the Shanghai fighting continued to operate at the actual non-military level with respect to the Settlement's neutral status, while British warships (and those of other Great Powers) continued to stand by in case the fighting spread into the Settlement. Continued attempts by British diplomats during February to mediate the

¹⁷Between January 21-26th, Japan sent one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and sixteen destroyers to Shanghai. Survey, 1932, pp. 472-480. Simon's instructions to his Tokyo Ambassador appear in D.B.F.P., Second Series, IX, #195.

¹⁸D.B.F.P., Second Series, IX, #'s 114, 129, 130, 154, 156, 195, 200.

dispute failed, and a fresh Japanese military offensive on March 1st pushed the Chinese troops out of the immediate vicinity of Shanghai. After this successful Japanese move formal negotiations began on March 9th between China and Japan with the British acting as mediators. On May 5th the two disputants signed an armistice agreement based upon a British compromise formula.¹⁹

During the Shanghai crisis the international restraints upon British policy choices were once again Japanese military superiority, future Japanese policy options, and the policy choices of other interested nations, particularly the United States.²⁰ The relative potency of these restraints varied somewhat, although not critically, according to the diplomatic stakes involved. With respect to maintaining the International Settlement's neutral status, the British wanted to stop the Japanese from using it as a base for launching attacks against the Chinese and landing reinforcements for Japanese units operating in the Shanghai vicinity. To accomplish these objectives the British initially pursued a symbolic non-military policy in order to minimize conflict with Japan. U.S. policy preferences were secondary. This rationale governed Sir John Simon's thinking early in the crisis, as the following quote from Simon's letter of January 29th to his P.M., Ramsey MacDonald, shows:²¹

¹⁹Survey, 1932, pp. 500-514.

²⁰Ibid., and D.B.F.P., Second Series, IX, #153 and #238.

²¹D.B.F.P., Second Series, IX, #153. *British Ambassador to the U.S. ***Italics mine.* ****Italics Simon's.*

Stimson sent a message urging that we should at once join the Americans in formal and categorical representations to Japan that the International Settlement at Shanghai was sacrosanct, and that we should take the gravest view of its being the scene or source of violent conflict. I suggested to Lindsay* a variant in Stimson's formula (the object being to avoid offending the Japanese too much)**...we should jointly*** address both** China and Japan, urging China to comply fully with Japanese reasonable demands, and to avoid action which would lead to trouble, and at the same time urging Japan to remember that the interests of foreign powers in the International Settlement made it right for us to advise restraint and caution.

The Japanese attack on Chapei from their sector of the International Settlement slightly altered the relationship among these influences.²² The policy of the United States now assumed greater, although not equal, consideration with Japanese policy and military capabilities. Simon instructed the British Ambassador in Washington to ask the Americans to protest to the Japanese about their attack on Chapei, as the British were doing, and also instructed him to inform the U.S. government that H.M.S. Kent was proceeding to Shanghai.²³ The diplomatic stakes now included British lives and property as well as the neutral status of the Settlement. A minute by Vansittart, addressed to Simon on February 1st and initialed by him on February 3rd, states the rationale behind these British moves to protect their diplomatic stakes.²⁴

²²D.B.F.P., Second Series, IX, #'s 154, 239.

²³Stimson's note of January 25th, referred to by Simon in his letter to MacDonald, had suggested sending reinforcements to Shanghai as well as making a categorical statement to Japan that the International Settlement was sacrosanct. Vansittart suggested including this message in the instructions to Lindsay in Washington. D.B.F.P., Second Series, IX, #151.

²⁴Ibid., #238, footnote 2; see also #153, footnote 12.

(1) If Japan continues unchecked and increasingly, as she indeed seems bent on doing, our position and vast interests in the Far East will never recover. This may well spread to the Middle East. The Japanese victory in 1904 was the beginning of the trouble there.

(2) We are incapable of checking Japan in any way if she really means business and has sized us up, as she certainly has done.

(3) Therefore we must eventually be done for in the Far East, unless

(4) The United States are eventually prepared to use force.

(5) It is universally assumed here that the U.S. will never use force.

(6) I do not agree that this is necessarily so. The same was said of the U.S. in the Great War. Eventually she was kicked in by the Germans. The Japanese may end by kicking in the U.S. too, if they go on long enough kicking as they are now.

(7) The Japanese are more afraid of the U.S. than of us, and for obvious reasons. At present, however, they share our low view of American fighting spirit.

(8) By ourselves we must eventually swallow any and every humiliation in the Far East. If there is some limit to American submissiveness, this is not necessarily so.

(9) We can therefore frame no policy and face no future till we are sure on this all-important point. To assume that there is no limit is a counsel of despair.

(10) We must let the provocation proceed further than at present. At some point, however, we shall,....have to know where we stand on this vital question. When that moment comes, it will be impossible (sic) to make sure either by telephone or telegram. The moment, however, has of course not yet come.

(11) If and when this sounding has to be taken, there will probably be a lull in Japanese aggression till we and they know the answer. F.V., Feb. 1.

To Secretary of State

I think there is an universal tendency to go to great lengths of (5) in my annexed minute. I suggest that you should consider it in connection with Sir J. Pratt's memorandum, and put the logical sequence to your colleagues. Till this sequence has been faced (see (9), in my minute) we can have no longrange, or even shortrange, policy in the Far East. We must live from hand to mouth--an humiliating process--unless we have made up, or cleared, our minds upon the answer to (6). R.V., Feb. 1. J.S., Feb. 3.

Vansittart's minute reveals that British diplomatic protests were based partly upon present Japanese policy, which did not yet directly endanger British lives and property but did violate the Settlement's

TABLE 2.. INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD JAPAN DURING THE SHANGHAI CRISIS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Decision</u>		<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Primary Reasons</u>	
	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross-Press.</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
10/31	s/n-m	Remind Japan of British Investments	Poss.	Br. eco. poss. in Manchuria		
1/32	s/n-m	Grave note	Milieu	Neutral status of Shanghai		Low
1/32	s/n-m	Call for Shanghai neutrality	Milieu	Neutral status of Shanghai		Low
1/32	a/n-m	Offer to mediate	Milieu	Neutral status of Shanghai		Low
2/32	q/m	Send ships to Shanghai	Poss.	Br. Poss. Shanghai		Low
3/32	a/n-m	Mediate for truce	Poss.	Br. poss. in China		

neutral status. The British naval reinforcements anticipated Japan's future policy options and reflected the British inability to do anything else due to their own lack of military capabilities and no present American support for a military policy.

The situation in Shanghai did not worsen sufficiently during February to follow Vansittart's scenario and, after the Japanese military offensive of March 1st removed the fighting from Shanghai,

British policy operated at the actual non-military level to negotiate a truce. The policy choices of the Chinese and Japanese, expressed as preferred terms for the ceasefire, acted as international restraints upon the British mediator. The Japanese had occupied Chapei and would not leave without a guarantee against resumption of the boycott and other anti-Japanese movements by Chinese in Shanghai. The Chinese maintained that they could not provide such a guarantee so long as Japan occupied Chapei. The British mediator, Sir Miles Lampson, eventually formulated a troop-withdrawal scheme acceptable to both sides, and the conflict ended.²⁵

The Italo-Abyssinian Conflict

The second dramatic challenge to British policy makers in the 1930's came from Italy. A border clash between Italian and Abyssinian forces at Walwal in December, 1934, rapidly brought relations between the two nations towards the threshold of war. The British diplomatic stakes in this conflict indirectly consisted of local British imperial interests. The upper waters of the Nile, upon which Egypt depended for its existence, originated in Abyssinian territory at Lake Tsana, and three British possessions, Egypt, Kenya, and British Somaliland, shared frontiers with Abyssinia.²⁶ Later, Abyssinia's territorial integrity and the protection of British possessions in the Mediterranean from Italian attack became the diplomatic stakes.

British policy, under the direction of Sir John Simon as Foreign

²⁵Survey, 1932, pp. 510-513.

²⁶Somali and Abyssinian tribesmen shared grazing privileges across ill-defined frontiers in these areas.

Secretary, proceeded at the symbolic non-military level.²⁷ In January, 1935, Simon instructed the British Ambassador at Rome, Sir Eric Drummond, to try and persuade Mussolini of the advantages of negotiating a peaceful solution without intervention by the League of Nations.²⁸ Mussolini subsequently agreed to direct negotiations with the Abyssinians at Addis Ababa. However, in February the Italian government mobilized two divisions of the Italian army. This move plus the Italian refusal to submit the dispute to arbitration led the Abyssinian government to appeal to the League of Nations for investigation and consideration of the conflict at the next ordinary session of the League Council in May.²⁹

Between February and May, 1935, the British government continued its attempts to persuade Mussolini to settle the dispute amicably. At the suggestion of Sir Anthony Eden, the British representative at the League, and with the approval of Simon, the British warned the Italians that a dismemberment of Abyssinia might seriously disturb Anglo-Italian harmony.³⁰ On the eve of the Stresa Conference in April the

²⁷The fullest accounts of the early phases of this conflict are in Survey, 1936, II, pp. 133-136; and in Anthony Eden's memoirs, Facing the Dictators, op.cit., pp. 213-241. Sir John Simon's memoirs, Retrospect (London, 1952) deal only with those phases of the dispute when he was no longer Foreign Secretary. British Foreign Office documents covering this conflict are not yet available.

²⁸The Abyssinian Emperor, Haile Selassie, was attempting to put the dispute on the League Council's agenda.

²⁹Cf. Survey, 1936, II, pp. 143-212. The Abyssinians attempted to submit it in March at the Council's extraordinary session, but were turned down.

³⁰Drummond, the British Ambassador, delivered this message in Rome; at London Vansittart presented it forcefully to Grandi, the Italian Ambassador during March, 1935. Eden, op.cit., pp. 222-224. The British also suggested to the French that they send the same message, which they apparently did.

Italian government announced that it would agree to make the necessary arrangements for arbitration. But early in the following May, Mussolini sent a message to the British through his ambassador appealing for a friendly and helpful British attitude toward Italy's activities in Abyssinia. Grandi, the Italian Ambassador, spoke to Simon of the situation there "as a cancer which had to be cut out."³¹

Simon interpreted Grandi's representations as conveying "in veiled though unmistakable terms" that Mussolini was "contemplating a forward policy of the most serious dimensions."³² Simon replied by suggesting that prolonged Italian military operations in Africa might weaken the front against Germany in Europe, which the Stresa Conference had established. He also expressed concern about the effects of Italian policy upon British parliamentary and public opinion. Grandi then suggested that local British interests in Abyssinia would not necessarily be endangered, but Simon answered that British concern over Abyssinia was more fundamental.³³

The meeting between Simon and Grandi in early May prompted two British Cabinet meetings to consider British policy at the upcoming session of the League Council, when the Abyssinians would present their appeal. In a Foreign Office memo Simon stated his conviction that, "if matters continue as they were, Italy would launch a large-scale offensive when the rainy season was over in Abyssinia, at the end of September or beginning of October." But he did not accompany this forecast with a

³¹Eden, ibid., p. 226.

³²Eden, cites Simon in these terms, ibid., p. 226.

³³Ibid., pp. 227-228.

policy recommendation.³⁴ The outcome of these meetings was the decision to remind Mussolini of how intensely the British felt about the peaceful settlement of disputes through the League and ask that Italian delegates at Geneva be instructed to discuss the best method for securing a solution under the League's auspices.³⁵ At Geneva the British and French governments proposed that the League Council pass two resolutions recommending arbitration of the dispute under the Italo-Abyssinian Treaty of 1928 and stating that the Council itself would consider the conflict if it were not resolved by August 25, 1935.³⁶

Up to this point, at the end of May, 1935, British policy clearly operated at the symbolic non-military level. Simon's conversations with Grandi indicated the international restraints which conditioned British policy. Simon's desire to retain Italian cooperation against Germany and avoid a weakening of Italian military capabilities by action in Africa reflected the influence of Italy's future policy choices regarding European issues and British relative military capabilities available for action on these issues.³⁷ All of the British diplomatic stakes in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict were not yet clearly defined. Grandi's remarks indicated that local British interests were not likely to be endangered.³⁸ The "more fundamental" concern to which

³⁴Ibid., p. 229.

³⁵Ibid., p. 230.

³⁶Survey, 1936, II, pp. 153-154; Eden, ibid., pp. 230-240.

³⁷Eden, ibid., pp. 226-227.

³⁸An impression reinforced by the Maffey Commission's report in June, 1935. Survey, 1935, II, pp. 42-44.

Simon had referred in his exchange with Grandi alluded to the expansion of British diplomatic stakes to include Abyssinian territorial integrity, if it should become the League's business to settle the conflict, and the accompanying deterioration of Anglo-Italian relations in Europe.

Sir John Simon left the Foreign Office before the extent of British involvement in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute increased. Sir Samuel Hoare replaced him in June, 1935. He spent his first days in office acquainting himself with the situation in Abyssinia and its implications for British policy. In a series of meetings with Vansittart and Eden he developed a rationale for future British policy based upon the following "basic facts":³⁹

First, Hitler's strength was becoming daily more formidable, and his intentions more unabashed. Secondly, Japanese aggression threatened us with war in the Far East when we were not strong enough to resist Hitler in Europe and at the same time fight in the Pacific. Thirdly, it was essential to British security to have a friendly Italy in the Mediterranean that would both guarantee our lines of communication to the Far East and make it unnecessary for the French to keep an army on the Italian frontier. Fourthly...Mussolini was at the time on very bad terms with Hitler, his rival dictator.

From these "facts", Hoare concluded that, "the diversion of Italian troops to a remote corner of East Africa, still worse,* the breach of the Stresa front that the expedition involved, meant a great and threatening accession of strength both to the Japanese in the East and to Hitler in the West," and "decided to do what we could to prevent its (Stresa) crumbling."⁴⁰ For Hoare, therefore, the

³⁹Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare) Nine Troubled Years, op. cit., p. 153. Eden also refers to these discussions, op.cit., p. 246.

⁴⁰Ibid. *Italics mine.

primary international restraints upon British policy were: (1) the possibility of losing Mussolini's support against Hitler; (2) the drop in British relative military capabilities even if Mussolini's support continued, but his troops became tied down in Africa.

On the basis of this rationale Hoare and his Cabinet colleagues decided to give Abyssinia a corridor to the sea from British Somaliland--if Mussolini would accept Abyssinian territorial concessions to Italy only along the disputed frontier between Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland.⁴¹ However, Mussolini refused the British proposal and replied that he had two alternative objectives in Abyssinia, depending upon whether the conflict terminated peacefully or by force of arms. Italy would not fight if Abyssinia agreed: (1) to cede to Italy those territories conquered by Abyssinia and not inhabited by Abyssinia; (2) to give control of Abyssinia proper to Italy while retaining the formal sovereignty of the Abyssinian Emperor. If Abyssinia would not agree to these terms, then Italy would invade and take over the whole country.⁴²

After Eden returned to London with Mussolini's reply, the Cabinet met on July 3rd. At the meeting:

There was no dispute that the action the Duce contemplated would involve a breach of the Treaty of 1906, of Article 10 of the Covenant and of the Kellogg Pact....The Government concluded that everything depended upon the attitude

⁴¹This proposal came from Hoare, Vansittart, and Eden. Templewood, op.cit., p. 155.

⁴²Eden, op.cit., pp. 247-256. Eden notes (p. 247) that his version tallies with the official version in the records of the Italian Foreign Office.

of France."⁴³

If British diplomatic stakes expanded to include these treaty obligations concerning Abyssinia's territorial integrity, then French support would determine how effectively these obligations would be honored.

France was the only Great Power besides Britain (and Italy) that had signed all three agreements. In this context Hoare and his colleagues began to implement a two-level policy: (1) they warned Italy of British obligations and encouraged negotiations at the symbolic non-military level; (2) they took steps to obtain an arms embargo against both Italy and Ethiopia at the actual non-military level. Both policies attempted to convince Mussolini of the dangers of Italian military action in Abyssinia without damaging chances for a peaceful settlement.⁴⁴ The negotiations policy continued the earlier attempt by Simon to operate within the restraints imposed by the desirability of retaining Italian cooperation against Germany. The arms embargo against both nations copied French policy and did not hinder Italian military preparations. In his memoirs Hoare describes these maneuvers as "The double policy that I was pursuing, of negotiations with Italy and respect for our collective obligations under the Covenant, based on Anglo-French cooperation."⁴⁵

Between July and October, 1935, Mussolini maintained his previously stated conditions for a peaceful settlement in informal talks at Paris

⁴³ Eden, ibid., p. 266. The London Treaty of 1906 included the agreement to respect Abyssinia's territorial integrity.

⁴⁴ Eden, ibid., pp. 267, 323-325.

⁴⁵ Templewood, op.cit., pp. 160-161. See also Eden's comments and efforts to lift the embargo against Abyssinia, pp. 323-325.

among the signatories of the London Treaty.⁴⁶ Tension between Britain and Italy increased. On September 10th, Hoare spoke at the League and pledged British support of the obligations in the Covenant. British intelligence reported the possibility of an Italian "mad dog" attack on British territory and forces in the Mediterranean. The British government responded by increasing the strength of the British navy in the Mediterranean in order to insure these diplomatic stakes against future Italian policy options. Undeterred, Mussolini's troops invaded Abyssinia on October 3rd. During the next three months the British government also asked for, and received, guarantees of assistance from France, Greece, Turkey, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, if Italy should attack Britain in the Mediterranean.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ On July 5th, Hoare had warned Grandi that it "did not seem possible to avert a great calamity" if Italy did not change her policy. Grandi suggested a meeting of the 1906 Treaty's signatories. Mussolini eventually approved the informal talks in Paris.

⁴⁷ The rationale for taking these steps varied by individual, making them difficult to scale. All of the participants at the Cabinet level agreed that it was primarily necessary because of Italy's future Mediterranean policy options and present posture toward Abyssinia. Estimates of relative British military capabilities in the area by British military men varied from sufficient to inadequate, depending upon the contingency. Against Italian ships the British navy was sufficient, but Italian dive-bombers would make any battle with Italy very costly. This price would be too high to pay, given other British commitments, unless total war was contemplated. Hoare, on the other hand, felt that military action against Italy was very unlikely and these moves were pro forma precautions. He communicated this interpretation to the Italian government. Baldwin apparently viewed the moves as serious attempts to influence Italy's Abyssinia policy toward a negotiated settlement. The decision to scale the military considerations as secondary follows Hoare's rationale and reflects the assumption that he was the "real" British decision maker until his dismissal in December, 1935. Evidence to support this position appears in the very recent, comprehensive biography of Baldwin, based on access to Cabinet papers and Baldwin's private papers. See Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin (London, 1969), pp. 850-858, 863, 876 ff., and also Templewood, op.cit., pp. 160 ff.

When Mussolini invaded Abyssinia, Hoare continued his "double policy" of negotiations with Italy and cooperation with France and the League until he resigned as Foreign Secretary in December. The British supported the League's policy of economic sanctions, subject to French endorsement of their scope. Simultaneously, British efforts to formulate a territorial settlement that would end the conflict continued. The pursuit of the latter policy at the expense of the former led to Hoare's downfall. In December, he and the French Prime Minister, Laval, tentatively proposed a settlement that would concede to Italy large segments of Abyssinian territory currently occupied by Italian troops and make frontier adjustments between Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland in favor of Italy. Hoare's Cabinet colleagues at first supported this proposal then changed their minds and asked Hoare to resign.⁴⁸

Hoare justified his proposal partly on the same grounds that had provided a rationale for his negotiations policy before Italy had invaded Abyssinia. He wished to keep Mussolini from aligning with Hitler in Europe, a move that would decrease British support and relative military capabilities against Germany.⁴⁹ In addition, however, the implications of the example set by Mussolini's successful military efforts in Abyssinia since October may have influenced Hoare. According to his memoirs, he thought that unless negotiations ended the war,

⁴⁸Vansittart was the other important sponsor of the Hoare-Laval Pact; he had accompanied Hoare to Paris for the talks with Laval.

⁴⁹Templewood, op.cit., pp. 191-192. See also Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948), pp. 181-182.

eventually a total Italian military victory was certain, which would disrupt the League and encourage German aggression.⁵⁰ There is also evidence that indicates Hoare was influenced by Laval's desire to try and conciliate Italy before the League considered expanding economic sanctions to include an oil embargo. There were two incentives for Hoare to follow Laval's wishes: the potential lack of French support in the League for oil sanctions and the French inability to come to Britain's immediate aid in the Mediterranean if Mussolini should attack there after the imposition of oil sanctions.⁵¹ These latter two considerations appear to have been secondary in Hoare's mind.⁵²

From the beginning, Hoare and the British Cabinet regarded the Hoare-Laval Pact as a tentative proposal, subject to consideration by the League and the two disputants.⁵³ Nevertheless, the domestic opposition in Parliament and among the British public induced the Cabinet to ask for Hoare's resignation as a symbol of the Government's abandonment of the proposal as British policy. Abyssinia also rejected the Pact's terms. The opposition at home and abroad centered around the belief that the territorial concessions to Italy in the Pact amounted to "rewarding the aggressor."⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Templewood, ibid., p. 183. This last reason may be an afterthought to reinforce in retrospect his policy rationale.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 178-179. The Hoare-Laval talks were on December 7th and 8th; the League would consider oil sanctions on December 12th. See also Survey, 1935 II, pp. 291-300.

⁵² Compare Templewood, pp. 191-192 with Survey, 1936, II, pp. 291-294.

⁵³ Survey, ibid., pp. 300-301, Templewood, ibid., p. 182.

⁵⁴ Middlemas and Barnes, op.cit., pp. 886-896.

Sir Anthony Eden succeeded Hoare as Foreign Secretary. He advocated increasing the League's economic sanctions to include an oil embargo against Italy, but eventually dropped this proposal when it met with continuous French opposition.⁵⁵ Eden also supported efforts to conciliate the two disputants, so long as mediation proposals came from League of Nations Committees rather than through channels outside the League. The final Italian military conquest of Abyssinia in May, 1936, bankrupted both of these policies, and Eden then recommended the abandonment of sanctions and the adoption of a non-recognition policy by Britain. These proposals became British policy in July, 1936, when the League withdrew its sanctions policy. At that time the British government also announced the imminent withdrawal of the British warships sent to the Mediterranean from other stations during the conflict.⁵⁶

Several international conditions influenced these changes in British policy. Eden recommended the abandonment of sanctions and the demobilization of the Mediterranean fleet because Italy had successfully defeated Abyssinia. He recognized that the French would support his policy and that this change in policy might contribute to reaching an agreement with Italy concerning Anglo-Italian relations in the Mediterranean.⁵⁷ Eden also realized that other members of the League would not use force to restore the status quo in Abyssinia, nor were

⁵⁵Eden had obtained Cabinet permission for oil sanctions if they would be supported by other League members.

⁵⁶Eden, op.cit., p. 474.

⁵⁷Eden, op.cit., pp. 430-432, 474, 669.

TABLE 3. INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
DURING THE ITALO-ABYSSINIAN CONFLICT

<u>Date</u>	<u>Decision</u>		<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Primary Reasons</u>	
	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross-Press.</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
1/35	s/n-m	Advocate negotiations	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ. and, indirectly, Br. Colonial poss.	Yes	
5/35	s/n-m	Warn of disharmony	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.	Yes	Low
6/35	s/n-m	Offer terr. concessions	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.	Yes	Low
7/35	a/n-m	Arms embargo	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.		
9/35	q/m	Send ships to Medit.	Poss.	British poss. in Medit.		
10/35	a/n-m	Economic sanctions	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.		
11/35	s/m	Obtain mil. guarantees	Poss.	Br. poss. in Medit.		
12/35	s/n-m	Hoare-Laval Plan	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.	Yes	Low
1/36	a/n-m	Maintain eco. sanctions	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.		
7/36	a/n-m	Non-recog. of Italian conquests	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.		
7/36	s/n-m	Return to pre-crisis force levels	Poss.	Br. Poss. in Medit.		

they likely to maintain the League's existing sanctions policy. The relative importance of these conditions in determining Eden's decisions varied. In his memoirs Eden maintains that he "had recommended the raising of sanctions, a particularly difficult decision for me, the main purpose of which had been to improve Anglo-Italian relations."⁵⁸ Eden hoped to coordinate the withdrawal of sanctions with other League members, but beyond this point, their policies do not appear to be a primary consideration in his decision to change British policy. Nor did Eden emphasize the desirability of maintaining Italian cooperation against Germany, as Hoare had done. Instead, from the start of his tenure as Foreign Secretary he stressed "close Anglo-French understanding and coordinated action" in order to "find a way to survive the tests which the next few months must bring from Hitler more importantly than Mussolini."

The German Occupation of the Rhineland

The first test from Hitler came on March 7, 1936, three months after Eden became Foreign Secretary, when German troops occupied the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland. This move violated the Locarno Agreements, in which Britain and Italy had agreed to come to the aid of either France or Germany if one of these two nations should violate the frontiers of the other or make any other "flagrant" violation of

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 669. The same reasoning (p. 474) applied to demobilizing the Mediterranean fleet. The French Government reported that as of May, 1936, thirteen nations were violating the League sanctions policy. Eden, p. 433.

⁵⁹Eden, op.cit., p. 355.

the Locarno Agreements.⁶⁰ The Locarno Agreements also provided for procedures to deal with violations that were not "flagrant." For this kind of act, the question was to be put before the League of Nations Council. If the Council should judge that the violation had actually occurred, then the signatories of the treaty were to come immediately to the assistance of the injured Power.⁶¹ However, the injured Power was to invoke the casus foederis.

For the case at hand France was the object of the violation. British policy, therefore, depended partially upon whether France should define the act as a flagrant or non-flagrant violation. The French government on March 8th decided to classify it as a non-flagrant violation and put it before the League Council.⁶² On March 9th, the British government implemented a symbolic military policy by reaffirming the British guarantee in the Locarno Agreements to come to the aid of France if French frontiers should be violated.⁶³ At the symbolic non-military level the British government protested against the German movement of troops into the Rhineland.⁶⁴ In announcing the occupation

⁶⁰ Rhineland Pact, Art. 4, paragraph 3, cited in Survey, 1936, p. 266. The full text of this pact is in Newman, op.cit., pp. 207-211.

⁶¹ Survey, ibid., p. 267 for citation from Locarno Treaty, Art. 4, paragraphs 1 and 2.

⁶² Ibid., p. 268.

⁶³ Cf. Eden's statement to the House of Commons on March 9, 1936, in the R.I.I.A.'s Documents on International Affairs, 1936, pp. 52-56. The guarantee no longer held for Germany, since Germany had repudiated Locarno on March 7th, but it did apply to Belgium. Belgium's frontiers had been covered under the Locarno treaty.

⁶⁴ Ibid., plus Eden's memoirs, op.cit., pp. 380-382.

of the Rhineland on March 7th, the Germans had also expressed an interest in negotiating a new agreement for organizing the security of Europe, now that German sovereignty and equal rights had been fully attained.⁶⁵ The British responded to this overture at the symbolic non-military level by promising to examine closely the German proposals.⁶⁶

The diplomatic stakes for British policy makers during the Rhineland crisis, therefore, were the territorial integrity of France (and Belgium), the demilitarization of the Rhineland, and a general settlement with Germany in Europe. In conversations with French and Belgian representatives between March 10th and 19th, Eden formulated a policy which linked all of these objectives together by guaranteeing British assistance to France under three contingencies, each one to be the subject of military talks between the British and French General Staffs.⁶⁷ The first contingency encompassed the short-run period of emergency characterized by German occupation of the Rhineland: Britain would guarantee French security, attempt to negotiate a compromise regarding the Rhineland, and establish a new security arrangement among interested powers to replace Locarno. The second and third contingencies provided a British guarantee to France for the long run, either as part of a new Locarno-type arrangement or even if negotiations aborted without agreement on the Rhineland or a new security arrangement for

⁶⁵ The text of Germany's March 7th statement is in Documents on International Affairs, 1936, op.cit., pp. 41-46.

⁶⁶ Eden's House of Commons speech, op.cit., footnote 63.

⁶⁷ Survey, 1936, pp. 288-289 and Eden, Dictators, op.cit., p. 405.

Europe. The pattern of British policy in each contingency was the same: a symbolic military policy on behalf of French territorial integrity and a symbolic non-military policy regarding the Rhineland and a new Locarno.⁶⁸

The international restraints that operated on Eden's formulation of British policy were: (a) his desire for close Anglo-French relations, which meant that France must support British policy; (b) Germany's policy of simply occupying the Rhineland without threatening French frontiers directly; (c) British naval involvement in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict and an inadequate British army, which left the British government unready to react militarily to Hitler's move; (d) Germany's policy of offering to negotiate a new settlement.⁶⁹ The desire for close Anglo-French cooperation against Germany and Germany's policy of simply occupying the Rhineland without threatening French frontiers determined British symbolic military policy regarding French territorial integrity. The lack of an immediate German threat to French territory made Britain's unreadiness to react militarily above the symbolic level a secondary determinant.

The determinants of the symbolic non-military policy regarding the Rhineland and a general settlement were the British desire for close Anglo-French cooperation and the inability to react militarily to the occupation of the Rhineland. Eden believed that, "Britain's armed forces were inadequate and unprepared and our support, except at

⁶⁸ ibid.

⁶⁹ Eden, ibid., pp. 385-414.

sea, could only be token."⁷⁰ The British Chiefs of Staff qualified his assessment even further, saying that any risk of war with Germany would require the withdrawal of British naval forces from the Mediterranean.⁷¹ Eden attempted to reconcile the French demand for security with Britain's lack of military capabilities by adopting a symbolic non-military policy of negotiations, backed by a British guarantee of French territorial integrity irrespective of the outcome of the negotiations.⁷² Germany's offer to negotiate a new general settlement was a secondary consideration in Eden's calculations, since he believed that Hitler was likely to "repudiate any treaty even if freely negotiated (a) when it becomes inconvenient, and (b) when Germany is sufficiently strong and the circumstances are otherwise favourable for doing so."⁷³ However, Eden did not advocate ignoring Germany's offer to negotiate. In the memorandum to the Cabinet just quoted, he concludes:

....owing to Germany's growing material strength and power of mischief in Europe, it is in our interest to conclude with her as far reaching and enduring a settlement as possible whilst Herr Hitler is in the mood to do so. But on entering upon this policy we must bear in mind that, whatever time-limits may be laid down in such a settlement, Herr Hitler's signature can only be considered as valid under the conditions specified above.⁷⁴

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 396.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 400.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 398-409

⁷³Ibid., p. 387.

⁷⁴Ibid.

TABLE 4. INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD GERMANY DURING THE RHINELAND CRISIS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Decision</u>		<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Primary Reasons</u>	
	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross-Press.</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
3/36	s/m	Will fight for France	Milieu	Fr. Terr. Integ.		
3/36	s/n-m	Protest, but will negotiate. for Eur. pact	Milieu	Eur. col security	Yes	Low

Consequently, when the League Council declared on March 19th that Germany had violated the Locarno Agreement, Britain pursued a new general settlement throughout 1936, while at the same time preparing to honor the guarantee to French territory. In April, conversations between the British and French General Staffs began--accompanied by German protests.⁷⁵ A series of diplomatic exchanges in the summer and fall of 1936 between London and the other Locarno Powers failed to arrange even a conference to discuss a new settlement. By this time the attention of the Great Powers had turned to the Spanish Civil War, which had begun in July, 1936. British policy makers now had three foreign policy projects that would become intertwined during the following year. They were the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, the Spanish Civil War, and the search for a modus vivendi with Germany.

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 414-417.

CHAPTER IV

BRITISH CONFLICT BEHAVIOR, 1937-1941

In 1937 Britain's foreign policy makers concerned themselves with four major issue-areas. They included the status of Abyssinia, now fully under Italian control; the Spanish Civil War; Germany's relations with Austria and the problem of reaching a settlement with Germany in central and east Europe; and the resumption of the Sino-Japanese conflict in northern China. The Abyssinian question and the Spanish Civil War provided occasions for conflict between Britain and Italy, while the latter two issues brought Britain into confrontation with Germany and Japan.

Abyssinia and Spain

British diplomatic stakes in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict per se were no longer important. The British policy of non-recognition was a legal artifact. In withdrawing their legation from Addis Ababa, the British government had bestowed de facto recognition upon the Italian conquest. However, Eden hoped to use de jure recognition as a quid pro quo in negotiations with the Italian government on other issues. The principal issue that concerned Eden in this respect was the level of Italian involvement in the Spanish Civil War.¹

When the conflict in Spain began in the summer of 1936, the

¹ The other major source of friction was the anti-British propaganda spread by Italy in the Middle East. Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators, op.cit., p. 485.

British and French governments attempted to gain an agreement among the European Great Powers to pursue a policy of non-intervention. They proposed that the governments of the Great Powers prohibit the export of arms to Spain from their countries. The Italian government accepted this proposal, but with some reservations. The Italian note of acceptance distinguished between direct and indirect intervention and based Italian reservations upon the latter, which would permit "volunteers" from Italy to fight in Spain.² The German and Soviet governments replied favorably to the Anglo-French proposal, and the French government then suggested that the Great Powers form a committee to coordinate the details of their common non-intervention policy.³ The Non-Intervention Committee met for the first time at London in September, 1936.

The British diplomatic stakes associated with the policy of non-intervention included a government in Spain that was free from outside domination, an objective related to other British diplomatic stakes, including protection of British possessions in the Mediterranean, free access to the Mediterranean, and the prevention of war in Europe among the Great Powers. Eden believed that any policy other than non-intervention in Spain might result in a Fascist government indebted to Italy for its victory and operated under Italian influence. Such a government might make territorial concessions to Italy or permit Italian military

²Eden, ibid., p. 453.

³Ibid., p. 452.

bases in the Balearic Islands.⁴ Gibraltar would then be threatened and, ultimately, British access to the Mediterranean would be endangered. Finally, if Italy (and Germany) openly intervened, then Russia and France might also intervene extensively, which could result in a war among the Great Powers.

British policy toward Italy during the early stages of the Spanish Civil War, therefore, operated at the symbolic non-military level. The principal international condition which determined this policy was the realization that intervention by Italy might precipitate future Italian policy choices that would threaten the British position in Europe and the Mediterranean. The French government's initiative in suggesting the non-intervention policy was a secondary incentive to adopt the policy, since Eden believed at the time that the policy was "the best that could have been devised under the circumstances," and stated that he "should have been glad to be able to say that non-intervention was my proposal."⁵

The qualified agreement by Italy to the non-intervention policy accompanied feelers by the Italian government concerning the possibility of improving Anglo-Italian relations in the Mediterranean. Between September and November, 1936, the Italian Ambassador to London, Count Grandi, visited Eden several times.⁶ The two men exchanged assurances that Britain did not desire to threaten Italy's Mediterranean interests and that Italy was not a danger to British Mediterranean interests.

⁴Ibid., p. 475.

⁵Ibid., p. 454.

⁶Ibid., pp. 475-481.

Grandi also asked Eden to recognize de jure the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. Eden refused to take this step, and Grandi departed for Rome on November 14th for instructions.⁷

When Grandi returned to London on November 25th, he informed Eden that Mussolini wished to formulate a Gentleman's Agreement, a joint Anglo-Italian declaration that would refer to the complementary nature of their interests in the Mediterranean. Grandi also told Eden that the Italian government understood that Britain could not bargain over Abyssinia, meaning that it would not be included in the negotiation of the Gentlemen's Agreement.⁸ Eden accepted Italy's offer of discussions and instructed Sir Eric Drummond, the British Ambassador to Rome, to begin negotiations, telling Drummond that the agreement must not offend the French, must declare respect for the territorial integrity of Spain and the other Mediterranean countries, and give some assurances that Italian propaganda against Britain in the Near East would cease. Italy accepted these stipulations and the two nations signed a joint statement in January, 1937.⁹

The Gentleman's Agreement, however, failed to remove the two major sources of tension between the British and the Italians. Mussolini continued to send "volunteers" to General Franco's armies

⁷ Eden's reasons for refusing to recognize the Italian conquest of Abyssinia were his desire for a quid pro quo and the fact that Britain's military capabilities were sufficient to neutralize any threat by Italy over this question. Eden, ibid., pp. 477-478. Britain's obligations as a member of the League of Nations also would have made recognition difficult, since Abyssinia still maintained a delegation there.

⁸ Ibid., p. 483.

⁹ Eden, ibid., pp. 484-486.

in Spain, and the British government still did not recognize the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. Eden felt that "Mussolini had used our negotiations as a cover plan for his further intervention" and "that the increased Fascist intervention in Spain was a violation of the spirit of the Agreement."¹⁰ In a memorandum to the Cabinet Eden concluded:¹¹

The Spanish civil war has ceased to be an internal Spanish issue and has become an international battle-ground. The character of the future government of Spain has now become less important to the peace of Europe than that the dictators should not be victorious in that country....Unless we cry a halt in Spain, we shall have trouble this year in one or other of the danger points....Memel, Danzig, or Czechoslovakia.

The principal mode of intervention in Spain was the sending of "volunteers." The British proposed that the non-intervention policy be expanded to include an embargo on foreign volunteers as well as arms shipments. On February 20th, the Non-Intervention Committee ratified the British proposal and set up a method of supervision designed to monitor all Spanish frontiers and harbors for violations. The Great Powers also agreed to withdraw foreign forces already fighting in Spain.¹²

Italy and Germany agreed to these proposals, but did not honor them. They continued to send "volunteers" to Spain throughout 1937

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 486-487.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 487-490.

¹²Ibid., pp. 493-495. Eden claims that the British proposal was a weakened version of his ideas by the Cabinet.

and did not withdraw the forces already there.¹³ At the same time tension between Italy and Britain increased in the Mediterranean, as the Italians launched new propaganda broadcasts in the Near East, and demands in the Italian press for de jure recognition in Abyssinia increased. In July the British government received reports of an increase in Italian troops in Libya and Italian naval maneuvers around Sicily.¹⁴ Unidentified airplanes attacked a British tanker off the coast of Spain in early August, and by the end of the month several countries had reported submarine attacks on their merchant ships all over the Mediterranean. The British Admiralty believed that Italian submarines had orders to attack any country's oil tankers sailing to ports controlled by the Spanish government.¹⁵

British diplomatic stakes in the Spanish conflict thus increased to include British lives and property endangered by "pirate" (Italian) submarines. The British reacted by authorizing British ships to attack and destroy any submarines that attacked them. At the suggestion of the French government, the Mediterranean and Black Sea nations met in September at Nyon, Switzerland to formulate a joint policy. Italy decided not to attend the conference, stating that the acts of piracy should be referred to the Non-Intervention Committee.¹⁶ Eden

¹³A disagreement between Russia and the Axis nations over including financial aid in the embargo prompted Italy and Germany to declare that they would delay troop withdrawals until agreement was reached.

¹⁴Eden, ibid., pp. 505-506.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 515-517.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 523.

represented the British government at Nyon and proposed that the Mediterranean be patrolled by destroyers with orders to sink any submarine attacking a non-Spanish ship. The plans for a destroyer patrol divided the Mediterranean into different zones. The British and French would initially conduct the patrol, but the plan made provisions for an Italian zone if the Italian government should subsequently wish to contribute destroyers. At the end of September Mussolini agreed to join the patrol, and the "pirates" disappeared from the Mediterranean.¹⁷

Eden's proposals for this actual-military policy were based upon the "overwhelming Anglo-French sea power in the Mediterranean," and his belief that the British government must act decisively to maintain Anglo-French prestige in Europe.¹⁸ He viewed the Nyon Conference as an opportunity to deal effectively with one aspect of the Spanish problem and demonstrate Anglo-French solidarity. The failure of the Gentleman's Agreement and the success of the Nyon policy encouraged Eden to deal firmly with Italy concerning the question of "volunteers" in Spain and the de jure recognition of Abyssinia. He believed that improved relations with Italy "could only be realized on a basis of reciprocity."¹⁹ In the next few months Eden attempted to base British de jure recognition of Abyssinia upon an Italian quid pro quo such as withdrawal of Italian forces in Spain. This strategy, however, brought him into conflict with Neville Chamberlain, the new British

¹⁷Ibid., p. 532.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 527-528.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 535-538.

TABLE 5. INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD ITALY DURING THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

<u>Date</u>	<u>Decision</u>		<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Primary Reasons</u>	
	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross-Press.</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
7/36	s/n-m	Propost Gvt.	Milieu	Spn. Terr.	Yes	
		Power, Non-		Integ.		
		Intervention				
1/37	s/n-m	Gentleman's	Poss.	Br. Medit.		
		Agreement		Poss.		
1/37	a/n-m	Non-	Milieu	Abyss. Terr.	Yes	High
		recognition		Integ.		
1/37	s/n-m	Propose to	Milieu	Spn. Terr.		
		prevent		Integ.		
		volunteers				
8/37	a/m	Patrol Medi-	Poss.	Br. Poss. in	Yes	High
		terranean for		Medit.		
		pirates				

Prime Minister, and Eden resigned his post as Foreign Secretary in February, 1938.

Eden vs. Chamberlain

Neville Chamberlain had become Prime Minister in April, 1937.

When Anglo-Italian relations worsened during the following summer months, Grandi requested a meeting with the Prime Minister. In their conversation on July 27th, the Italian ambassador asked for de jure recognition of Abyssinia. Although Chamberlain refused this request, he did express a willingness for formal comprehensive talks on Anglo-Italian relations

in September. The submarine attacks against British ships in the Mediterranean during August and September, however, also torpedoed prospects for Anglo-Italian conversations.²⁰

Eden opposed formal Anglo-Italian conversations unless Mussolini showed some evidence of good faith, such as honoring his commitment to withdraw troops from Spain or reducing the level of anti-British propaganda. Between September and December, 1937, Eden and Grandi met informally several times, but their exchanges ended in a stalemate. Chamberlain became increasingly impatient to have formal talks with Italy, as the following extract from his diary reveals:

In late December, before we separated for Christmas, I spoke to Anthony about the Italian situation. By that time Musso had given notice of his intention to leave the League. Our relations had steadily deteriorated. The Bari station was pouring out streams of anti-British propaganda, the press was hostile, anti-British intrigue was going on in Egypt, Palestine and Arabia, the Berlin-Rome Axis had been greatly strengthened, Germany had signed an Anti-Comintern pact with Japan, and Italy had joined it. I told A. that I feared we were getting ourselves into a deadlock...

Chamberlain concluded that formal Anglo-Italian talks ought to begin. Lord Halifax* agreed with him, arguing that when they began, Italian propaganda attacks would decline.²¹

In early February, 1938, Chamberlain received a message from Mussolini, stating that "he desired early agreement, to cover all

²⁰ The British government informed the Duce in September that conversations were not possible at this time. Eden, *ibid.*, p. 532 and Keith Feiling, *The Life of Neville Chamberlain* (London, 1946), pp. 330-331.

²¹ Feiling, *ibid.*, p. 335. *Halifax was then Lord President in the Cabinet and later Eden's successor as Foreign Secretary. Eden's opposition to formal conversations with Italy appears in his memoirs, *ibid.*, p. 536.

points in dispute, and that we would not find Italy unreasonable."²² On February 10th, Eden talked with Grandi who confirmed that "the Italian government were ready to open conversations at any time, on as wide a basis as possible, to include de jure recognition, but not excluding Spain."²³ The following week Chamberlain had Eden arrange a meeting for him with Grandi. Chamberlain's informal discussions with Grandi convinced the Prime Minister that formal talks could begin in Rome. In the confrontation between Eden and Chamberlain that accompanied this decision, the British Cabinet supported Chamberlain against Eden, and Lord Halifax replaced Eden as Foreign Secretary.²⁴

Formal Anglo-Italian talks began in Rome almost immediately after Eden's resignation. They continued throughout March, uninterrupted by the Anschuluss of Germany and Austria. On April 16, 1938, the two governments reached an agreement covering their relations in Africa and the Mediterranean. They further agreed that its terms would not be ratified until Italy had evacuated "volunteers" from Spain and Britain had reciprocated by recognizing Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia.²⁵

²²Feiling, op.cit., p. 337. The message was transmitted via Chamberlain's sister-in-law. Eden claims in his memoirs that Mussolini agreed to talk about propaganda, the Mediterranean, colonies, and economics. Spain was not on the agenda. Eden also mentions Mussolini's messages as a reply to a letter to Lady Chamberlain from the Prime Minister, while Feiling does not. Eden, op. cit., pp. 650-651.

²³Eden, ibid., p. 653.

²⁴For the details of these conversations between Chamberlain and Grandi, consult Eden, ibid., Appendix D. This appendix documents negotiations between Chamberlain and Grandi without Eden's knowledge.

²⁵Survey, 1938, I, pp. 137-143.

During the summer of 1938, British and Italian representatives met several times. The British asked the Italians to restrain the Spanish Nationalist forces from bombing British ships in Spanish waters, while the Italians pressed for ratification of the Anglo-Italian agreement before the Spanish question was settled.²⁶ During the Four-Power Conference at Munich in September, Mussolini told Chamberlain that he intended to withdraw 10,000 infantry men from Spain. In October, conversations between the British Ambassador and the Italian Foreign Minister took place concerning ratification. On November 16th, the British formally recognized Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia.²⁷

Chamberlain had told the House of Commons on November 2nd that he favored bringing the Anglo-Italian agreement into force. He noted that he had received three assurances from Mussolini:²⁸

first that the remaining Italian forces of all categories would be withdrawn as soon as the British plan came into operation; second that no further Italian troops would be sent to Spain; and third that there was no intention of sending additional aircraft to compensate for the withdrawal of infantry.

He also noted that General Franco had declared his neutrality in European international politics and that all of the states in Europe, except for Britain and the U.S.S.R., had recognized de jure Italian sovereignty in Abyssinia.²⁹

²⁶Ibid., pp. 158-159, 364-386.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 158-162.

²⁸Ibid., p. 161.

²⁹Ibid.

These considerations and Mussolini's assurances were not, however, Chamberlain's primary reasons for recommending ratification. In order to understand Chamberlain's primary reasons and his disagreement with Eden, it is necessary to comprehend Chamberlain's international strategy. His perception of Britain's international position in 1937 and 1938 included the following salient features. First, the British government found itself confronted by three enemies simultaneously: Germany, Italy, and Japan. Second, British military capability by itself was insufficient to fight all three or any pair of them simultaneously. Third, Britain's most likely potential allies, France and the United States,³⁰ could not provide reliable support in the short run for a military confrontation with Britain's enemies. Chamberlain concluded that in the short run Britain must try to prevent an Axis coalition until British military capabilities increased.

During the Cabinet crisis over Eden's resignation, Chamberlain made a long entry in his diary which documents his perception of the European situation:³¹

On enemies:	From the first I have been trying to improve relations with the two storm centers, Berlin and Rome. It seemed to me that we were drifting into worse and worse positions with both, with the prospect of having ultimately to face 2 enemies at once.
On allies:	France, though very deeply attached to her understanding with us, has been in a terribly weak condition,

³⁰ Russia was not considered a likely ally.

³¹ Feiling, op.cit., pp. 322-337. This is the first entry in his diary after becoming Prime Minister.

being continually subject to attacks on the franc...together with industrial troubles and discontent which seriously affects her production of all kinds, and particularly of arms and equipment. The U.S.A. has drawn closer to us, but the isolationists there are so strong and vocal that she cannot be depended on for help if we should get into trouble.

On conversations with Italy & preventing an Italo-German alignment:

To intimate now that this was not the moment for conversations would be to convince Mussolini that he must consider talks with us off and act accordingly.... There might indeed be some overt act of hostility, and in any case the dictatorships would be driven closer together, the last shred of Austrian independence would be lost, the Balkan countries would feel compelled to turn towards their powerful neighbors, Czechoslovakia would be swallowed, France would have to submit to German domination or fight, in which case we should almost certainly be drawn in. I could not face the responsibility for allowing such a series of catastrophes.

Chamberlain, therefore, counted upon Anglo-Italian conversations to ease the tensions between the two nations and possibly detach Mussolini from alignment with Germany, the nation which posed the principal threat to the peace of Europe.³² His biographer, Keith Feiling, quotes him as saying, "If only we could get on terms with the Germans, I would

³²In their informal talks on February 18, Grandi "denied emphatically that any agreement concerning Austria had been made between Hitler and Mussolini," Feiling, *ibid.*, p. 338. Eden notes that secret sources of information convinced him that Hitler intended to seize Austria and that Mussolini had acquiesced. Eden, *op.cit.*, pp. 538, 657. On February 21st, after Eden's resignation, Italian records indicate that, "Chamberlain explained to the Italian Ambassador, Grandi, that the British Government looked upon Austria as lost and had no intention of making proposals or suggestions to other states in relation to the Austrian situation." F.W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship (London, 1962), p. 836.

not care a rap for Musso."³³

During the summer and fall of 1937 Chamberlain had attempted to "get on terms with the Germans" by continuing Eden's post-Rhineland policy of seeking a general settlement with Germany. To Chamberlain a general settlement had two dimensions: European and colonial. These two aspects were presented to Germany in a quid pro quo relationship by Lord Halifax who, in November, 1937, visited Hitler at Berchtesgaden to determine the details of German demands. During his visit, "Halifax suggested that a 'general settlement by means of which quiet and security might be established in Europe' ought to accompany any colonial settlement."³⁴ Eden's conversations with Ribbentrop in London during December had continued the theme: the Germans could regain their former colonies now under League mandate and Britain could achieve "a greater feeling of security," if Germany in return would offer an agreement on arms limitation.³⁵

Chamberlain did not favor a reciprocal arrangement of this kind. His idea of a German concession was a verbal assurance about the use

³³Feiling, ibid., p. 329. See also Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers, op.cit., p. 52, who quote Chamberlain as saying, "If only... we could sit down at a table with the Germans and run through all their complaints and claims with a pencil, this would greatly relieve all tension." Eden had already tried similar tactics in 1936, after the Rhineland crisis, with his "Questionnaire to Hitler," regarding collective security arrangement to replace Locarno. See Eden, op.cit., pp. 416, 418 ff.

³⁴Gilbert and Gott, ibid., p. 95.

³⁵Ibid., p. 97. See also Documents on German Foreign Policy (hereafter D.G.F.P.), Series D, I, #50. The proposals were made despite French opposition. Gilbert and Gott, ibid., p. 96.

of force and not a commitment on an arms agreement. After Halifax visited Hitler, Chamberlain noted:³⁶

On Germany
In Europe

The German visit was from my point of view a great success, because it achieved its object, that of creating an atmosphere in which it is possible to discuss with Germany the practical questions involved in a European settlement....Both Hitler and Goering said separately, and emphatically, that they had no desire or intention of making war, and I think we may take this as correct, at any rate for the present. Of course they want to dominate Eastern Europe; they want as close a union with Austria as they can get without incorporating her in the Reich, and they want much the same things for the Sudetendeutsche as we did for the Uitlanders in the Transvaal.

On colonies &
German quid pro
quos:

They want Togoland and Kameruns. I am not quite sure where they stand about S.W. Africa; but they do not insist on Tanganyika, if they can be given some reasonably equivalent territory on the West Coast, possibly to be carved out of Belgian Congo & Angola. I think they would be prepared to come back to the League, if it were shorn of its compulsory powers, now clearly shown to be ineffective, and though Hitler was rather non-committal about disarmament, he did declare himself in favor of the abolition of bombing aeroplanes.

On British policy:

Now here, it seems to me, is a fair basis of discussion, though no doubt all of these points bristle with difficulties. But I don't see why we shouldn't say to Germany, "give us satisfactory assurances that you won't use force to deal with the Austrians & Czechoslovakians, & we will give you similar assurances that we won't use force to prevent

³⁶Feiling, pp. 332-333, cites this quote presumably from Chamberlain's private papers, dated November 26, 1937. *Underlining mine.

TABLE 6. INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD GERMANY AND ITALY, 1937-1938

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Decision</u>		<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Primary Reasons</u>	
	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross-Press.</u>	<u>Rel.Cap</u>
12/37	s/n-m	Offer <u>guid pro</u> <u>quo</u> Colonial- Eur. pkg. deal to Germany	Milieu	Colonies & Eur. coll. sec.		
2/38	s/n-m	Offer colonial Eur. understand- ing to Germany	Milieu	Colonies & Eur. coll. sec.		Low
4/38	s/n-m	Afro-Medit. Agreement with Italy	Poss.	Br. Afro- Medit. Possessions	Yes	Low
11/38	s/n-m	Agree to recog- nize Italian Abyss.	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.	Yes	Low

the changes you want, if you can get
them by peaceful means.*

After Eden had resigned and just before formal conversations with Italy began, Chamberlain offered Germany a colonial settlement along these lines and asked, "what contribution...(Germany)...would be prepared to make to the general peace and security of Europe."³⁷ These

³⁷D.G.F.P., Series D, I, #138, p. 243. The quote is from a written statement presented to Hitler by Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador. See also D.G.F.P., Series D, I, #131.

moves by Chamberlain in the spring of 1938 before the Anschluss reflected a strategy that he was to pursue in subsequent dealings with Germany and Italy. He would take what he considered the immediate issue between Britain and Germany and propose British concessions regarding it or other issues in return for German assurances regarding this issue or other issues. At the same time he would attempt to settle Anglo-Italian differences in order to obtain Italian cooperation against Germany or at least prevent a simultaneous confrontation with Italy and Germany until British military capabilities had increased.³⁸ Chamberlain also hoped that he could actually achieve a lasting general settlement in Europe without the use of force.

Austria and East Europe

Chamberlain's attitude, that changes in East Europe were likely and understandable, reflected a change from the official British posture at the beginning of the 1930's. The British government had at that time opposed any kind of Austro-German union (Anschluss). When the Austrian and German governments had announced privately to France and Britain their plans for an Austro-German customs union in March, 1931, the British government had questioned its compatibility with their treaty obligations against any kind of direct union. British opposition had been conditioned by French anxiety and opposition to the move. The British government recommended that the League review the situation and refer it to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion. The Court had ruled it a violation of treaty obligations, but not before Germany and Austria had announced their withdrawal of the

³⁸See footnote 26.

plan.³⁹

After Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933, the British government maintained their opposition to a change in the status quo in East Europe, although British opposition did not go beyond the symbolic non-military level.⁴⁰ In the summer of 1934, the British supported the idea of an Eastern Locarno arrangement that would guarantee Czechoslovakia, Germany, Poland and the Baltic states; Britain, however, would not participate as a guarantor.⁴¹ When Hitler had put pressure on Austria earlier in the same year, the British, French, and Italian governments had issued a joint declaration in February, 1934, that "they take a common view as to the necessity of maintaining Austria's independence and integrity in accordance with the relevant treaties."⁴² In April, 1935, the British government attended the Stresa Conference with France and Italy. There the three Powers restated their interest in "maintaining the independence and integrity of Austria," and reaffirmed their 1934 decision to consult together if it should be threatened.⁴³ Their joint statement also supported

³⁹Survey, 1931, pp. 305-331, and Henderson's statement in the House of Commons on March 30, 1931, cited therein, plus D.B.F.P., Second Series II, Chapter 1.

⁴⁰D.B.F.P., Second Series, V, Chapters V-VII.

⁴¹Survey, 1934, pp. 454-456. In the spring of 1935, an "Air Locarno" proposal for air support for the victim of aggression also emerged with British backing. Survey, 1935, I, pp. 58-90.

⁴²D.B.F.P., Second Series, XI, #'s 288, 290. The German pressure took the form of propaganda and tourist and trade restrictions. For the British support for an East European pact, see D.B.F.P., Second Series, VI, Chapters VII and VIII.

⁴³The consultations policy was adopted in September, 1934, after the assassination of Dollfuss.

continuing the search for an Eastern European security arrangement.⁴⁴

In 1936, the Italo-Abyssinian conflict disintegrated the Stresa Front, and Hitler shifted his attention to the Rhineland in an effort to neutralize the Franco-Soviet Pact, which had emerged from the negotiations for an Eastern Pact.⁴⁵ When Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937, Germany's western frontier was no longer so vulnerable militarily to French forces because of the remilitarization of the Rhineland, and Italy's inclination to defend Austria from German penetration had decreased. Do these changes account for the change in British policy from one of opposition to change in East Europe to one of accepting peaceful change? There is evidence to indicate that this is the case. British policy toward Austria, Czechoslovakia, and East Europe was conditioned primarily by the policies of France and Italy and secondarily by German policy. When both France and Italy opposed change, as in the period 1931-1935, British policy supported them. When the Stresa front disintegrated, British opposition waned.

This change cannot be explained solely in terms of changes in the identity of British policy makers. Eden, who would not make unilateral concessions to Mussolini or Hitler regarding Spain or colonies, respectively, was willing to accommodate German ambitions in Austria. In December, 1937, he informed Ribbentrop, the German ambassador to Britain, that "the question of Austria was of much greater interest to Italy than to England. Furthermore, people in England recognized that a closer

⁴⁴Survey, 1935, I, pp. 159-161, has the texts from the Stresa Conference.

⁴⁵Survey, 1936, pp. 252-263.

connection between Germany and Austria would have to come about some time. They wished, however, that a solution by force be avoided."⁴⁶ Chamberlain (and Halifax) extended this view to include Czechoslovakia and East Europe, while Eden might not have, if he had remained in office.⁴⁷

When Hitler moved to annex Austria in 1938, the British government protested but did not make any further effort to oppose the Anschluss.⁴⁸ The British government expressed anxiety about future Austro-German relations upon hearing of the "negotiations" between Hitler and Schuschnigg in February. When the Austrian Chancellor decided on March 9th to hold a plebiscite regarding union with Germany, Halifax warned Ribbentrop on March 10th that he "attached the utmost importance" to the execution of the Austrian plebiscite and that an explosion in Austria or Czechoslovakia "might precipitate a general conflict."⁴⁹ On March 12th when Hitler closed the Austro-German frontier and mobilized his troops for invasion, the Austrian Nazis demanded

⁴⁶D.G.F.P., Series D, I, #50.

⁴⁷During his November, 1937 visit to Germany, Halifax reportedly mentioned Danzig, Austria, and Czechoslovakia as areas where peaceful adjustments might be necessary. Christopher Thorne, The Approach of War, 1938-39 (New York, 1968), p. 38.

⁴⁸D.B.F.P., Third Series, I, #'s 39 and 79.

⁴⁹D.G.F.P., Series D, I, #145; see also #'s 146 and 148. In all three documents, British spokesmen endorse closer Austro-German union with varying degrees of intensity and deplore the use of force with varying degrees of rigor. In #148, a conversation between Wilson and Kordt, Wilson hints that Chamberlain is more tolerant of German tactics than Halifax is.

TABLE 7. INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
REGARDING THE ANSCHLUSS QUESTION

<u>Decision</u>			<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Primary Reasons</u>	
<u>Date</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross-Press.</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
3/31	s/n-m	Oppose <u>Anschluss</u> through League of Nations Channels	Milieu	Austrian Terr. Integ.		
9/34	s/n-m	Oppose <u>Anschluss</u> Consultations	Milieu	Austrian Terr. Integ.		High
3/38	s/n-m	Express concern and warn Ger.	Milieu	Austrian Terr. Integ.		Low
3/38	s/n-m	Protest <u>Anschluss</u>	Milieu	Austrian Terr. Integ.		Low

that the plebiscite be cancelled. Schuschnigg complied, and Chamberlain informed Ribbentrop that "personally he understood the situation" and thought that "it would be better if the plebiscite were not held now."⁵⁰

When Schuschnigg resigned and turned over the government to Seyss-Inquart under threat of German military occupation, the British government protested "against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent state in order to create a situation incompatible with its

⁵⁰

Ibid., #'s 151 and 150, and D.B.F.P., Third Series, I, #44.

national independence."⁵¹ After Hitler occupied Austria the following day at the request of the new Austrian leadership, the British government simply informed the German government that they had noted the German declaration to withdraw troops when the Austrian situation stabilized.⁵²

Chamberlain's private evaluation of the Anschluss and his future strategy appears in his diary entry for March 13, 1938:⁵³

On Anschluss: It is perfectly evident, surely, now that force is the only argument Germany understands...a visible force of overwhelming strength, backed by determination to use it. And if that is so, is it not obvious that such force and determination are most effectively mobilized by alliances...? Heaven knows, I don't want to get back to alliances but if Germany continues to behave as she has done lately, she may drive us to it....

On strategy: For the moment we must abandon conversations with Germany, we must show our determination not to be bullied by announcing some increase or acceleration in rearmament, and we must quietly and steadily pursue our conversations with Italy.

He concluded, "If we can avoid another violent coup in Czechoslovakia, which ought to be feasible, it may be possible for Europe to settle down again, and some day for us to start peace talks again with the Germans."

For the coming Sudeten crisis Chamberlain defined as British

⁵¹D.B.F.P., Third Series, I, #39, sent by Halifax. Henderson diminished the force of this protest when he delivered it. See #'s 38 and 54.

⁵²Ibid., #58.

⁵³Feiling, op.cit., pp. 341-342.

diplomatic stakes the territorial integrity of France, which in turn appeared to be linked to the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia by the Franco-Czech alliance.⁵⁴ This situation dictated that British diplomatic stakes include a resolution of Sudeten-German grievances, if possible, without resorting to the use of force. A second British objective was the improvement of Anglo-German relations.

To accomplish these objectives Chamberlain adopted a combination of policies. He rejected a policy of alliances against Germany which would insure a British military commitment to Czechoslovakia, on the grounds that Britain and France lacked the military capabilities "to beat her (Germany) to her knees in a reasonable time....I have therefore abandoned any idea of giving guarantees to Czechoslovakia, or the French in connection with her obligations to that country."⁵⁵ While Chamberlain did not give Czechoslovakia a guarantee, he did point out in a speech to Parliament on March 24th that "legal obligations are not alone involved and, if war broke out, it would be unlikely to be confined to those who have assumed such obligations.... This is especially true in the case of two countries like Britain and France..."⁵⁶ This statement represented Chamberlain's attempts to influence Germany's future policy away from the use of force regarding

⁵⁴ See the quotation below from his parliamentary speech of March 24, 1938.

⁵⁵ Feiling, p. 348. Chamberlain's evaluation of British military capabilities was apparently based upon a report by the British Chiefs of Staff. See Feiling, p. 347. This position was reaffirmed in Anglo-French conversations in April. See D.B.F.P., Third Series, I, #450, especially p. 214.

⁵⁶ Cited in Feiling, pp. 348-349.

Czechoslovakia without at the same time blocking change.

In Anglo-French conversations at the end of April between Chamberlain and Halifax from Britain and Daladier and Bonnet from France, Chamberlain explained his strategy and sought French cooperation in finding a new arrangement for the Sudetenland that both Germany and Czechoslovakia would accept. The two governments agreed that:⁵⁷

there should be a demarche by His Majesty's Government...to the German Government that they were doing their best to find a peaceful solution of the Sudeten difficulty and had asked Dr. Benes to make his contribution, but it took two to reach an agreement, and they therefore wished to know what was the position of the German Government....Simultaneously, a demarche could be made at Prague by both the French and British Governments to secure the maximum concessions from Dr. Benes. If, however, a peaceful solution were not reached by this means, His Majesty's Government would then say to the German Government that they had done everything they could; if...the German Government intended to resort to force, they would be doing so in full knowledge...that France would be compelled to intervene by virtue of her obligations, and that His Majesty's Government could not guarantee that they would not do the same. In this connexion His Majesty's Government would make use of the phrase used by Mr. Chamberlain in his speech to the House of Commons on the 24th of March, 1938.

Accordingly, in the first week of May Halifax instructed Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, to ask the Germans to specify a "settlement which in their view would be satisfactory to the Sudeten Deutsch."⁵⁸ When the end of May brought rumors of German troop movements and Czech mobilization, followed by a French promise to aid the Czechs if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia, Halifax warned

⁵⁷ ⁵⁷ D.B.F.P., Third Series, I, #750, especially pp. 227-232.

⁵⁸ Thorne, op.cit., p. 61.

Ribbentrop that if a general conflict occurred, Britain should not be counted on to stand aside. British behavior during the May crisis, therefore, corresponded to their previous agreement with the French government.⁵⁹ The British attempted to protect French territorial integrity with a symbolic military policy and achieve a solution of the Czecho-German dispute with a symbolic non-military policy.

The international conditions that influenced the symbolic military policy were Anglo-French military capabilities, Germany's future policy option of attacking France, and the French commitment to Czechoslovakia. Britain's lack of military capabilities and Germany's future policy options toward Czechoslovakia conditioned the symbolic non-military policy, which the British continued during the May crisis.⁶⁰ At the height of the crisis Halifax told the French government:⁶¹

the military situation is such that France and England, even with such assistance as might be expected from Russia, would not be in a position to prevent Germany over-running Czechoslovakia. The only result would be a European war, the outcome of which, so far as can be foreseen at this moment, would be at least doubtful.

The May crisis faded as quickly as it had appeared, probably because there had been initially no German troop movements in the first place and no intention on the part of Germany to attack Czechoslovakia at that time.⁶²

The next British move in the Czecho-German conflict came at the actual non-military level in July, 1938, when Lord Runciman went to

⁵⁹ D.B.F.P., Third Series, I, #250.

⁶⁰ Ibid., #'s 263, 264, 271.

⁶¹ Ibid., #271.

⁶² Survey, 1938, II, pp. 135-142.

the Sudetenland as a mediator between the Germans and the Czechs. His efforts to mediate the dispute continued until early September; negotiations ended when the Sudeten Germans rejected the last of four proposed settlements that the Runciman Mission had helped to formulate.⁶³ Runciman attempted to persuade the disputants to resume negotiations until September 14th, when Chamberlain decided to intervene personally. He announced that he would fly to Berchtesgaden and interview Hitler in an effort to resolve the conflict.

At the time of Chamberlain's decision to resort to summit diplomacy, the British diplomatic stakes continued to be the preservation of French territorial integrity and the adjustment of the Sudeten-German grievances. The British policy choices regarding these two objectives also remained the same. On September 11th Chamberlain had declared that Britain would intervene to protect France, "our nearest neighbor, the other great democracy and the country with whose integrity and security our own is so closely bound up."⁶⁴ This position did not mean, however, that Britain would support France if the latter decided to defend Czechoslovakia from a German attack--unless the integrity of France should also become involved. Chamberlain's decision to visit Hitler and the efforts of the Runciman Mission expressed the British policy regarding the Sudeten-German grievances.

During the next two weeks Chamberlain and Hitler met three times.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 207-262. The Runciman Mission attempted to reconcile the Czech Government's original proposals (Plan I) and the Sudeten party's memo of June 7th (Plan II); the Czech Government proposed Plans III and IV after consultation with Runciman.

⁶⁴D.B.F.P., Third Series, II, Appendix III. See also #824.

At their first meeting on September 16th Hitler demanded the incorporation of the Sudeten Germans into the Reich or else he would attack Czechoslovakia. He told Chamberlain that further meetings would be useless unless they could agree on this demand in principle. Hitler also stated that the Czechoslovak problem was the last major frontier question for Germany to solve.⁶⁵ Chamberlain had come to Berchtesgaden prepared to discuss with Hitler the improvement of Anglo-German relations, which were threatened by the Czech-German conflict. When Hitler declared that the Czech-German conflict was the only outstanding problem between the two countries, he linked together two sets of British diplomatic stakes: the improvement of Anglo-German relations and the adjustment of the Sudeten conflict. Chamberlain informed Hitler that he personally did not object in principle to the peaceful German annexation of the Sudetenland, but he would have to confer with the British Cabinet and with the French government.

Chamberlain flew back to London where he obtained the approval of the Cabinet and the French government to detach the Sudeten districts from Czechoslovakia, if the Czechs would accept the plan.⁶⁶ On September 21st the Czech government finally accepted the proposal,⁶⁷ and

⁶⁵Ibid., #896

⁶⁶This marked a significant change from the previous British position, which had favored autonomy but not incorporation into the Reich. The Berchtesgaden meeting also marked a change in public German policy from the symbolic non-military level to the symbolic military level of threatening to attack Czechoslovakia. Privately, German plans dating from last May called for an attack on September 30th.

⁶⁷See Thorne, op.cit., p. 75, on the French threat to desert Czechoslovakia.

Chamberlain flew to Godesberg on the 22nd to tell Hitler that he had gained acceptance for his terms: those areas containing 50% or more Germans would be ceded to Germany. At this point Hitler declared that present conditions made any delay in annexation impossible, and he announced his intention to occupy the Sudetenland beginning on September 26th up to a line specified by the German General Staff. A plebiscite would follow later. If the Czechs resisted, Germany would invade the entire country.⁶⁸

Chamberlain reacted negatively to these new demands, describing them as an ultimatum. He did agree to pass them on to the Czechs and the French, and Hitler agreed to postpone the occupation until October 1st. In the next few days the tension heightened as Czechoslovakia's leaders rejected Hitler's terms and Britain and France maintained their pre-crisis policies; France continued to support the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia while Britain remained committed to the defense of France. Chamberlain also continued to make proposals for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but had received no encouragement from Germany by the afternoon of September 27th, when several divisions of German troops moved to their final pre-occupation positions.⁶⁹

That evening, however, Hitler replied by letter to Chamberlain's

⁶⁸Survey, 1938, II, pp. 388-391. Full German mobilization was scheduled for the next day. Survey, 1938, II, p. 415.

⁶⁹The British fleet was also mobilized on September 27th. See Thorne, op.cit., p. 80. Between September 23rd and 27th, Horace Wilson had two interviews with Hitler, but Hitler refused to discuss the proposals. D.B.F.P., Third Series, II, #'s 1115 and 1129.

message that Sir Horace Wilson had delivered in the afternoon. Wilson had informed Hitler that Britain's policy remained unchanged regarding French territory but that he would "try to make those Czechos sensible." In his reply Hitler praised Chamberlain's efforts to "bring the Government in Prague to reason,"⁷¹ and reaffirmed his plans after the occupation for a plebiscite and a joint guarantee of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. He elaborated further upon the plebiscite aspect, saying that it would be arranged jointly by German and Czech representatives under the supervision of an international commission.⁷²

Chamberlain responded the next morning with a proposal for a Four Power Conference to negotiate a settlement. During the morning hours of September 28th, the French also sent a proposal that offered to Germany more Czech territory than Hitler had initially proposed to occupy. By noon Mussolini had suggested a 24-hour delay in full German mobilization and a Four Power Conference in the interim. Hitler agreed to Mussolini's suggestions and invited Britain, Italy, and France to a conference at Munich.⁷³ At Munich the four Great Powers agreed that Germany would occupy the Sudetenland in five successive stages between October 1st and October 10th, under the supervision of an

⁷⁰Survey, 1938, II, pp. 420-423.

⁷¹Survey, ibid., p. 423.

⁷²Chamberlain's proposals for German occupation under supervision of an International Boundary Commission, which were sent on the evening of the 27th, had not reached Hitler before he wrote Chamberlain. For the text of these proposals, which were similar to the settlement reached at Munich, see Survey, ibid., pp. 412-413.

⁷³A very detailed account is in Survey, ibid., and Wheeler-Bennett, op.cit. The Czechs came to the Munich conference as observers.

TABLE 8. INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
DURING THE SUDETEN CRISIS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Decision</u>		<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Primary</u>	<u>Reasons</u>
	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross- Press.</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
3/38	s/m	Guarantee Fr. Terr.	Milieu	Fr. Terr. Integ.		High
3/38	s/n-m	Publically com- municate concern for Czech.	Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.		Low
5/38	s/n-m	Privately ask Ger. for pro- posals to settle Czech.	Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.		Low
5/38	s/m	Will fight to protect Fr.	Milieu	Fr. Terr. Integ.		High
7/38	a/n-m	Send mediator for Cz.-Ger.	Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.		Low
9/38	s/m	Threaten inter- vention to pro- tect France	Milieu	Fr. Terr. Integ.		High
9/38	a/n-m	Chamberlain goes to Hitler	Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.		Low
9/38	a/n-m	Chamberlain offers part of Sudeten to Ger.	Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ. (and Anglo-Ger. Relations)		Low

TABLE 8. CONTINUED

<u>Decision</u>			<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Primary Reasons</u>	
<u>Date</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross- Press.</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
9/38	s/m	Br. will fight to protect Fr.	Milieu	Fr. Terr. Integ.		High
9/38	q/m	Mobilize Br. Fleet	Milieu	Fr. (& Br.) Terr. Integ.		High
9/38	s/n-m	Offer super- vised Ger. occupation of Sudeten	Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.		Low
9/38	s/n-m	Propose 4- Power Con- ference	Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.		Low
9/38	s/n-m	Agree to Munich Pact	Milieu	Czech. & Eur. Coll. Sec.		Low

international boundary commission that would also define plebiscite areas and oversee population movements. A joint guarantee would protect the remainder of Czechoslovakia from aggression. The Czechs subsequently accepted these terms. Chamberlain and Hitler also signed an agreement that committed them to consult personally to solve questions of concern to their respective countries and resolve any differences which might arise.⁷⁴

⁷⁴Cf. Wheeler-Bennett, op.cit., pp. 179-180 and Appendix K.

Chamberlain believed that he had accomplished all of his objectives: maintenance of French territorial integrity and adjustment of Sudeten grievances without resort to force, and an improvement of Anglo-German relations. British policy during the Sudeten crisis consistently reflected Chamberlain's perception of British and French military capabilities. He distinguished between the Anglo-French ability to defend French territory and their inability to prevent the German invasion of Czechoslovakia. His military policy regarding French territorial integrity and his attempts to mediate between Germany and Czechoslovakia were two distinct policies based upon different diplomatic stakes and different estimates of military capabilities.

After the Munich Conference Chamberlain attempted to consolidate his rapproachment with Hitler and maintain his policy of protecting France from attack. In November, 1938, Britain and France agreed that the proposed guarantee of Czechoslovakia should specify that no assistance could be rendered unless three out of the four guarantors participated. This formulation would prevent Britain and France from going to war because of joint action by Germany and Italy, the other two guarantors. The following January, amidst rumors of a German attack in the west, Britain and France agreed that an invasion of Holland or Switzerland would be a casus belli. During the same month Chamberlain and Halifax visited Mussolini, who assured them that the Anglo-Italian agreement concerning the Mediterranean still held.⁷⁵

The next three months saw Germany and Italy undermine their agreements with Britain regarding Czechoslovakia and the Mediterranean,

⁷⁵Thorne, op.cit., p. 98.

respectively. At the end of February the Germans announced that "clarification of the internal development of Czechoslovakia and an improvement of that country's relations with surrounding states"⁷⁶ must occur before Germany would sign a guarantee. Czechoslovakia's internal conditions were marked by conflict between the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia and the Slovaks in Slovakia. Slovak spokesmen formally appealed to Hitler during the second week in March for protection and independence from the Czech government, after Hitler had hinted that if they did not, he would abandon them to the Hungarians when German forces occupied Bohemia and Moravia.⁷⁷ Then Hitler induced the Czech government to place "the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich" on March 15th. The Germans occupied Bohemia and Moravia, while the Hungarians occupied Ruthenia and Slovakia declared its independence.⁷⁸

The first British reaction to the events in Czechoslovakia was mild. The guarantee did not apply, since it had never officially been signed. Government spokesmen emphasized Czechoslovakia's internal strife as creating the situation that led to German intervention. The French government initially took the same attitude, and any British attempt to take immediately effective action against Germany required

⁷⁶Cited in Thorne, ibid., p. 96. Germany proposed that Czechoslovakia become a German satellite in foreign policy and economics, p. 100.

⁷⁷Thorne, ibid., pp. 102-104.

⁷⁸Slovakia followed this declaration with a request on the 16th to become a German protectorate. Hitler acquiesced. Thorne, ibid., p. 104.

the resources of the French army.⁷⁹ Britain and France did protest the action, however, and when more details of German tactics in Czechoslovakia arrived in London on March 20th, Chamberlain proposed to Russia, Poland, and France that they issue a joint declaration with Britain saying that they would consult to decide how to resist "a threat to the political independence of any European State."⁸⁰ Before the British and French could persuade the Poles to agree to this proposal, Hitler persuaded the Lithuanian government to cede Memel, threatening force if they refused.⁸¹

Following the annexation of Memel came hints of a German plan to attack Poland in the immediate future. Chamberlain then decided to offer Poland an interim and non-reciprocal guarantee until further Anglo-Polish negotiations could arrive at a permanent arrangement. Poland accepted the offer, and the next day (March 31, 1939) Chamberlain announced that the British and French Governments "feel themselves bound at once to lend her all support in their power" if Polish independence were "clearly threatened."⁸² France was already committed to aid Poland under the terms of the Franco-Polish Alliance of 1921.

Two sets of international determinants influenced the reversal in British policy from a peripheral role in East Europe to one of military involvement. First, Chamberlain and Halifax were influenced

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 104-106 for the text from a Foreign Office memo to this effect.

⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 113-116; D.B.F.P., Third Series, IV, #446.

⁸¹Thorne, ibid., pp. 108-109.

⁸²D.B.F.P., Third Series, IV, #'s 566, 568, and 582.

by Germany's recent coups in Czechoslovakia and Memel, plus the reported pressure put upon Poland. Second, the British proposed this step, subject to the concurrence of the French.⁸³ The immediate stake attached to the British guarantee was Polish independence, but this was related to other British interests. The British viewed Poland "as the key to the whole situation" in East Europe and ultimately in the West as well; the Polish army was in a position to assist Rumania and engage Hitler in a two-front war in concert with France.⁸⁴ Britain's interim guarantee to Poland reflected these considerations. The British wanted to replace it with a permanent and reciprocal one in which war by the Western guarantors to protect other European countries would be an occasion for Polish action.

Italy occupied Albania within ten days after the guarantee to Poland. On April 12th the French government informed the British government that France intended to announce a guarantee of Greece and Rumania the next day. Chamberlain and Halifax were inclined to delay until Poland could join in making a commitment, but French pressure influenced the British government to join France in guaranteeing Greece and Rumania. The British stakes in the guarantee included Rumanian oil for the British navy and the prevention of further Italian conquests in the Mediterranean.⁸⁵

⁸³D.B.F.P., Third Series, IV, #'s 538 and 568.

⁸⁴D.B.F.P., Third Series, IV, #'s 549 and 551 and Appendix IV.

⁸⁵D.B.F.P., Third Series, V, p. 197 has the text of the British guarantee; on initial British reluctance to guarantee Rumania, see D.B.F.P., Third Series, V, #'s 144, 53 and 57. See D.B.F.P., Third Series, V, #'s 128 and 132 for rumors of imminent attack on Greece.

The guarantees to Poland, Greece, and Rumania indicated a change in the position of British decision makers, but Chamberlain and Halifax still hoped to achieve their objectives without war. The pattern of British policy toward Germany during the next few months until the outbreak of war in September in some respects resembled previous British behavior during the Sudeten conflict. Simultaneously, they implemented a symbolic non-military policy along with their policy of military commitments. British spokesmen encouraged a negotiated settlement of the German demands regarding Danzig and the Corridor until Hitler indicated that negotiation was no longer possible. Similarly, Chamberlain and Halifax attempted to avoid alienating Mussolini after the guarantees to Greece and Rumania. The British government had protested the conquest of Albania, but had left the Anglo-Italian agreement intact and continued attempts to influence Hitler through Mussolini.⁸⁶

In April, 1939, Hitler made the first of a series of moves leading to war in September, when he denounced the German-Polish non-aggression pact of 1934.⁸⁷ In May the British Ambassador to Berlin revealed that Britain would fight over Danzig; at the same time there were unofficial British inquiries about German desires concerning economic and colonial questions.⁸⁸ At the end of June Halifax and Chamberlain publically

⁸⁶ D.B.F.P., Third Series, V, #'s 86-90, 95, 101, 110, 123, 317, 570.

⁸⁷ Previously, German strategy was to negotiate a new solution for Danzig and the Corridor, a strategy which had British sympathies. Thorne, op.cit., pp. 122-126, 129.

⁸⁸ D.B.F.P., Third Series, V, #'s 431, 489, 513, and D.G.F.P., Series D, VI, #182, on Danzig, and Gilbert and Gott, op.cit., pp. 213-215, on inquiries about a settlement.

TABLE 9. INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD GERMANY AND ITALY DURING THE SPRING OF 1939

<u>Date</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross- Press.</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
1/39	s/m	Holland and Swiss are <u>casus belli</u>	Milieu	Dutch & Swiss Terr. Integ.		High
3/39	s/n-m	Express concern over Czech.	Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.		Low
3/39	s/n-m	Protest Ger. act in Czech.	Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.		
3/39	s/m	Guarantee Poland	Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.		High
4/39	s/n-m	Protest Ital. act in Albania	Milieu	Alb. Terr. Integ.	Yes	
4/39	s/m	Guarantee Grk. & Rum.	Poss.	Rum. Oil&Br. Med. Poss.		High

reaffirmed the British commitment "to resist aggression," apparently reacting to rumors of a possible German military move against Danzig in early July. Chamberlain and Halifax informed Mussolini on July 5th, that, "Such a chain of events would lead immediately to a European war, for this country is absolutely united in its determination to carry out its pledges to Poland and the position is the same in France."⁸⁹

⁸⁹D.B.F.P., Third Series, VI, #234.

Chamberlain's perceptions in the aftermath of the "July scare" are revealed in this passage from his private letters in mid-July:⁹⁰

Dantzig (sic) is, of course, at present the danger spot. I have told Musso plainly that, if Hitler tries to get it by force, it will mean starting the European war. To which M. replies "let the Poles agree that Dantzig goes to the Reich, and I will do my best to get a peaceful agreed solution." But that is not good enough. That is just what we tried at Munich, but Hitler broke it up when it suited him. I doubt if any solution, short of war, is practicable at present, but if dictators would have a modicum of patience, I can imagine that a way could be found of meeting German claims while safeguarding Poland's independence and economic security.

Chamberlain still entertained the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the German-Polish conflict. Chamberlain's unofficial representative Sir Horace Wilson, apparently explored this possibility at the end of July in conversations with Dr. Wohltat, a representative of German economic interests,⁹¹ and again on August 3rd in a meeting with Dirksen, the German ambassador.⁹²

The month of August brought an increase in international tension as relations between Poland and Germany deteriorated. Germany and Poland exchanged warnings during the second week of August concerning the obstruction of customs collections on the frontier between Poland and Danzig. Further customs and frontier incidents occurred the following week, and on August 19th the British received information that Germany planned to attack Poland between August 25th and 28th.

⁹⁰Quoted in Feiling, op.cit., p. 407.

⁹¹Gilbert and Gott, op.cit., pp. 219-235.

⁹²Cited from Dirksen Papers, #24 in Thorne, p. 163. The Dirksen Papers are also known as Documents and Materials Relating to the Second World War, II (Moscow, 1948).

Chamberlain and Halifax again wrote Mussolini that such a move would mean British intervention.⁹³

On August 21st the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was announced. On the 22nd Chamberlain sent Hitler a message through the German Ambassador, which warned Hitler that Britain would meet her obligations to Poland and urged a negotiated settlement between Germany and Poland. He also suggested a guarantee by the Great Powers for such a solution.⁹⁴ Hitler's replies over the next three days suggested that he would act to resolve the Polish question within the next few days, but that he wished to reach a settlement with Britain afterwards regarding armaments and colonies.⁹⁵

On August 25th the British and Polish governments ratified a treaty in which the two nations agreed to support one another against "any action by a European Power which clearly threatens, directly or indirectly, the independence of one of (them)."⁹⁶ There followed during the next six days an exchange of messages between the British and German governments, initiated by Hitler, which explored the possibility of a negotiated settlement.⁹⁷ The British throughout these exchanges advocated direct negotiations between Poland and Germany and attempted to

⁹³Thorne, p. 155.

⁹⁴D.B.F.P., Third Series, VII, #145.

⁹⁵Thorne, pp. 180-183. See also D.G.F.P., Series D, VII, #200.

⁹⁶Quoted in Thorne, p. 184. A secret protocol specified Germany as the Power and Danzig as included within the scope of indirect aggression. The text of the agreement is in D.B.F.P., Third Series, VII, #309.

⁹⁷See Survey, 1939-1946, pp. 519-45, for a detailed account and Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., for a brief, accurate version.

arrange such an opportunity.⁹⁸ The success of these British efforts depended upon the policy choices of Poland and Germany, but neither government was ready to negotiate on the other's terms. Consequently, on the evening of August 31st a spokesman for the German government informed Henderson, the British Ambassador, that attempts to negotiate "were now to be considered terminated by the neglect of others."⁹⁹

The next morning Germany invaded Poland. The British government responded with a double policy: full mobilization and a warning to Germany that the British would "fulfill their obligations to Poland" unless Germany withdraws her forces from Polish territory and suspends all aggressive action against Poland.¹⁰⁰ The principal restraint upon British policy at this point was the plea of the French government for more time to prepare for war and the British desire to coordinate the French declaration of war with Britain's.¹⁰¹ Finally, on the evening of September 2nd Halifax insisted to the French that Britain must deliver an ultimatum to Germany regarding troop withdrawal that would expire by noon the next day. The French responded that they would also act by noon.¹⁰² The British ambassador delivered the ultimatum the

⁹⁸Mussolini's effort to arrange another "Munich Conference" was refused by Britain after some wavering and discussion with the French Government. Thorne, op.cit., pp. 196-197.

⁹⁹Thorne, p. 197, D.B.F.P., Third Series, VII, #619.

¹⁰⁰Thorne, p. 199 and D.B.F.P., Third Series, VII, #669.

¹⁰¹The French were also attempting to keep Mussolini's conference proposal alive; the British would not attend unless Germany withdrew troops, which the Germans refused to do. Thorne, pp. 200-201, and D.B.F.P., Third Series, VII, #'s 699, 700 and 708.

¹⁰²D.B.F.P., Third Series, VII, #741.

TABLE 10. INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
DURING THE POLISH CRISIS

<u>Decision</u>			<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Primary Reasons</u>	
<u>Date</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross- Press.</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
5/39	s/m	Will fight for Danzig	Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.		High
5/39	s/n-m	Ask about Ger. Col. obj's.	Milieu	Eur. coll. security		
6/39	s/m	Br. will resist aggression	Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.		High
8/39	s/m	Br. will resist aggression	Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.		High
8/39	s/m	Br. will meet its Pol. obli- gation	Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.		High
8/39	s/m	Br.-Pol. reci- procal guarantee	Milieu	Pol. & Fr. Terr. Integ.		High
9/39	q/m	Br. mobilize	Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.		Low
9/39	s/m	Br. ultimatum to Ger.	Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.		High
9/39	a/m	Br. enters war	Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.		High

next morning. Germany's refusal to comply brought the two nations to war.

The Far East

When World War II Began, Italy and Japan were not participants. Italy remained neutral until the German invasion of France in 1940, when Mussolini joined Hitler. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan entered World War II on the side of the Axis in December, 1941, but Japanese armies had been fighting in China since 1937. Between 1937 and 1941 the British government faced the task of protecting British diplomatic stakes in the face of Japanese attempts to defeat China in the Sino-Japanese War.

The Tangku Truce had ended the first phase of the Sino-Japanese conflict in May, 1933, with the Japanese in control of Manchuria and a neutralized zone along the border of northern China. Although the Manchurian war had weakened China militarily and economically, the Japanese government discouraged efforts by the League of Nations, the United States, and individual European countries to aid China financially after the truce. Tokyo's Foreign Office issued the Amau Doctrine in April, 1934.¹⁰³ It stated that the Japanese government opposed all forms of aid to China from any other country than Japan, whose "guiding principle should be generally to defeat foreign activities in China at present, not only those of a joint nature but those conducted individually, in view of the fact that China is still trying to tie Japan's hands through using the influence of foreign Powers."¹⁰⁴ The British reaction to the Amau Doctrine was to inquire about Japan's treaty obligations; Japan replied that foreign rights in China, the Nine Power

¹⁰³ See Borg, op.cit., Ch. III, especially pp. 75-76.

¹⁰⁴ Quoted in Borg, ibid., p. 76.

Treaty, and the Open Door principles would be respected.¹⁰⁵ The Amau Doctrine applied primarily to government-to-government aid rather than private investments.

Between 1934 and 1937 British policy in the Far East attempted to protect the British economic position in China and reach an agreement with Japan regarding their relations in China. In late 1936 secret conversations began between the Japanese ambassador and the British Foreign Office; they continued until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in the summer of 1937. The Japanese ambassador explored the possibilities of reaching a new consensus regarding the "protection and rehabilitation of China," but the British would not consider any new agreements without the participation of China and the United States.¹⁰⁶

British policy between 1934 and 1937 operated at the symbolic non-military level under international restraints that would continue to influence policy choices after the Sino-Japanese War began. They were the British involvement in Europe, British military capabilities, and the policy of the United States in the Far East. Militarily, the British navy's China Squadron consisted of "six cruisers, a light fleet carrier, ten destroyers, seventeen submarines, and various ancillary craft, including thirteen gunboats on the Yangtze and five on the West

¹⁰⁵Nicholas R. Clifford, Retreat from China (Seattle, 1967), p. 8, who cites Borg, Chapter II.

¹⁰⁶Clifford, p. 12. In March, 1937, Chamberlain, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, had suggested to the U.S. Government that "The time might be ripe for an Anglo-American-Japanese agreement that would prevent the simultaneous outbreak of war in Europe and the Far East," but his idea was rejected by the U.S.

River."¹⁰⁷ The possibility of war with Germany and Italy in Europe prevented the reinforcement of this squadron with ships from European waters.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, any British military policy would need the support of the American navy, and any non-military policy which might alienate the Japanese should have the support of the United States. Lacking either one, British policy makers explored the possibilities of conciliating Japan until the fighting began between Japan and China in July, 1937.¹⁰⁹

British diplomatic stakes in China consisted of China's territorial integrity, upon which the British depended for the maintenance of their economic position in China and to which they were committed as members of the League of Nations.¹¹⁰ The British economic interests included the Maritime Customs arrangement, investment in Chinese railroads, trade and navigation privileges in Chinese inland waters, trading rights in northern China, and the British position at the Treaty Ports of Shanghai and Tientsin.¹¹¹

When the fighting erupted, the British government suggested that the British, French, and American governments make a joint expression of concern, but the Americans refused and recommended that parallel

¹⁰⁷ Clifford, p. 14.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ This pattern of British thinking stems from the Manchurian conflict. See Vansittart's memo in Chapter III of this study, p. 59.

¹¹⁰ For an inventory of British territory and investments, cf. Clifford, pp. 15-16, and p. 56.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

but separate expressions would be more effective. The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, subsequently instructed his Ambassadors to Japan and China to make unilateral representations.¹¹² This pattern of coordinating British policy with American policy continued at the Brussels Conference in November, 1937. The League of Nations had recommended that the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty meet to consider a joint policy regarding the war. At Brussels Eden told the American delegate, Norman Davis, in private conversation:¹¹³

...His Majesty's Government were ready for the fullest cooperation with the United States Government. It was, however, useless to ignore the European situation and we could take no action in the Far East while the present conditions persisted in Europe, except in full cooperation with the United States.

The conference members twice invited Japan to participate, but each time the Japanese government refused. The United States refused to support a sanctions policy, while Britain privately recommended non-recognition and the withholding of credits and loans to Japan--subject to American approval. Consequently, no policy was adopted beyond a statement that the signatories did not think that force could solve the problems in East Asia. Then the conference adjourned with the provision that it might be recalled after further consideration of the problems.¹¹⁴

Meanwhile, the Japanese forces in northern China captured the territory around Shanghai. All of the Great Powers with interests in

¹¹²Ibid., p. 18.

¹¹³Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators, op.cit., p. 609.

¹¹⁴Clifford, op.cit., pp. 41-43, and Eden, pp. 606-613.

Shanghai--Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States--sought assurances that the fighting would not spread to Shanghai and protested when it did.¹¹⁵ A British proposal for an Anglo-French-American guarantee of the safety of Japanese civilians in Shanghai in return for neutralizing the city was supported by France but opposed by the United States, apparently because of Japanese opposition to the plan.¹¹⁶ The Japanese army used Japan's section of the International Settlement as a base for operations outside Shanghai, which the British protested as a violation of the Settlement's neutral status. Eden was willing to consider a trade embargo against Japan in July, but Prime Minister Chamberlain and the American government opposed such sanctions.¹¹⁷ By November 10th Japan had won the battle for Shanghai.

The next threat to British interests came in December, when the Japanese shelled H.M.S. Ladybird and H.M.S. Bee and sank the U.S.S. Panay on the Yangtze River. This incident climaxed Japanese interference with British navigation and trade in the battle area. Both sides had restricted British movements on the river since August, but the shelling of warships was a violation of neutral rights, and the British were formally neutral in the conflict. The British government protested separately after the United States refused to make explicitly parallel or joint representations. A suggestion by the British for a demonstration of naval force was also rejected by the United States; a

¹¹⁵ The British section of Shanghai was also apparently reinforced to protect lives and property, as in 1932, Clifford, ibid., p. 25.

¹¹⁶ Clifford, ibid., p. 23.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 26, and Eden, pp. 603-613.

policy of economic sanctions, suggested by Roosevelt for consideration, was dropped when the Japanese and American governments settled the Panay incident at the end of December.¹¹⁸

Other British diplomatic stakes in China were also located inside the war zone; they came under Japanese pressure during 1937 and the early part of 1938. The Japanese wanted to control the revenues collected by the Maritime Customs organization, introduce a new currency in occupied territory, and take over the railways in which British money was invested. The British government attempted to negotiate solutions to the problems which these policies caused for British economic interests. Restrictions upon navigation and trading rights increased during 1938; British protests elicited Japanese justification on the grounds of military necessity. When the American government refused to support any firm British stand on these questions, the British negotiators agreed to deposit funds from the Maritime Customs into Japanese banks and cooperate at a minimal level with Japanese demands regarding the other issues.¹¹⁹ This symbolic non-military policy tried to maintain the British economic position in China without directly attempting to influence the outcome of the Sino-Japanese war.

During this period Britain refused to implement economic sanctions against Japan or grant Chinese requests for financial aid. The official

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Eden, ibid., p. 618, and Clifford, ibid., p. 50. The only military outcome of the Panay incident was F.D.R.'s decision to send a U.S. naval officer to Britain for staff conversations regarding the Pacific, if war should occur with Japan. The officer was not prepared to discuss immediate joint action, only technical matters. Eden, ibid., pp. 618-620.

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Clifford, ibid., Chapter VI, gives an excellent summary of these economic issues between Britain and Japan.

TABLE 11. INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
DURING THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937-1938

<u>Date</u>	<u>Decision</u>		<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Primary Reasons</u>	
	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross-Press.</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's</u>
12/36	s/n-m	Conversations with Japan	Poss.	Br. Poss. in China	Yes	Low
7/37	s/n-m	Express concern over fighting	Milieu	Ch. Terr. Integ.	Yes	Low
8/37	s/n-m	Want assurances about Shanghai	Milieu	Neutral status of Shanghai	Yes	Low
8/37	s/n-m	Protest over Shanghai	Milieu	Neutral status of Shanghai	Yes	Low
12/37	s/n-m	Protest over Ladybird	Poss.	Br. naviga- tion rts.	Yes	Low
3/38	s/n-m	Protest over restrictions	Poss.	Br. naviga- tion rts.	Yes	Low
5/38	s/n-m	Agree to deposit Maritime funds	Poss.	Br. trade rts.	Yes	Low
6/38	s/n-m	Open conversa- tions	Poss.	Br. poss. in	Yes	Low
6/38	a/n-m	Offer to medi- ate	Milieu	Ch. Terr. Integ.	Yes	

British position regarding the war remained a neutral one. In the summer of 1938 after a change of Foreign Ministers in the Japanese Cabinet talks began between Robert Craigie, the British ambassador, and the new Japanese Foreign Minister. The conversations discussed a settlement of the issues concerning Shanghai, the railways in the war zone, and the reopening of the Yangtze River to navigation. Chamberlain accompanied the opening of the discussion with a public offer of British mediation in the Sino-Japanese conflict.¹²⁰ The conversations continued without success until the middle of September, 1938, when Ugaki, the Foreign Minister, resigned. His successor announced that if the British wished to continue the talks, they would be handled by lower officials in the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The termination of these conversations ended the last British effort to gain a general negotiated settlement with Japan in the Far East.¹²¹

British policy alternatives after the termination of high-ranking negotiations included: (1) to continue a symbolic non-military policy characterized by neutrality in the Sino-Japanese war and piecemeal protests and bargaining over Japanese restrictions of Nine Power Treaty rights and the Open Door; (2) an actual non-military policy of economic aid to China and/or economic sanctions against the Japanese, which would be a de facto abandonment of neutrality; (3) military action to protect British stakes in China. Events between September and December, 1938, stimulated British policy makers to consider a new choice among these policy options. On September 30th the League of Nations declared that

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 83.

¹²¹Ibid., pp. 83-85.

a policy of sanctions under Article XVI was now applicable to Japan on an individual basis. In early October the American government delivered their strongest protest yet to Japan concerning violations of the Open Door in Manchuria and the occupied sections of China. On October 12th Japanese forces landed in southern China and occupied Canton; concurrently, by October 25th Japanese troops occupied Hankow and the remainder of the Yangtze River valley in northern China. On November 2nd the Japanese government proclaimed plans for a New Order in East Asia; it envisioned "a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and coordination between Japan, Manchukuo, and China" that would reduce the position of the European powers in Asia. On November 6th Chiang Kai-shek hinted to British representatives that China might cooperate with the New Order if British aid against Japan was not forthcoming.¹²²

The British responded to these events in November and December, 1938. They protested jointly with the United States and France on November 7th against the continuation of navigation restrictions on the Yangtze after the fighting in that area had ceased. Following this move, Britain and the United States separately guaranteed grants to China for financing the purchase of British and American exports.¹²³ These British policies were intended to adapt to the changed policies of the United States and the challenge of the New Order Doctrine without substantially increasing the threat of war with Japan. During the months preceding the outbreak of war in Europe the British government had occasion to reaffirm these new policies. In February, 1939,

¹²² Ibid., pp. 87, 88, 86, 89-92, 87.

¹²³ Ibid., pp. 94-96.

the British Cabinet authorized a government loan to stabilize the Chinese currency (fapi) which was under attack by the Japanese yen in the occupied areas. In the spring and summer of 1939 Japan brought pressure to bear upon the British position in Shanghai, Amoy, and Tientsin. These cities with their large foreign communities were an obstacle to Japanese control in occupied China. The foreign settlements in Shanghai and Amoy were internationally administered, while in Tientsin each European Power had control of its own concession.¹²⁴

Japanese behavior in Shanghai was confined to demanding administrative reforms that would give Japan a greater share in governing the city. At Amoy, however, the Japanese landed troops in May, 1939, to "restore order" after an official of the Japanese puppet regime in the area was murdered. When Western protests against the landing of troops were ignored, British, French and American cruisers steamed into Amoy's harbor and dispatched troops to "help the Japanese restore order" to the International Settlement there. Negotiations took place throughout the summer until the outbreak of war in Europe, when British and French forces withdrew.¹²⁵ The British decision to take military action in Amoy reflected their realization that Amoy might be a test case for future Japanese policy in Shanghai; in addition, the British had the support of the French and the United States.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 109.

¹²⁵ Ibid., pp. 108-112. American troops remained until October, when agreement to increase the number of Japanese police in Amoy brought mutual withdrawal.

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp. 111-112.

The dispute between Britain and Japan in Tientsin began with negotiations concerning Chinese silver deposits in European banks located in Tientsin.¹²⁷ Other questions compounded the dispute; Japanese officials claimed that Chinese assassins were hiding in the British and French Concessions. Raids jointly conducted by British and Japanese police yielded several suspects, but no conclusive evidence that they were responsible for any specific terrorist acts and assassinations. When Britain refused to hand over the suspects, the Japanese authorities announced in June, 1939, that they would blockade the British and French Concessions in order to prevent infiltration by Chinese guerrillas. The blockade greatly delayed the shipment of food and fuel into the Concessions, and the British protested.¹²⁸

Lack of support by France and the United States for any stronger measures led British decision makers to adopt a policy of negotiations to end the blockade. The Japanese linked the infiltrators issue with the currency issue during the negotiations. After a year of negotiations the British and Japanese signed a comprehensive agreement that lifted the blockade, resolved the silver question, and provided for joint policy arrangements. The arrangement on currency matters did not have the support of France or the United States, who had disassociated themselves from the negotiations in August, 1939.¹²⁹ Until after the fall of France and the Low Countries in the summer of 1940,

¹²⁷ For a summary of the Tientsin dispute, see ibid., pp. 112-126, 129-130.

¹²⁸ Ibid., pp. 124-125.

¹²⁹ Ibid., pp. 124-125.

TABLE 12. INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
DURING THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1938-1939

<u>Date</u>	<u>Decision</u>		<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Primary Reasons</u>	
	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross-Press.</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
11/38	s/n-m	Protest navigation restrictions.	Poss.	Br. Yangtze River rts.	Yes	
12/38	a/n-m	Grants to China	Milieu	Ch. Terr. Integ.	Yes	
2/39	a/n-m	Govt. currency loan	Milieu	Ch. Terr. Integ.	Yes	
5/39	s/n-m	Protest Amoy landing	Poss.	Br. poss. in Amoy	Yes	
5/39	q/m	Land troops in Amoy	Poss.	Br. poss. in Amoy		High
6/39	a/n-m	Negotiate Tientsin	Poss.	Br. rts. Tientsin	Yes	Low
9/39	s/n-m	Withdraw Amoy troops but still negotiate	Poss.	Br. poss. in Amoy	Yes	

the immediate focus of Anglo-Japanese differences remained in China, and the American government refused to make a military commitment on behalf of British interests there. Consequently, the British attempted to conciliate the Japanese at Tientsin.

The outbreak of the war in Europe altered the relationships among

British diplomatic stakes in the Far East. Economic interests in China now counted relatively little compared to the problem of imperial defense. The defense of India, Singapore, Burma, Malaya, Australia, and New Zealand required that Anglo-Japanese conflicts be kept short of war unless backed by a strong military position. The British navy could not simultaneously patrol European and Asian waters, so unless war came to the Far East or the tide of battle turned in Europe, the British navy would stay in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The only other source of sufficient military support in the Far East was the American navy. Therefore, American policy became a crucial determinant of British policy in Asia.¹³⁰ When Germany conquered France and Holland, the question of who would control Indo-China and the East Indies arose, which in turn concerned the American position in the Phillippines and the Pacific. The British were also interested in the future of Indo-China; it bordered Burma and Malaya, which were adjacent to India. The fate of the East Indies concerned imperial defense as well, since they were located next to Australia and New Zealand. In June, 1940, the Japanese demanded that the British close the Hong Kong frontiers and the Burma Road over which supplies and arms flowed to China. After two futile appeals to the United States for support against the Japanese, Churchill announced on July 18th that Hong Kong and the Burma Road would be closed for three months in order to search for an acceptable permanent agreement.¹³¹ When negotiations

¹³⁰Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950), pp. 587-588, 600-601, and Clifford, ibid., pp. 131-133.

¹³¹Clifford, ibid., pp. 142-145.

TABLE 13. INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD JAPAN, 1940-1941

<u>Decision</u>			<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Primary Reasons</u>	
<u>Date</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Cross-Press.</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
7/40	s/n-m	Negotiate over Burma Rd.	Milieu	Ch. Terr. Integ.	Yes	Low
10/40	a/n-m	Maintain Burma Rd.	Milieu	Ch. Terr. Integ.	Yes	Low
7/41	s/n-m	Freeze Jap. Assets	Milieu	Indo-China		High
12/41	a/m	Enter war against Japan	Poss.	Br. Empir.		High

with Japan failed to produce any agreement, the British reopened the Burma Road in October.

Another conflict reflected similar British concerns, but this time the British and American responses harmonized. On July 24, 1941, Japanese troops landed in southern Indo-China to occupy bases extorted from the Vichy Government. The British and American governments reacted jointly by freezing Japanese funds inside their respective countries and restricting their trade with Japan.¹³² The British decision to adopt these economic sanctions against Japan was influenced primarily by the American decision to implement such a policy. Japan's future

¹³² Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (Boston, 1965), pp. 361-363, and Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950), pp. 586-587.

policy options of capitulating to American pressure or war with the sanctionist powers were secondary considerations, because both Churchill and Eden believed that if Japan chose war, the United States would go to war. Therefore, future American policy choices outweighed Japan's future policy options.¹³³

The Dutch East Indies copied the Anglo-American policy, thereby cutting off the last source of oil and other resources for the Japanese war machine. This joint sanctions policy continued while Japanese-American negotiators met until Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and Singapore in December, 1941, bringing World War II to the Far East.

¹³³
Ibid.

PART III.

CHAPTER V

INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

Overview

The findings which follow are based upon an analysis of eighty-five British foreign-policy decisions. Before reporting the relationships suggested by these cases, a profile of the characteristics of the decisions should help to put the findings in perspective. The first three tables below show the distribution of policy decisions by target, type of policy choice, type of policy change, type of policy goal, and type of determinant.

TABLE 14. DECISIONS BY TARGET AND INTENSITY
OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR, 1931-1941

		<u>Target</u>			<u>Total Decisions</u>
<u>Conflict Behavior</u>		<u>Japan</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	
Low	s/n-m	61%(19)	55%(11)	44%(15)	53% (45)
	a/n-m	29%(9)	25%(5)	9%(3)	20% (17)
High	s/m		10%(2)	38%(13)	18% (15)
	a/m*	<u>10%(3)</u> 100%(31)	<u>10%(2)</u> 100%(20)	<u>9%(3)</u> 100%(34)	<u>9% (8)</u> 100% (85)
Total Decisions:		36%(31) + 24%(20) + 40%(34) = 100% (85)			

*Contains both quasi and actual military behaviors.

Table 14 indicates that British decision makers were involved in Europe, the Mediterranean, and Far East at roughly the same level in terms of the number of key decisions taken toward Japan, Italy, and Germany between 1931 and 1941. The table does not show the chronological order of policy decisions, but the organization of the preceding narrative chapters indicates this feature. Between 1931 and 1936 (Chapter III) British decision makers confronted sequentially Japan in Manchuria, Italy in Abyssinia, and Germany in the Rhineland; between 1937 and 1941 (Chapter IV) they faced simultaneously Italy in Spain, Germany in East Europe, and Japan in China.¹ The level of British involvement according to frequency of types of conflict behavior varied from target to target over the ten-year period. British decision makers found it appropriate to engage in high conflict behavior toward Japan in 10 percent of their decisions, Italy 20 percent, and Germany 47 percent. For the entire period, 1931-1941, the British government engaged in high conflict behavior in 27 percent of their decisions toward these targets.

Table 15 shows the relative frequency of different types of policy changes and policy goals. Only 25 percent of British policy decisions occurred in situations where the diplomatic stakes were British possessions. The remainder involved the possessions of other nations, and Table 15 suggests that British policy makers pursued an incremental strategy in their involvement with these stakes. On the

¹ Actually, Germany occupied the attention of British policy makers before 1936, but specific conflicts of significant intensity did not occur until then--with the possible exception of the perennial Anschluss question and the rearmament issue.

TABLE 15. DECISIONS BY TYPE OF POLICY GOAL
AND TYPE OF POLICY CHANGE, 1931-1941

		<u>Policy Goals</u>		
		<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Possession</u>	<u>Total Decisions</u>
Policy	Low	95% (61)	52% (11)	85% (72)
Change	High	5% (3)	48% (10)	15% (13)
		100% (64)	100% (21)	100% (85)
Total Decisions:		75% (74)	+ 25% (21)	100% (85)

other hand, in situations involving British possessions radical policy changes were much more likely.

Table 16 displays the frequency with which the different determinants of British foreign policy apply to the eighty-five British policy decisions. Several interesting points emerge from Table 16. First, only 33 percent of the decisions show the presence of cross-pressures, although a high percentage (81%) had more than one primary reason for a rationale. This gap would indicate that the structural features of a multipolar system do not appear to be directly related to two-thirds of the British conflict behavior surveyed in this study. Several factors account for this gap, including idiosyncratic traits of different British decision makers and variations in the intensity of cross-pressures within the ten-year period under investigation. Subsequent sections of this chapter explore these alternative explanations. Second, almost three fourths of the British decisions fit the power-politics model. British decision makers considered their relative military capabilities

before making 71 percent of their decisions. This finding is even more striking when contrasted with the small proportion of possession goals (25%) and the large proportion of non-military decisions (73%) which appear for this period in Tables 15 and 14, respectively. These latter figures would suggest that with tangible and, therefore, vital British interests at stake only a small proportion of the time, coupled with non-violent behavior as the most typical British policy during this period, concern for relative military capabilities would be relatively infrequent.

TABLE 16. DECISIONS BY EXPLANATORY MODELS

<u>Determinants</u>	<u>Number of Decisions</u>	<u>% of Total Decisions</u>
National Interests	85	100%
Power Politics	60	71%
Cross-Pressures	28	33%
Multi-Determinant*	69	81%

*National Interests plus either Cross-Pressures or Power Politics Models.

This anomaly is explainable on at least two grounds.² First, in a large number of these situations at least one of the parties in the conflict engaged in military activity, a circumstance that would make

²This finding is not surprising to the real politick school of international politics, which emphasizes the fear of war as a pervasive aspect of most foreign policy decisions. A recent and imaginative exploration of this approach is James Payne, The American Threat: the Fear of War as an Instrument of American Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1970), especially Chapter 1.

all decision makers sensitive to relative military capabilities. Second, the British were fearful of the future intentions of the rulers of Japan, Italy, and Germany throughout the period and typically reacted by considering the most violent outcomes as a possibility in their conflicts with these governments, whether or not the immediate circumstances of a particular conflict directly suggested such an outcome. Two types of conflict situations, therefore, emerge from the data: non-military and military conflict situations. They differ according to whether the British decision maker perceived relative military capabilities as a primary determinant of his decision. Comparatively speaking, the decision maker presumably perceived the threat to British diplomatic stakes, milieu or possession, as low in non-military situations and high in military situations. Consequently, if the threat was low, then appropriate British conflict behavior was low, and if the threat was high, then British conflict behavior was also high. These two propositions offer a very parsimonious explanation of British conflict behavior that is compatible with the results of the Stanford studies by Robert North and his colleagues, who conclude that high levels of conflict behavior correlate with high perceptions of threat.³ Table 17 presents the evidence for this proposition.

Non-Military situations show the expected results: a high proportion of low conflict behavior (88%). However, there is also a high proportion of low conflict behavior (67%) in military situations, which would suggest that either we are making an artificial distinction between

³Robert North, Dina Zinnes, and Howard E. Koch, Jr., "Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak of War," in James Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (Glencoe, 1961), 469-482.

TABLE 17. DECISIONS BY TYPE OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR
AND TYPE OF CONFLICT SITUATION

		<u>Type of Situation</u>	
<u>Conflict Behavior</u>		<u>Non-Military</u>	<u>Military</u>
Low	s/n-m	56% (14)	52% (31)
	a/n-m	32% (8)	15% (9)
High	s/m	8% (2)	22% (13)
	a/m	4% (1)	12% (7)
		N= (25)	N= (60)

types of situations or that other variables are operating to produce these results. Table 18 shows the effects of controlling for level of military capabilities as the power politics hypothesis would suggest: if decision makers perceive relative capabilities to be insufficient (low), then they will tend to select low levels of conflict behavior.

The table indicates that the British were more likely to engage in low conflict behavior in military situations if they perceived their relative capabilities as low and suggests a strong correlation between high conflict behavior and high capabilities. However, Table 18 also shows that, regardless of the level of military capabilities, the British tended to select symbolic military behavior rather than actual military behavior even though the latter category has been inflated to include both demonstrations of military force and actual military conflict. This result could be due (a) to the presence of other international restraints, e.g., cross-pressures and milieu goals;

(b) to differences in the intensity of perceived threats within military situations; (c) to responses by the targets of initial British threats which made actual military behavior unnecessary; or (d) to a submissive rather than aggressive response pattern by the British to threat situations, in which symbolic military behavior was a face-saving gesture for British decision makers.

TABLE 18. DECISIONS IN MILITARY SITUATIONS BY TYPE
OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR AND RELATIVE CAPABILITIES

		<u>Military Situations</u>	
<u>Conflict Behavior</u>		<u>Low Capabilities</u>	<u>High Capabilities</u>
Low	s/n-m	77% (30)	5% (1)
	a/n-m	18% (7)	9% (2)
High	s/m	-----	62% (13)
	a/m	5% (2)	24% (5)
		N = (39)	N = (21)

Controlling for the effects of cross-pressures is possible by further cross tabulation. In order to test the second alternative it is necessary to have a measure of threat-intensity beyond the consideration of relative military capabilities that simply distinguishes military from non-military conflict situations. Differences in diplomatic stakes provide this type of measure with threats to milieu goals likely to be perceived as less intense than threats to possession goals, according to the national interests model. Examination of the third alternative requires evidence available from the historical narrative


chapters about the target's response to initial British threats and subsequent British behavior. The fourth alternative would emerge as a residual explanation if alternatives (a), (b), and (c) do not explain the thirteen cases of British symbolic military behavior. A high frequency of cases that do not fit (a), (b), and (c) would support the version of the appeasement thesis that interprets British behavior as motivated by an extreme fear of war, either because of domestic considerations or personality traits of the decision makers.⁴

An overview of British behavior, therefore, raises two questions for analysis in addition to the theoretical propositions presented in Chapter 1. First, why did so few British decisions occur under cross-pressures between 1931 and 1941? Second, why did British decision makers fail to use actual military force in several conflict situations when they perceived themselves to have high military capabilities? The remainder of this chapter examines the data in an attempt to answer these questions plus explain British conflict behavior in terms of systems theory and the different theories of decision making. The systems theory and decision making hypotheses from Chapter 1 appear on the following page.

British Behavior in Non-Military Situations

Table 19 shows the distribution of policy decisions in non-military situations by intensity of conflict behavior, existence of cross-pressures, and type of diplomatic stakes. All nine decisions in Table 19


⁴The conclusion of this study explores the relationships between the findings in this chapter and various historical interpretations of this period in British diplomatic history.



a. Systems Hypotheses.

1a. The greater the number of members in the system, the greater the number of interaction opportunities and the more likely a member will become involved in several conflicts that will generate cross-pressures.

2a. The greater the number of conflicts that involve a particular member and create cross-pressures, the lower his available military capabilities for a particular conflict.




b. Decision-Making Hypotheses.

1b. If cross-pressures exist, then the decision maker's conflict behavior is likely to be low in intensity and change incrementally over time.

2b. If relative capabilities are low, then the decision maker's conflict behavior is likely to be low in intensity and change incrementally over time.

3b. If the diplomatic stakes are low (secondary interests) then the decision maker's conflict behavior is likely to be low in intensity and change incrementally over time.

4b. The greater the number of international restraints, the more likely a decision maker's conflict



c. Hybrid Hypotheses.

All of the hypotheses from the systems model plus hypothesis 3b from the decision-making models (and possibly 1b as well) apply to the hybrid model.

- | | | |
|--|--|------------------------------|
| <p>a. Systems Hypotheses.</p> <p>3a. The lower the member's capabilities, the less likely his conflict behavior will be intense and change radically over time</p> | <p>b. Decision-Making Hypotheses.</p> <p>4b. behavior will be low in intensity and change incrementally over time.</p> | <p>c. Hybrid Hypotheses.</p> |
|--|--|------------------------------|

Figure 8. Alternative Models of British Conflict Behavior

that have high cross-pressures associated with them also exhibit low levels of conflict behavior. The fifteen decisions which do not have high cross-pressures include all of the decisions in non-military situations that have high levels of conflict behavior. Of these three high conflict policies, two were associated with possession goals. These findings are consistent with the cross-pressures and national interests models which hypothesize that low levels of conflict behavior are associated with high cross-pressures and milieu goals, respectively.

TABLE 19. DECISIONS IN NON-MILITARY SITUATIONS BY TYPE
OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR, DIPLOMATIC STAKES,
AND EXISTENCE OF CROSS-PRESSURES

		<u>Non-Military Situations</u>			
		<u>Cross-Pressures</u>		<u>No Cross-Pressures</u>	
<u>Conflict Behavior</u>		<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Possession</u>	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Possession</u>
Low	s/n-m	50% (3)	100% (3)	50% (5)	50% (3)
	a/n-m	50% (3)	-----	40% (4)	17% (1)
High	s/m	-----	-----	10% (1)	17% (1)
	a/m	-----	-----	-----	17% (1)
		<u>N = (6)</u>	<u>N = (3)</u>	<u>N = (10)</u>	<u>N = (6)</u>

Table 20 summarizes the relationships between policy change, type of diplomatic stakes, and existence of cross-pressures for British policy decisions in non-military situations. In the table radical policy change is most likely to occur when the stakes are possession goals. The association of possession goals with radical policy change is consistent with

the assumption of the national interests model, that national decision makers will take more risks for possession goals than for milieu goals. There is no relationship between British policy change and the presence or absence of cross-pressures.

TABLE 20. DECISIONS IN NON-MILITARY SITUATIONS BY TYPE
OF POLICY CHANGE, DIPLOMATIC STAKES,
AND EXISTENCE OF CROSS-PRESSURES

		<u>Non-Military Situations</u>			
		<u>Cross-Pressures</u>		<u>No Cross-Pressures</u>	
		<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Possession</u>	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Possession</u>
Policy	Low	100% (6)	67% (2)	100% (10)	67% (4)
Change	High	----	33% (1)	-----	33% (2)
		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
		N = (6)	N = (3)	N = (10)	N = (6)

The association in Table 19 of high conflict behavior and high policy change with possession goals and no cross-pressures on the one hand, and the existence of cross-pressures and milieu goals with low conflict behavior and low policy change on the other, suggests that British decision makers may be less sensitive to the existence of cross-pressures when possession goals are the stakes than when milieu goals are the stakes. Table 21 presents the evidence regarding this proposition, and reveals a very weak relationship in support of the hypothesis.

Table 21 assumes that perception of cross-pressures is an index of the decision maker's sensitivity to their existence. One rationale for associating insensitivity with possession goals is the theory of

TABLE 21. DECISIONS IN NON-MILITARY SITUATIONS BY PERCEPTION OF CROSS-PRESSURES AND TYPE OF DIPLOMATIC STAKES

<u>Non-Military Situations</u>		<u>Diplomatic Stakes</u>	
		<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Possession</u>
Perception of	No	62% (10)	67% (6)
Cross-Pressures	Yes	38% (6)	33% (3)
		<u>N = (16)</u>	<u>N = (9)</u>

cognitive dissonance, which suggests that individuals subconsciously structure their perceptions to reduce conflicts among decision alternatives by focusing upon the most salient aspects of the decision-making situation. If we use tangibility of policy goals as an index of saliency, then the concrete, immediate aspects of possession goals would be more salient to the decision maker than the indirect, more intangible, cross-pressures aspects of the present decision's relationship to other decisions regarding other goals. On the other hand, where the immediate stakes are relatively intangible milieu goals, then the decision maker confronts two relatively remote, intangible aspects of the situation; the relationship of some other nation's possession goals to his own decision and the relationship between this decision regarding these goals and his interest in other goals outside this particular conflict.⁵

⁵On the theory of cognitive dissonance, see Leon Festinger, The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, 1957). For its application to political decision makers, see Joseph De Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, 1968), pp. 37, 125.

So far, we have examined British decisions in non-military situations and tested the following hypotheses with the results listed below.

<u>Model</u>	<u>Results</u>	<u>Hypothesis</u>
cross-pressures	Yes	1) If British decision makers find themselves under cross-pressures, then they will be more likely to select low levels of conflict behavior.
national interests	Yes	2) If British diplomatic stakes are milieu goals, then they will be more likely to select low levels of conflict behavior.
cross-pressures	No	3) If British policy makers find themselves under cross-pressures, then they will be more likely to select an incremental policy change.
national interests	Yes	4) If British diplomatic stakes are milieu goals, then British decision makers are more likely to select an incremental policy change.
cognitive dissonance	Maybe	5) If British diplomatic stakes are possession goals, then the intensity of British conflict behavior is less likely to be sensitive to cross-pressures.

The relationships between these findings and systems theory are mixed. On the one hand, there is the positive relationship between high cross-pressures and low conflict behavior, which is partially

consistent with the model. On the other hand, only nine of the twenty-five British decisions in non-military situations (36%) occurred under cross-pressures. The latter finding would suggest that the structural features of the international system have limited applicability in explaining a large proportion of these British decisions in non-military situations. Why were so few of these decisions made under cross-pressures, even though there was a diffuse distribution of capabilities and simultaneous British participation in a number of regional conflicts when all of the decisions were made? There appear to be two logically possible answers. Either these structural features did not generate cross-pressures, or they did but the decision makers did not react toward them as hypothesized. Hypothesis #5 tested the validity of the latter possibility with limited results. The limited explanatory power of the cognitive dissonance hypothesis suggests further consideration of the other possibility: under what conditions would these structural features of the international system not produce cross-pressures?

Only one set of circumstances would appear to fit this requirement. Even if the British simultaneously participated in conflicts in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East, the intensity of international conflict in each of these areas might vary. This possibility appears to hold for the period, 1931-1936, when the British became involved in intense conflicts sequentially, first in the Far East, then in the Mediterranean, and finally in Europe. Only in 1936, when the Rhineland crisis overtook the Italo-Abyssinia conflict, were British decision

makers involved simultaneously in intense conflicts in two or more
⁶
 areas.

There are also two more possibilities for idiosyncratic traits of the decision makers to explain the absence of cross-pressures. First, even though British decision makers might find themselves simultaneously involved in several intense conflicts, they might consciously assign priorities for strategic reasons to different conflicts so that cross-pressures generated by some conflicts might be more important than cross-pressures generated by other conflicts. Or a particular decision maker might regard some actually existing cross-pressures as unimportant in determining policy because of ideological considerations, which tell him to ignore these cross-pressures.

An analysis of the British decisions in non-military situations reveals evidence in support of all three possibilities as shown in Table 22. Table 22 indicates that British decision makers operated under cross-pressures in non-military situations primarily after 1936. The two decisions under cross-pressures in the period 1931-1936 were made by Simon and Eden in 1935 and 1936, respectively; the target in each case was Italy. This distribution supports the explanation for the existence of cross-pressures due to simultaneous involvement in intense military conflicts.⁷

⁶The distinction between "intense" and "non-intense" conflicts rests upon the presence or absence, respectively, of military activity by one or more parties in the conflict.

⁷Chamberlain's seven decisions occurred after 1936. Eden's decision occurred in July, 1936, after the Rhineland crisis; it was the decision to be neutral in the Spanish Civil War in the hope of preventing that conflict from spilling over into a European War. Simon's decision occurred in January, 1935; it was the decision to advocate negotiation of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict in order to maintain Italy in the Stresa Front against Germany.

An examination of the decisions made without cross-pressures reveals that part of them fall under the explanation above, while cognitive dissonance and idiosyncratic traits of the decision makers explain others. Simon's and Henderson's decisions occurred in 1931 against Japan and Germany, respectively, and the absence of cross-pressures fits the general characterization of the period, 1931-1936. Hoare's, Eden's and Chamberlain's decisions reflect the influence of two types of variables. Hoare's high-conflict decisions fit the cognitive dissonance/national interests model; they were made to protect British Mediterranean possessions during the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. His two low-conflict decisions supported the League of Nations and were part of Hoare's "double policy" strategy of simultaneously supporting the League and seeking a negotiated settlement of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict.⁸ This strategy was a conscious attempt to neutralize the existing cross-pressures created by Britain's League obligations and the desire for Italian support against Germany. As such, they represent a decision maker's attempt to subordinate cross-pressures and reduce dissonance for ideological and strategic reasons.⁹

A comparison of Eden's decisions in the absence of cross-pressures in 1936 and 1937 with all of Chamberlain's decisions reflects the conflict over strategy between the two men which ended in Eden's resignation

⁸The four decisions were the July, 1935, arms embargo decision, the September, 1935, decision to send warships to the Mediterranean, the October, 1935, decision to impose economic sanctions, and the November, 1935, decision to seek guarantees of military support from other nations. See Chapter III, pp. 55-57.

⁹See Chapter III, *ibid.* Hoare's League policy reflected an ideological/domestic commitment to the League, while the negotiations policy reflected international/strategic considerations.

TABLE 22. DECISIONS IN NON-MILITARY SITUATIONS OVER TIME BY EXISTENCE OF CROSS-PRESSURES,
INTENSITY OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR, AND DECISION MAKER

		<u>Non-Military Situation</u>					
		1931-1936			1937-1941		
Conflict Behavior		<u>Henderson</u>	<u>Simon</u>	<u>Hoare</u>	<u>Eden</u>	<u>Govt.</u>	<u>Chamberlain</u>
Cross-Pressures	Low		(1)		(1)		(7)
	High						
No Cross-Pressures	Low	(1)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)
	High			(2)	(1)		
		N = 1	N = 3	N = 4	N = 5	N = 2	N = 1
							N = 9

as Foreign Secretary in February, 1938. While the two men agreed that Germany was the primary problem for British policy makers, they differed over policy toward Italy and Japan. Eden preferred a less conciliatory approach in dealing with these nations, while Chamberlain wanted to adopt a more conciliatory position.¹⁰

TABLE 23. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN DECISION-MAKING PATTERNS BETWEEN EDEN AND CHAMBERLAIN IN NON-MILITARY SITUATIONS

		. Non-Military Situations					
		1936-1937			1938-1939		
	<u>Cross-Pressures</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Germany</u>
Eden	Yes		(1)				
	No		(4)	(2)			
Chamberlain	Yes				(6)	(1)	
	No						(2)
		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
		N = 0	N = 5	N = 2	N = 6	N = 1	N = 2

Table 23 reflects these similarities and differences. The absence of cross-pressures for both men when the target was Germany substantiates the contention that they considered the German Question to be the most important British foreign policy problem. However, the lack of cross-pressures which characterizes Eden's policy is in sharp contrast to the presence of cross-pressures in Chamberlain's Italian and Japanese policies.

¹⁰ See Chapter IV, pp. 86-95.

The roots of their differences appear to be idiosyncratic in the sense that Eden was reluctant to conciliate Mussolini, because he mistrusted him and also felt that conciliation was somewhat immoral. Chamberlain's estimate of Mussolini's trustworthiness differed sharply from Eden's, and he took a more flexible, pragmatic approach to the moral aspects of dealing with dictators.¹¹

These differences led Eden to favor a more "compartmentalized" foreign policy in which British policy toward Italy should be limited to Mediterranean questions and not include the European objective of gaining Italy's support against Germany. At the global level Eden tended to view the world as primarily bipolarized between democracies and dictatorships with France and the United States as the only potentially reliable British allies among the world powers. Chamberlain preferred an "interrelated" foreign policy in which British objectives toward Italy should include support against Germany as well as protection of British Mediterranean interests. From a global perspective Chamberlain saw the world as primarily multipolarized with shifting alignments determined by changing concrete interests and by personal relationships among the leaders of different nations. These differences finally resulted in Eden's resignation over the question of British policy toward Italy.¹²

The foregoing analysis illustrates some necessary qualifications of the model elaborated by systems theory. First, it does not explicitly

¹¹The specific details of their differences appear in Eden, op.cit., pp. 667-671. See also Ian Colvin, None So Blind (New York, 1965), pp. 137-138.

¹²Ibid.

take into account variations in the sequence and intensity of conflicts as determinants of the cross-pressures which restrain foreign policy choices in the model. Second, it does not explicitly allow for variations in perceptions by decision makers, such as Eden, who might act as if the world were bipolar instead of multipolar. Nor does it allow for variations in the stakes of different conflicts, which may make decision makers vary in their sensitivity to cross-pressures. Finally, systems theory suggests that simultaneous involvement in several conflicts will prevent nations from escalating any one of these conflicts. This statement is probably true, but needs to be qualified. Such nations will be prevented from both initiating an escalation and responding to an escalation by other nations. The first contingency contributes to international stability, but the second can contribute to international instability. For example, Chamberlain's sensitivity to cross-pressures partly accounts for his appeasement strategy which, in retrospect, appears to have partly undermined international stability and contributed to the origins of World War II.¹³

In conclusion, an analysis of British decisions in non-military situations yields some interesting insights that fit one or more of our simple, two-variable models of foreign policy. Also, the analysis provides some empirical grounds for accepting the systems theory model of international politics in a multipolar system.

British Behavior in Military Situations

The majority of the British foreign policy decisions in this study took place under circumstances that the decision makers perceived as

¹³ See Chapter IV, pp. 89-92.

military situations, i.e., situations where military considerations directly influenced the decisions. As in the case of British behavior in non-military situations, roughly one third of the decisions in military situations occurred under cross-pressures (22 out of 60). Consequently, in addition to explaining British behavior with the aid of our set of two-variable models, we will also want to determine why so few British decisions fit the more complex systems theory model. The steps in the analysis of military situations, therefore, essentially duplicate the preceding steps of analysis for non-military situations.

TABLE 24. DECISIONS IN MILITARY SITUATIONS BY INTENSITY OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR, EXISTENCE OF CROSS-PRESSURES AND RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES

		<u>Military Situations</u>			
		<u>Low Capabilities</u>		<u>High Capabilities</u>	
Cross-Pressures:		Yes	No	Yes	No
Low	s/n-m	94% (16)	64% (14)	---	5% (1)
	a/n-m	6% (1)	27% (6)	50% (1)	5% (1)
High	s/m	-----	-----	----	68% (13)
	a/m	-----	9% (2)	50% (1)	21% (4)
		<u>N = (17)</u>	<u>N = (22)</u>	<u>N = (2)</u>	<u>N = (19)</u>

Within the general category of military situations we had earlier distinguished situations in which British decision makers had high military capabilities from situations with low military capabilities.¹⁴ Table 24 shows this same distribution plus the number of decisions

¹⁴See Table 18 in this chapter, p.141.

taken under cross-pressures within each group.

The four columns in Table 24 suggest first that the existence of cross-pressures plus low capabilities are sufficient conditions for restraining British behavior to low levels of conflict. Second, the absence of cross-pressures plus the existence of low relative capabilities also is strongly associated with low levels of conflict behavior. Third, in military situations where British relative capabilities are high, the existence of cross-pressures does not appear to restrain British conflict behavior. Fourth, where capabilities are high and cross-pressures are absent, the chances of high conflict behavior in military situations are very great, but the behavior is more likely to be symbolic than actual. Over-all, cross-pressures appear to be weakly related to the intensity of conflict behavior; their presence does not strongly affect the relationship between relative capabilities and conflict behavior.

Further analysis is necessary to qualify the relationships in Table 24's columns. Table 25 controls for the effects of different types of diplomatic stakes upon the distribution of policy choices in column one of Table 24. The distribution for milieu goals corresponds to the national interests model that suggests policy makers will be unlikely to select high levels of conflict behavior to protect or maintain milieu goals. Since all of these decisions also occurred under cross-pressures and low capabilities, the 100 percent distribution in the low conflict categories supports our "cumulative effects" hypothesis that in conflict situations where several variables, diplomatic stakes, cross-pressures, and relative capabilities, reinforce the tendency for conflict behavior to be low, then it will be very likely to be low.

TABLE 25. DECISIONS BY INTENSITY OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR AND
DIPLOMATIC STAKES FOR MILITARY SITUATIONS WITH
CROSS-PRESSURES AND LOW CAPABILITIES

<u>Military Situation</u>			
Cross-Pressures+Low Capabilities			
Conflict Behavior	Diplomatic Stakes:	Milieu	Possession
Low	s/n-m	90% (9)	100% (7)
	a/n-m	10% (1)	-----
High	s/m	-----	-----
	a/m	-----	-----
		<u>N = (10)</u>	<u>N = (7)</u>

One result in Table 25 is somewhat surprising and potentially undermines the "cumulative effects" hypothesis. All of the British decisions regarding possession goals fall into the low-level conflict category, but a comparison of the distribution under milieu and possession goals reveals an interesting difference. A greater proportion of possession goals than milieu goals are associated with symbolic non-military behavior, when the cumulative effects hypothesis would predict the opposite result. Because of the small number of cases in each column, it is plausible to explain the reversal in percentages as a measurement error; the relatively small difference in percentage (10%) might also be used to reinforce this explanation.

However, it is also possible to account for the difference on theoretical grounds. Carl Friedrich has formulated the "rule of anticipated reactions," which he uses to characterize the operation of

"influence" in human relations:¹⁵

...one may characterize influence by saying that it usually exists when the behavior of B is molded by and conforms to the preferences of A, but without the issuance of a command...

Influence flows into the human relation whenever the influencer's reaction might spell disadvantage and even disaster for the actor, who foresees the effect the action might have and alters it more or less in accordance with this foresight.

Friedrich's rule applies to the data in Table 25 as follows. According to the national interests model, the British are more likely to select high levels of conflict behavior when possession goals are the diplomatic stakes in military situations. If the potential targets of this behavior also know it, then the targets may attempt to assuage British perceptions of threat to their possession goals in order to enhance the chances of low-level British conflict behavior. Six of the seven cases in Table 12 under possession goals would appear to fit under this rule. The six all deal with Japanese threats to British economic rights and possessions in China between 1936 and 1939. In these cases Japanese policy was to negotiate these conflicts and/or to plead the "necessities of war" (against China, not Britain) when Japan impinged

¹⁵ Carl Friedrich, Man and His Government (New York, 1963), pp. 200, 201. Italics are Friedrich's. See also the entire chapter, pp. 199-215, "Influence and the Rule of Anticipated Reactions," for further elaboration with examples. The "rule of anticipated reaction" is one formulation of the psychological principle which underlies most of the deterrence literature in the fields of military strategy and diplomatic negotiation. See Schelling, op.cit., Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (Garden City, 1962), Chapter's I, II, and V, and Fred Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York, 1964), Chapter V.

upon British rights.¹⁶ Therefore, Japanese behavior may partially explain British conflict behavior, although the perception of cross-pressures and low military capabilities also probably influenced British decisions.

TABLE 26. DECISIONS BY INTENSITY OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR AND DIPLOMATIC STAKES FOR MILITARY SITUATIONS WITHOUT CROSS-PRESSURES BUT WITH LOW CAPABILITIES

		Military Situation	
		<u>No Cross-Pressures but Low Capabilities</u>	
Diplomatic Stakes:		Milieu	Possession
Low	s/n-m	67% (14)	----
	a/n-m	29% (6)	----
High	s/m	----	----
	a/m	5% (1)	100% (1)
		N = (21)	N = (1)

Table 26 analyzes column two of Table 24 and shows that the influence of the type of diplomatic stakes conforms to our expectations: one of the two cases of high conflict behavior in Table 26 is a

¹⁶The six Japanese cases are the decisions numbered 1502-1506, 1510, in Appendix I. In the seventh case, decision #2206, the target was Italy, and the British decision maker, Chamberlain, appears primarily motivated by cross-pressures rather than Italian tactics. For a theoretical elaboration related to the Japanese tactics in the other six cases, see E. James Lieberman, "Threat and Assurance in the Conduct of Conflict," in Rober Fisher (ed.), International Conflict and Behavioral Science (New York, 1964), pp. 110-123.

quasi-military behavior in connection with British possession goals.¹⁷ The other case is the British decision to mobilize when Germany invaded Poland in September, 1939. The delay in actually going to war and the British perception of low capabilities were both due to the French government's plea for more time to prepare defenses as a joint guarantor of Poland. When France was ready and Germany did not cease attacking Poland, Britain went to war.¹⁸

The joint results of Tables 25 and 26 suggest that the original relationship in Table 24 between low capabilities and low conflict behavior needs to be elaborated. Although it is accurate to say that low capabilities correlate with low conflict behavior, variations within this generalization are the product of relationships between two other independent variables, cross-pressures and diplomatic stakes, and the dependent variable, conflict behavior. If cross-pressures coexist with low military capabilities, then regardless of the type of diplomatic stakes, conflict behavior will tend to be low. If cross-pressures do not exist in a low-capabilities situation, then the level of conflict behavior appears to depend upon the type of diplomatic stakes. If the stakes are milieu goals, then conflict behavior will tend to be low. If possession goals are the stakes, then conflict behavior will be high.

¹⁷ It was the decision in February, 1932, to send ships to Shanghai to protect British lives and property when the fighting between Japan and China threatened to engulf the city. Even under this extreme provocation, British policy makers remained very sensitive to their inferior military position and proceeded with caution. See Chapter III, pp. 56-61.

¹⁸ For the details, see Chapter IV, p. 118.

Both cross-pressures and diplomatic stakes are related to conflict behavior when relative capabilities are low; but the existence of low capabilities increases the likelihood that variations in cross-pressures and diplomatic stakes will have the effects just specified above, since they are likely to occur with reduced intensity when relative capabilities are high. The existence of high relative capabilities has a liberating effect upon British decision makers even when cross-pressures exist. Table 27 suggests that British decision makers under these circumstances may be more willing to fight for possession goals and engage in higher conflict behavior for milieu goals.

TABLE 27. DECISIONS BY INTENSITY OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR AND DIPLOMATIC STAKES FOR MILITARY SITUATIONS WITH CROSS-PRESSURES AND HIGH CAPABILITIES

		<u>Military Situation</u>	
		<u>Cross-Pressures and High Capabilities</u>	
Diplomatic Stakes:		Milieu	Possession
Low	s/n-m		
	a/n-m	100% (1)	
High	s/m		
	a/m		100% (1)
		<u>N = (1)</u>	<u>N = (1)</u>

The target of the British decisions in Table 27 is Italy. The actual non-military decision was Eden's choice in January, 1937, to continue a non-recognition policy regarding the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. The actual military decision was again Eden's: after the

Nyon Conference in August, 1937, he instituted naval patrols for pirates in the Mediterranean. The type of diplomatic stakes and the target's policies in each case presumably influenced British decisions, but the level of military capabilities was decisive. Eden's belief in British naval superiority over Italy in the Mediterranean gave him the flexibility to refuse talks on Abyssinian recognition and later patrol for pirates in the Mediterranean.¹⁹

Table 28 reinforces the interpretation that high relative capabilities have a liberating effect upon decision makers. This table summarizes British behavior when high capabilities exist and cross-pressures are absent. The only international restraint is the type of diplomatic stakes--a restraint that is largely ignored. Higher conflict policies are characteristic British behavior regarding both milieu and possession goals.

TABLE 28. DECISIONS BY INTENSITY OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR AND DIPLOMATIC STAKES FOR MILITARY SITUATIONS WITH HIGH CAPABILITIES AND NO CROSS-PRESSURES

		<u>Military Situation</u>	
		<u>No Cross-Pressures and High Capabilities</u>	
Diplomatic Stakes:		Milieu	Possession
Low	s/n-m	6% (1)	
	a/n-m	6% (1)	
High	s/m	75% (12)	33% (1)
	a/m	13% (2)	67% (2)
		N = (16)	N = (3)

¹⁹ See Chapter IV, pp. 83-87.

In the fifteen of the nineteen cases in Table 28 Germany is the target of British policy. The exceptions are the British guarantee of Greece and Rumania against Italian attack, the decision to land troops in Amoy, the employment of economic sanctions after Japan occupied Indo-China, and the military response to the Japanese attack upon Singapore. The guarantee maintained the British possession goals of access to Rumanian oil and British possessions in the Mediterranean. Two of the policies against Japan also protected possession goals: the Amoy landing and the response to the Singapore attack defended British economic and military installations. The adoption of economic sanctions came in behalf of an ally's possession goal: Indo-China belonged to France.

All of these cases support the "liberating effects" interpretation, because they demonstrate a willingness to engage in higher conflict behavior even when milieu goals are the diplomatic stakes. The solitary case of symbolic non-military behavior occurred in September, 1934, when the British, French, and Italians adopted a policy of consultations after the assassination of Dollfuss. The symbolic military decisions regarding milieu goals concerned British guarantees of French and Polish territorial integrity against Germany during the Sudeten and Polish crises, respectively. The two actual military policies were the British decision to mobilize in September, 1938, during the Sudeten crisis and the decision to defend Poland after the German attack in September, 1939. For each of these three types of policies the British had the support of one or more allies. The French ostensibly supported them in every decision; the Italians and the Poles supported the 1934 and 1939 decisions, respectively. British policy makers could count upon

the support of at least one of their allies, because the diplomatic stakes included either French or Polish territorial integrity in every case except the 1934 decision.

Although these British decisions were high conflict behaviors, the majority were symbolic military policies. An explanation in theoretical terms for the preponderance of symbolic military decisions in Table 28 brings us back to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter. Why did British decision makers primarily respond with symbolic military policies rather than actual military policies when they had high relative capabilities? The question can be put even more forcefully in view of the foregoing analysis of Table 28, which identifies Germany as the target of these symbolic military policies: why didn't the British fight Germany during the Sudetenland crisis?²⁰

Earlier, we suggested four plausible answers, which are consistent with different theories:

THEORY	ANSWERS
Cumulative effects model	a) the presence of other international restraints, i.e., cross-pressures and milieu goals.
National interests model	b) differences in the intensity of perceived threats <u>within</u> military situations, which made a symbolic military policy appropriate; milieu goals may make the perception of threat less intense

²⁰Britain did fight for Poland. Of the twelve symbolic military policies, five occurred over the Sudeten, and seven over Poland.

	because less is at stake.
Friedrich's rule of anticipated reaction	c) responses by the targets of initial British threats which made actual military behavior unnecessary.
Domestic/idiosyncratic model	d) a submissive rather than aggressive response pattern by British decision makers to threat situations, because of domestic considerations or personality traits of the decision maker(s).

The data collected in this study offer some support for all four possibilities plus a further possibility that qualifies the "liberating effects" interpretation of Tables 27 and 28.

Evidence for the first two possibilities is in Table 28. The stake, French territorial integrity, was a British milieu goal; both the cumulative effects model and the national interests model state that the presence of milieu goals is associated with relatively low levels of conflict behavior. However, these interpretations appear ultimately to be fallacious in view of the British mobilization in September, 1938, on behalf of the same goal (French territorial integrity). This behavior would also appear to rule out the domestic/ idiosyncratic interpretation in one sense, i.e., although the British were probably very reluctant to fight over the Sudetenland and made every effort to prevent a war, nevertheless, if French territorial integrity became threatened, they would probably have felt compelled to fight.

The elimination of these three alternatives leaves the "rule of anticipated reaction" as a possibility. Did the British fail to fight during the Sudeten crisis because of German reactions to British policy? This explanation appears to be the one most compatible with the facts, although it would appear to contradict the appeasement thesis. The conventional interpretation of the Sudeten crisis is to describe it as the height of appeasement, with the term "Munich" almost synonymous with appeasement. Chamberlain is pictured as giving in to German demands, and the French are portrayed as reneging on their commitment to defend Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity. Both of these interpretations are essentially accurate, but they need to be qualified. While Chamberlain did give in to Hitler's maximum demands, Hitler also met Chamberlain's minimum demands--demands that Chamberlain formulated before he knew that they would be acceptable to Hitler but which Hitler anticipated.

The narrative in Chapter IV notes that on the evening of September 27th two messages, one from Chamberlain to Hitler and one from Hitler to Chamberlain, passed one another in transit. Hitler's message was a reply to an earlier British communication that had restated British opposition to German plans for unilaterally occupying the Sudetenland on October 1st. Hitler's reply reaffirmed his occupation plan with one significant change. He explicitly stated that an international commission would supervise the subsequent plebiscite on the question of annexation. Chamberlain's message, which crossed Hitler's reply to the earlier British communication, proposed that German occupation of the Sudeten take place under the supervision of an International

Boundry Commission that would also supervise the plebiscite.²¹

The independent convergence of Chamberlain and Hitler upon the notion of an international commission to legitimize the German annexation of the Sudetenland is strong evidence for interpreting the Munich crisis in terms of the "rule of anticipated reaction."²² The terms of the Munich agreements achieved Hitler's maximum demands of (a) German occupation beginning October 1, 1938, (b) a plebiscite after rather than before occupation, and (c) the German definition of the occupation area. By conceding a role to an international commission Hitler met Chamberlain's minimum objectives of (a) adjusting the Sudeten question without resort to force, (b) an agreement by Hitler to adjust any Anglo-German differences via consultation, and (c) maintenance of French territorial integrity. Chamberlain conceded to Hitler the necessity for territorial adjustments, but Hitler both anticipated and made enough concessions about the method of adjustment to satisfy Chamberlain's minimum demands.

Finally, the role of the French government during the Sudeten crisis needs examination. There is some evidence to indicate that France might not have come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if Hitler had

²¹See Chapter IV, pp.107-8 . At Godesberg Chamberlain had suggested an international commission to supervise a German-proposed plebiscite. Hitler at that time did not commit himself to Chamberlain's suggestion, and the German proposal for a plebiscite was vague about its territorial scope and implementation procedure. Survey, 1938, II, pp. 388, 420-421.

²²This phenomenon of convergence is a characteristic of many bargaining situations where the parties have some conflicting and some common interests. See Schelling, op.cit., for an extensive theoretical treatment of this question in crisis situations.

not agreed to a conference at Munich. On September 28th the French offered to Germany more Czech territory than Hitler had initially proposed to occupy.²³ British reactions to German occupation of the Sudetenland hinged upon French policy, since Britain was committed to French territorial integrity and not Czechoslovakia's. Czech security was linked to Britain by the Franco-Czech alliance. If France did not honor the alliance in the event of German occupation, then British protection of French security would not be called into question.

This type of relationship has important theoretical implications for the "liberating effects" interpretation of the existence of high capabilities. The source of high military capabilities is crucial. If high capabilities are the result of support by an ally rather than domestic rearmament, then the ally's policies determine the range of policy options for the policy maker dependent upon outside military support. In the British experience between 1931 and 1941 there are two types of situations which illustrate this point. In the Munich example French policy could ultimately determine the intensity of British involvement in the Sudeten crisis. High French conflict behavior would produce high British conflict behavior unless Britain wished to reverse its commitment to French territorial integrity. In the case of British policy toward Japan in Tables 13 and 14, British policy options expanded to actual non-military and actual military behavior only when the United States decided to support such moves. A review of the historical narratives of both the Manchurian conflict in Chapter III and the Sino-Japanese conflicts in Chapter IV reveals

²³See Chapter IV, p. 107.

British dependency upon American policy and capabilities to be a consistent pattern.²⁴

The lack of an adequate source of military capabilities was a pervasive influence upon British policy in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East. In retrospect, it may be the most satisfying single-factor explanation of British conflict behavior for the period 1931-1941. Most of the conflict situations in this study are military situations. The correspondence of low conflict behavior with low capabilities, and high conflict behavior with high capabilities in these situations is very high. The introduction of other factors into the analysis has not altered this conclusion, although they have helped to explain variations in British behavior within the high and low conflict categories and the slight variations across them.

So far, we have analyzed British decisions in military situations and tested the following hypotheses with the results listed below.

<u>Model</u>	<u>Results</u>	<u>Hypothesis</u>
cross-pressures model	Yes	1) If British decision makers are themselves under cross-pressures, then they will be more likely to select low levels of conflict behavior.
national interests model	Yes	2) If British diplomatic stakes are milieu goals, then they will be more likely to select

²⁴ See Chapter IV, pp. 120-134, and Chapter III, pp. 48-61.

<u>Model</u>	<u>Results</u>	<u>Hypothesis</u>
		low levels of conflict behavior.
power-politics model	Yes	3) If British relative capabilities are low, then British conflict behavior is likely to be low.
"cumulative effects" model	Yes	4) The greater the number of international restraints, the more likely British conflict behavior will be low.
"cumulative effects" and "liberative effects" models	Yes	5) If relative capabilities are low, then cross-pressures and diplomatic stakes are more influential in the selection of British conflict behavior than when relative capabilities are high.
"rule of anticipated reaction"	Yes	6) The intensity of some British conflict behavior is explainable by the policy choices of other actors in the international system.

To conclude the analysis of British conflict behavior in military situations it is necessary to tabulate the bivariate relationships between British policy change and diplomatic stakes, relative capabilities, and cross-pressures, plus examine these cases in terms of systems theory.

Table 29 summarizes the relationships between policy change in a military situation and various international restraints. The table suggests: (a) that the greater the number of international restraints, the more likely is incremental policy change (Situation A); (b) where most international restraints disappear, radical policy change is more likely (Situation D); (c) where the cross-pressures and relative capabilities hypotheses disagree, diplomatic stakes is the best predictor for type of policy change (Situations B and C). These results conform to the "cumulative effects" hypothesis most closely when diplomatic stakes are part of the cumulative majority.²⁵

Finally, the results in Table 29 suggest an interesting correspondence in our explanations of policy change for both non-military and military situations. In non-military situations we had observed that (Table 20), regardless of cross-pressures, British decision makers are more likely to select an incremental policy change if the diplomatic stakes are milieu goals and radical policy change if the stakes are

²⁵Actually, the table also indicates that Situations A and D weakly fit the systems model. The causal modeling analysis in the last section of this chapter shows a fit for systems theory, because partials are used as a tool for analysis. Partial correlations obscure the relationship in Situations B and C, because "A partial correlation coefficient between x and y 'with z constant' is a weighted average of the correlations between x and y for $z = z_1$, $z = z_2$, etc. But even though this information is useful, it is usually too crude for social science analysis. (For example) It is interesting to know that the obvious relation between a modern attitude and the tendency to favor few children per family decreases when 'age is kept constant', but much more interesting to know that the correlation only disappears for the young age groups, not for the older. To arrive at this type of result one has to...(really keep)...one variable constant and...(see)...how the other two behave as a function of that variable...what matters is that the covariation between them is studied explicitly as a function of the variable kept constant--not implicitly as in the techniques of partial correlation." Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research (New York, 1967), p. 402.

TABLE 29. DECISIONS IN MILITARY SITUATIONS BY TYPE OF POLICY CHANGE,
DIPLOMATIC STAKES, CROSS-PRESSURES, AND RELATIVE CAPABILITIES

<u>Military Situations</u>									
<u>Situation A</u>		<u>Situation B</u>		<u>Situation C</u>		<u>Situation D</u>			
<u>CP's & Low Cap.</u>		<u>No CP's but Low Cap</u>		<u>CP's but High Cap</u>		<u>No CP's & High Cap</u>		<u>Totals</u>	
<u>Mil</u>	<u>Poss</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Poss</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Poss</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Poss</u>		
Policy Low	90% (9)	71% (5)	100% (21)	-----	100% (1)	-----	87% (14)	-----	83% (50)
Change High	10% (1)	29% (2)	-----	100% (1)	-----	100% (1)	13% (2)	100% (3)	17% (10)
N = (10)		N = (7)		N = (21)		N = (1)		N = (16)	
						N = (1)		N = (3)	
								100% (60)	

possession goals. In military situations (Table 29), diplomatic stakes are also the best predictor, especially where the influence of other international determinants operate in opposite directions. This comparison suggests two conclusions. First, that the diplomatic stakes are probably the most salient aspect of the conflict situation. Second, policy makers may therefore focus primarily upon them when the complexity of the situation increases and information about policy consequences becomes less certain. In Table 29 the most complex situations in terms of uncertainty of policy consequences would appear to be Situations B and C. Table 30, a slightly revised version of Table 20, yields similar, though not identical, results for non-military situations.

Situations B' and C' exhibit the same patterns between them as appear within situations B and C in Table 29. Over all, Table 30 shows incremental policy change as slightly more likely than does Table 29 (see Totals Column for each table). This difference could stem from the distinction between non-military situations and military situations that forms the basis for the two tables. In military situations radical policy change could be more likely because the perception of threat is greater than in non-military situations. In non-military situations, conflict-resolution appears more likely to occur through sustained symbolic non-military behavior without shifts to the military level, whereas crises involving the consideration of military capabilities and rapid, radical policy changes would appear to be interrelated.

Therefore, we can conclude that the following hypothesis holds for military situations as well as non-military situations:

TABLE 30. DECISIONS IN NON-MILITARY SITUATIONS BY TYPE OF POLICY CHANGE
AND COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION

<u>Non-Military Situation</u>						
	<u>Situation A'</u>		<u>Situation B'</u>		<u>Situation C'</u>	
	CP's & Mil Goals	No CP's but Mil Goals	CP's but Poss Goals	No CP's & Poss Goals	Totals	
Policy Low	100% (6)	100% (10)	67% (2)	67% (4)	88% (22)	
Change High	-----	-----	33% (1)	33% (2)	12% (3)	
	N = (6)	N = (10)	N = (3)	N = (6)	100% (25)	

<u>Model</u>	<u>Results</u>	<u>Hypothesis</u>
national interests/ cumulative effects	Yes	7) In more complex situations where the influence of other international determinants operate in opposite directions, decision makers are more likely to change policy according to the type of diplomatic stakes; if the stakes are milieu goals, the policy change is more likely to be incremental than if the stakes are possession goals.

The principal difference between policy variations in non-military v. military situations is:

<u>Model</u>	<u>Results</u>	<u>Hypothesis</u>
power politics	Yes	8) Incremental policy change is more likely in non-military situations than in military situations.

There remains the question of why the systems theory model did not apply to a majority of British decisions in military situations. For non-military situations we had earlier suggested two types of answers. Either cross-pressures did not exist despite the existence of structural features of the international system hypothetically associated with cross-pressures, or cross-pressures existed, but British decision makers did not respond to them as hypothesized. An

examination of the evidence for both explanations in military situations follows.

The evidence for explaining the presence or absence of cross-pressures by the cognitive dissonance model appears in Table 31. It shows no support for this explanation. The relationship between diplomatic stakes and the perception of cross-pressures is the reverse of the relationship predicted by the cognitive dissonance model.

TABLE 31. DECISIONS IN MILITARY SITUATIONS BY PERCEPTION OF
OF CROSS-PRESSURES AND TYPE OF DIPLOMATIC STAKES

		<u>Military Situations</u>	
		<u>Diplomatic Stakes:</u>	
		Milieu	Possession
Cross- Pressures	Yes	23% (11)	67% (8)
	No	77% (37)	33% (4)
		<u>N = (48)</u>	<u>N = (12)</u>

The inverse relationship in Table 31 actually reflects evidence for the alternative explanations. Most British possession goals, except for the British Isles themselves, were located in the Mediterranean and the Far East, while European conflicts concerned milieu goals. Our previous analysis of non-military situations showed that cross-pressures were most likely when British decision makers made policy toward Italy and Japan in the late 1930's. Table 32 and Table 33 present the evidence in support of this interpretation for military situations.

The majority of the decisions in Table 32 between 1931 and 1936 were not taken under cross-pressures; the five decisions that did occur under cross-pressures concerned the occupation of the Rhineland and the

TABLE 32. DECISIONS IN MILITARY SITUATIONS BY TYPE OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR,
CROSS-PRESSURES, DATE, AND DECISION MAKER

		<u>Military Situation</u>				
		<u>1931-1936</u>			<u>1937-1941</u>	
<u>Conflict Behavior</u>		<u>Simon</u>	<u>Hoare</u>	<u>Eden</u>	<u>Eden</u>	<u>Chamberlain Churchill</u>
Cross-Pressures	Low	(1)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(7) (2)
	High				(1)	(0)
No Cross-Pressures	Low	(9)				(12) (1)
	High	(1)				(17) (1)
		<u>N = (11)</u>	<u>N = (2)</u>	<u>N = (2)</u>	<u>N = (5)</u>	<u>N = (36)</u> N = (4)

TABLE 33. DECISIONS IN MILITARY SITUATIONS BETWEEN 1937 and 1941
BY DECISION MAKER, CROSS-PRESSURES, AND TARGET

Military Situation, 1937-1941

Target:		Japan		Italy		Germany	
Cross-Pressures:		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Decision Maker	Eden	(3)	(0)	(2)	(0)	---	---
	Chamberlain	(5)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(0)	(27)
	Churchill	(2)	(2)	----	----	---	---
TOTALS		(10)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(0)	(27)

Italo-Abyssinian crisis. Most of the decisions in Table 32 under cross-pressures (14 out of 19) occurred between 1937 and 1941. Table 33 shows that the only targets of these decisions were Japan and Italy. Twenty-seven of the thirty-one decisions that occurred without cross-pressures during this period had Germany as their target. The rationale for the presence or absence of cross-pressures in military situations appears to be the same as for non-military situations. The relationship between dates, targets, and decision makers on the one hand, and the existence of cross-pressures on the other, is similar for both types of situations. Variations in the timing and intensity of conflicts, plus idiosyncratic, adaptive behavior based upon strategic or ideological reasons accounts for the presence of cross-pressures as a determinant of British foreign policy. Consequently, the earlier qualifications of systems theory are appropriate for both non-military and military situations between 1931 and 1941.²⁶

Systems theory best fits British policy toward Italy and Japan between 1937 and 1941. During these four years the relationships in military situations among cross-pressures, relative capabilities, and intensity of British conflict behavior conform to the systems model. Table 34 summarizes these relationships.

The distribution in Table 34 shows that the majority of the decisions fall in columns one and four, which conforms to the hypothesized relationships among cross-pressures, relative capabilities, and conflict behavior. British conflict behavior in these columns is low

²⁶See pp. 154-155 of this chapter.

TABLE 34. BRITISH CONFLICT BEHAVIOR AND PERCEPTIONS OF RELATIVE CAPABILITIES UNDER CROSS-PRESSURES, 1937-1941

<u>Italian and Japanese</u>					
<u>Military Situations, 1937-1941</u>					
Cross-Pressures:		Yes		No	
Relative Capabilities:		Low	High	Low	High
Conflict	Low	100%(12)	50%(1)	---	25%(1)
Behavior	High	---	(0) 50%(1)	---	75%(3)
		N = (12)	N = (2)	N = (0)	N = (4)

when relative capabilities are low and cross-pressures exist; it increases in intensity when these international restraints are absent.²⁷

The deviant cases in the table also illustrate important relationships. The two cases in column two are Eden's decision to refuse British recognition of the Italian conquests in Abyssinia and his policy of patrolling the Mediterranean for pirate submarines during the Spanish Civil War. Both decisions occurred in the presence of cross-pressures and high capabilities. Eden based his rationale for these policies upon British naval strength in the Mediterranean and his perception that a firm stand there would demonstrate British determination regarding other issues. British military capabilities permitted this response

²⁷The distribution for policy change is virtually identical with the one for policy intensity. The only difference would be in column one where the distribution would be (10) low and (2) high for policy change; the distribution for policy intensity is Table 34. The two deviant cases for policy change in column one are #'s 2206 and 1510.

to cross-pressures, but Eden's perception that British commitments were interdependent fits a bipolar model of the international system in which the system's members consist of two camps--in this case democracies and dictatorships. Eden's bipolar image of the European-Mediterranean situations contrasted sharply with Chamberlain's multipolar image and finally resulted in Eden's resignation as Foreign Secretary in February, 1938.²⁸

Eden's two decisions are also examples of the liberating effects that high military capabilities can have upon decision makers. British naval superiority in the Mediterranean combined with Eden's personal dispositions to enable him to ignore the restraining potential of cross-pressures created by simultaneous involvement in other issues. Column four of Table 34 reflects a similar phenomenon. The three high-conflict decisions there include the guarantee of Greece and Rumania, the Amoy landing, and the response to the Japanese aerial attack upon Singapore. In each case the pressure or support of an ally influenced British policy. French pressure contributed to the Greco-Rumanian decision, while Franco-American cooperation made the Amoy landing a joint operation. British involvement in Europe against Germany did not restrain British policy makers, because they could ignore cross-pressures so long as their allies backed them. Even the low-conflict decision in column four, the Anglo-American policy of economic sanctions in retaliation for Japanese incursions into Indo-China, reaffirms the liberating

²⁸Singer and Deutsch, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *op.cit.*, and Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* XCIII (Summer, 1964), 881-909, describe reactions to cross-pressures that conform to Chamberlain's and Eden's behavior, respectively.

effect of reliable allies. When Churchill adopted this policy, he assumed that American support would neutralize any deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations that might jeopardize the British war effort in Europe.

A close examination of those decisions that fit the systems theory model, therefore, reveals the direct influence of three exogenous variables: idiosyncratic perceptual biases, differences among the types of British military capabilities, and variations in the policies of other members of the system. Eden's bipolar image of the European-Mediterranean situation, the British tradition of naval strength, and support from France and the United States influenced British perceptions of cross-pressures and relative capabilities. Together these variables account for high British conflict behavior toward Italy and Japan between 1937 and 1941. The perception of military capabilities is crucial: if exogenous variables intervene, cross-pressures may be ignored and conflict behavior increased. Even Eden admitted the key role of allies. In the Far East Eden was responsive to cross-pressures and conservative in his estimates of British capabilities in the absence of American military support; these considerations led him to make three low-conflict decisions toward Japan during 1937. Eden also based his European policies upon a solid Anglo-French alliance.

This chapter has analyzed the relationships between international restraints and British foreign policy in conflict situations. Various relationships of association have been established between the type of diplomatic stakes, the presence or absence of cross-pressures, the level of military capabilities, and British conflict behavior. The following statistical summary establishes the relative strength of

these different relationships and investigates whether the relationships are causal ones.

Statistical Summary

The Figures below illustrate the basic types of possible causal relationships between A and B. They differ from one another in at least one or two important properties: the direction of the relationship and the sequence of the relationship. Direction refers to the assignment of the cause and effect roles, which the arrows indicate. For example, Figures 13, 14, and 15 all differ in direction, since the cause-and-effect roles are reversed in 13 and 15, respectively, and shared in 14. Sequence commonly refers to the positional relationship between A and B.²⁹ The two basic sequences are additive and developmental; Figure 10 is an additive causal model, while Figures 11 and 12 are developmental models. Hybrid models regarding both direction and sequence are also possible.

Three principal mathematical methods are available to determine the direction and sequence of such causal relationships, if they exist. They are multiple regression analysis for additive models, recursive regression equations for developmental models, and multiplicative

²⁹Other substantive orderings besides historical time sequence are also possible..."We can (also) distinguish orders of complexity such as variables characterizing persons, collectives, and sets of collectives. Other ordering principles could be introduced, e.g., degree of generality, exemplified by the instance of a specified opinion, a broader attitude, and a basic value system." Paul Lazarsfeld, "The Algebra of Dichotomous Systems," cited in Alker, Mathematics and Politics, op.cit., p. 113.

interaction analysis for reciprocal causal models.³⁰ All three mathematical techniques summarize the strength and predictability of relationships among variables by using "least squares" analysis of association among the variables.³¹ The results provided by all three methods assume that the variables under analysis include all that are causally relevant. That is, there are no antecedent or intervening variables which would make the results spurious.³²

Concretely, the problem at this stage of the analysis is to select the proper causal models and accompanying mathematical techniques that are appropriate for summarizing the relationships presented in this

³⁰ Hubert Blalock's two books, Social Statistics, op.cit., and Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research, op.cit., extensively discuss multiple regression analysis and recursive regression analysis, respectively. Alker, op.cit., Chapter 6, provides an integrated discussion of both techniques. A discussion of multiplicative interaction analysis appears briefly in Alker, pp. 108-111; James Coleman explores it in considerable detail in Introduction to Mathematical Sociology (New York, 1964), pp. 224-240.

³¹ The logic of "least squares" analysis is presented succinctly in Alker, ibid., pp. 65-76, and in William Buchanan, Understanding Political Variables, op.cit.

³² See Blalock, Causal Inferences, op.cit., pp. 19-20. Three other possible sources of error are: unrepresentativeness of the sample, inaccurate recording of observations, and observations that do not measure the variables in the models. Since the generalizations in this study are not meant to extend beyond the cases in this study, except in a heuristic sense, the question of sampling error is irrelevant. Considerable effort has been made to cross-check the accuracy of the observations as they were recorded and transferred to IBM cards, and as the tables were generated on a counter-sorter. The relatively small number of cases and observations suggests that this type of measurement error is low. The question of index-validity has already been discussed in the sections of Chapter II that deal with scaling techniques.

chapter. There are at least three ways to accomplish this task.

First, it is possible to work out mechanically the equations for all three methods and select the one that best fits the data.³³ Second, one or more methods may be ruled out by empirical knowledge of the data. For example, if the analyst knows that A precedes B in chronological existence, then the possibility of reciprocal causality is eliminated--at least until B has existed for some length of time after A has caused B to come into existence. Third, the theoretical model that has guided the research may have the structural features of one or more of the causal models. This study will use elements of all three ways to identify the causal model that best fits and summarizes British foreign policy behavior.

From a theoretical perspective a developmental model appears to be relevant. The systems model is essentially a developmental model with the multipolar power structure of the international system as "first cause" and interaction opportunities, cross-pressures, relative military capabilities, and foreign policy behavior as successive derivatives in the developmental sequence.³⁴ The perspective offered by the decision-making models, however, compete with the systems analysis view. They suggest that the diplomatic stakes are a primary determinant of foreign policy; such factors as relative capabilities and cross-pressures are modifiers of behavior but not necessarily variables that

³³It would appear that this strategy is a high-risk one, if the choice is between it and theory-guided strategy. See Buchanan, op.cit., pp. 286-287.

³⁴Longitudinally, the "dynamic equilibrium" of the Singer and Deutsch model assumes feedback and, therefore, interaction effects. The present discussion, however, takes a cross-sectional perspective. See Singer and Deutsch, op.cit., and Coleman, op.cit., p. 127.




Figure 9. No Cause. (spurious)



Figure 10. Partial Cause



Figure 11. Immediate Cause



Figure 12. Remote Cause



Figure 13. Single Cause



Figure 14. Reciprocal Cause



Figure 15. Reverse Cause

derive their values from the diplomatic stakes or from one another. The decision-making models taken together, therefore, compose an additive model. Finally, developmental and additive models are not necessarily contradictory; Figure 16 shows a compatible hybrid of them.




Figure 16. A Logically-Based Hybrid of the National Interests and Systems Theory Models

Empirically-based qualifications make the model in Figure 16 incomplete in three respects. First, other variables that influence relative capabilities are not included. Second, there is the possibility that the effects of cross-pressures are direct as well as indirect. Finally, the model in Figure 16 represents the hypothetical structure of military situations only; a model of non-military situations is obviously additive as in Figure 18. Figures 17 and 18 take account of these qualifications. The arrows indicating causal direction in these Figures are subject to validation by "dummy variable" analysis, a form of regression analysis that is applicable to dichotomous variables.³⁵ Dummy variable analysis will produce Pearson's r coefficients of association between the pairs of variables linked by arrows, if they are associated with one another.

Figure 17 predicts that $r = 0$ between national interests and relative

³⁵See Alker, pp. 80-88, and Appendix II of this study. The results reported on the following pages with dummy variable techniques assume a linear relationship between the variables.




Figure 17. An Empirically-Based Hybrid of the National Interests and Systems Theory Models for Military Situations. The variables and arrows in parentheses are ones that have not been systematically measured in this analysis.




Figure 18. An Additive Hybrid of the National Interests and Cross-Pressures Models for Non-Military Situations

capabilities and between national interests and cross-pressures. That is, their joint effects upon the dependent variable, foreign policy, is additive. The predicted relationships between cross-pressures, relative capabilities, and foreign policy partly are developmental and partly additive, with the possibility of spuriousness due to exogenous variables. Since our analysis has not systematically measured these exogenous variables for every decision, we cannot rule out spuriousness. But if we assume that their influence is random or can identify where it is not random, then they can be integrated into the analysis as "error terms."³⁶ If the direction of the developmental sequence is primarily from cross-pressures to relative capabilities to foreign policy, i.e.,

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{If } CP \rightarrow RC \rightarrow FP, \\ \text{Then } r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = (r_{CPRC}) (r_{RCFP}) \end{array}$$

If the direction is primarily from relative capabilities to cross-pressures to foreign policy, i.e.,

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{If } RC \rightarrow CP \rightarrow FP, \\ \text{Then } (r_{RC \rightarrow FP}) = (r_{RC \rightarrow CP}) (r_{CP \rightarrow FP}) \end{array}$$

If there is a spurious relationship between cross-pressures and foreign policy, i.e.,

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{If } CP \nrightarrow FP, \\ \text{Then } (r_{CP \rightarrow FP}) = (r_{RC \rightarrow FP}) (r_{RC \rightarrow CP}) \end{array}$$

If there is a spurious relationship between relative capabilities and

³⁶See Alker, Mathematics and Politics, p. 125, and Blalock, Causal Inferences, pp. 45-52.


foreign policy, i.e.,

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{If } RC \nrightarrow FP, \\ \text{Then } (r_{RC \rightarrow FP}) = (r_{CPFP})(r_{CPRC}) \end{array}$$

If the relationships from cross-pressures to foreign policy and from relative capabilities to foreign policy are additive, then:

$$r_{CP \rightarrow RC} = 0$$

Up to this point the models in Figures 17 and 18 have labeled the dependent variable as simply "foreign policy." They have not distinguished between the two foreign policy variables, intensity of conflict behavior and degree of foreign policy change. The following analysis first attempts to fit the models to the intensity of British conflict behavior in military and non-military situations. Then the same models are applied to explain British foreign policy change in military and non-military situations. The analysis dichotomizes the intensity variable into non-military (low) and military (high) behavior. The following generalizations and statistical measures consequently do not apply to variations within this dichotomy. The first step of the analysis appears in Figure 19 below and on the following page.



<u>Theoretical</u>	<u>Interpretations</u>	<u>Empirical</u>
<u>Additive Predictions</u>	<u>Fit</u>	<u>Additive Results</u>
$r_{NI \rightarrow CP} = 0$	NO	$r_{NI \rightarrow CP} = -.38$
$r_{NI \rightarrow RC} = 0$	YES	$r_{NI \rightarrow RC} = -.02$
$r_{NI \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	YES	$r_{NI \rightarrow FP} = .09$
$r_{CP \rightarrow RC} = 0$	NO	$r_{CP \rightarrow RC} = +.34$
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	YES	$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = +.41$
$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	YES	$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = .81$
<u>Developmental Predictions</u>	<u>Fit</u>	<u>Developmental Results</u>
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = (r_{RC \rightarrow FP})(r_{CP \rightarrow RC})$	NO	$.41 \neq .27$
$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = (r_{RC \rightarrow CP})(r_{CP \rightarrow FP})$	NO	$.81 \neq .14$
<u>Spurious Predictions</u>	<u>Fit</u>	<u>Spurious Results</u>
$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = (r_{CPFP})(r_{CPRC})$	NO	$.81 \neq .14$
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = (r_{RC \rightarrow CP})(r_{RC \rightarrow FP})$	NO	$.41 \neq .27$

Figure 19. Alternative Causal Interpretations of the Intensity of British Conflict Behavior in Military Situations, 1931-1941

Figure 19 presents the fit between the theoretical interpretations and the empirical interpretations available for summarizing the causal relationships between the intensity of British conflict behavior and international restraints. First, there is a poor fit between British behavior and the developmental model. Second, it would appear that the relationship between policy choices and relative capabilities is very strong and not spurious. Third, the additive model best fits a multi-variate, empirically based, interpretation of British conflict behavior in military situations--although the correlation between cross-pressures

and relative capabilities indicates that cross-pressures may have both a direct and indirect effect upon British decisions.

The negative correlation between national interests and cross-pressures and the positive correlation between cross-pressures and relative capabilities do not fit the predictions of the additive model. There is some evidence to indicate that the former is due to the systematic (i.e., non-random) influence of exogenous variables; the latter may be valid or stem from the influence of exogenous variables. The $-.38$ correlation reflects the location of most British possession goals in the Mediterranean and Far East on the one hand, and the tendency for British policy makers to perceive cross-pressures as primary determinants of their decisions regarding these diplomatic stakes on the other. The conflict between Eden and Chamberlain over strategy in the Mediterranean and Far East suggests that this correlation may have occurred partially because of systematic idiosyncratic judgments by Chamberlain. The $+.34$ correlation between cross-pressures and relative capabilities could be a spurious correlation that reflects the influence of exogenous variables upon both cross-pressures and capabilities, or it may be a valid correlation.

The evidence in Figure 19 from the test for spuriousness between cross-pressures and foreign policy shows no fit between the predicted result and the empirical result.³⁷ We cannot completely rule out the

³⁷Testing for spuriousness between diplomatic stakes and cross-pressures, and between cross-pressures and relative capabilities, shows no significant change in the original relationships either: $R_{NICP \cdot RC} = -.40$; $r_{CPRC \cdot NI} = +.36$. The original relationships were $-.38$ and $+.34$, respectively. No significant change occurs between diplomatic stakes and relative capabilities when the same procedure is applied: $r_{NIRC} = -.02$; $r_{NIRC \cdot CP} = +.13$.

possibility that exogenous variables have produced a spurious relationship between cross-pressures and relative capabilities, which in turn could make the test for spuriousness between cross-pressures and foreign policy invalid. Nevertheless, the calculation of partial correlation coefficients for cross-pressures, diplomatic stakes, relative capabilities, and intensity of conflict behavior reveals more evidence to support the additive model. None of the original bivariate relationships decrease significantly, and one of them increases sharply.³⁸

$$(1) r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = .41 \quad (3) r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = +.81 \quad (5) r_{NI \rightarrow FP} = .09$$

AND

AND

BUT

$$(2) r_{CPFP \cdot NIRC} = .35 \quad (4) r_{RCFP \cdot NICP} = .78 \quad (6) r_{NIFP \cdot CPCR} = .31$$

$$(7) R_{FP \cdot NICPCR} = .84$$

Controlling for the effects of relative capabilities and diplomatic stakes upon the relationship between cross-pressures and foreign policy only reduces the correlation by .06 from .41 to .35. The original relationship between relative capabilities and foreign policy changes even less when cross-pressures and diplomatic stakes are the control variables (.81 to .78). The marked increase in the relationship between diplomatic stakes and foreign policy occurs when controls are implemented. When foreign policy is the dependent variable, the multiple correlation coefficient for all four variables is +.84. The difference in the coefficients of determination (r^2 's) below show an increase of

³⁸The techniques of partial and multiple regression analysis appear in Hubert Blalock, Social Statistics, op.cit. The partials and multiple correlation coefficients for this chapter were calculated on an Olivetti Programma 101 Desk Computer.

only +.04 in the strength of the relationships when the bivariate power politics model for military situations is supplemented by the cross-pressures and national interests models.

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} r_{RCFP}^2 = .81^2 = .66 \\ R_{FP \cdot NICPRC}^2 = .84^2 = .70 \end{array} \right\} +.04$$

The square roots of the coefficients of alienation measure the change in accuracy/predictability as the power politics model is supplemented by the cross-pressures and national interests models:³⁹

$$\begin{array}{l} \sqrt{\text{Coefficient of alienation}} = 1 - r_{RCFP}^2 \\ \left. \begin{array}{l} RC: \sqrt{1 - .66} = \sqrt{.34} = .58 \\ NICPRC: \sqrt{1 - .70} = \sqrt{.30} = .55 \end{array} \right\} .03 \end{array}$$

The differences in the square roots of the coefficients of alienation show that the standard deviation in foreign policy is reduced by only .03 when national interests and cross-pressures supplement the power politics model.

The power politics model is clearly the most powerful explanation for the level of British conflict behavior in military situations. Sixty of the eighty-five British decisions occurred in military situations. Furthermore, twenty-two of the twenty-five decisions in non-military situations were low-conflict choices. The best psychological predictors of the level of British conflict behavior, therefore, would appear to

³⁹Alker, Mathematics and Politics, p. 75, suggests this statistic as a measure of accuracy. Blalock, Social Statistics, suggests the Beta values in the regression equations that summarize the relationships.

be (a) whether the perception of relative capabilities is high or low and (b) whether the British decision maker perceives relative military capabilities as salient. Evidence for this extension of the power politics model to the analysis of non-military situations appears in Figure 20 on the following page.





Figure 20. An Additive Model for Intensity of Conflict Behavior in Non-Military Situations, plus Supporting Evidence

Two important points emerge from the data in Figure 20. First, British behavior clearly fits the additive model's predictions. Second, all of the correlation coefficients are low; their individual coefficients of determination and alienation would explain very little of the variance



<u>Theoretical</u>	<u>Interpretations</u>	<u>Empirical</u>
<u>Additive Predictions</u>	<u>Fit</u>	<u>Additive Results</u>
$r_{NI \rightarrow CP} = 0$	NO*	$r_{NI \rightarrow CP} = -.38$
$r_{NI \rightarrow RC} = 0$	YES	$r_{NI \rightarrow RC} = -.02$
$r_{NI \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	YES	$r_{NI \rightarrow FP} = +.56$
$r_{CP \rightarrow RC} = 0$	NO	$r_{CP \rightarrow RC} = +.34$
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	NO**	$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = -.04$
$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	YES	$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = +.23$
<u>Developmental Predictions</u>	<u>Fit</u>	<u>Developmental Results</u>
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = (r_{RC \rightarrow FP})(r_{CP \rightarrow RC})$	YES	$-.04 \neq .08$
$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = (r_{RC \rightarrow CP})(r_{CP \rightarrow FP})$	NO	$+.23 \neq -.01$
<u>Spurious Predictions</u>	<u>Fit</u>	<u>Spurious Results</u>
$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = (r_{CP \rightarrow RC})(r_{CP \rightarrow FP})$	NO	$+.23 \neq -.01$
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = (r_{RC \rightarrow CP})(r_{RC \rightarrow FP})$	YES***	$-.04 \neq .08$

Figure 21. Alternative Causal Models of Foreign Policy Change in Military Situations. *See Figure 19's commentary for interpretation. **See Partial Correlations below for interpretation. ***By definition an indirect, developmental relationship among three variables has a spurious (no direct cause) relationship between the first and third variables.

and would permit very little predictability, respectively.⁴⁰ These limitations suggest an important variable has been left out of the model. This variable could very well be the type of situation, viz., non-military.

The application of the models in Figures 17 and 18 to the analysis of foreign policy change brings results slightly different from the analysis of foreign policy intensity. Figure 21 presents the interpretation of foreign policy change in military situations.

A hybrid model best fits the analysis of foreign policy change in military situations. The interpretation of the correlation coefficients shows a direct relationship between diplomatic stakes and policy change and a developmental relationship between cross-pressures, relative capabilities, and policy change. These relationships form a hybrid model composed of national interests theory and systems theory. Calculation of the partials modifies this interpretation only slightly. The weak negative correlation between cross-pressures and policy change changes direction but is still very weak, indicating that the causal impact of cross-pressures upon policy change is primarily indirect rather than direct.

$$\begin{array}{llll}
 (1) & r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = -.04 & \text{BUT} & (2) & r_{FPCP \cdot RCNI} = .13 \\
 (3) & r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = +.23 & \text{AND} & (4) & r_{RCFP \cdot CPNI} = .23 \\
 (5) & r_{NI \rightarrow FP} = .56 & \text{AND} & (6) & r_{FPNI \cdot CPRC} = .58
 \end{array}$$

⁴⁰Their multiple coefficient of determination (R^2) explains 12% of the variance. The cumulative influence of diplomatic stakes and cross-pressures is significant, therefore, if 10% is the cutpoint between theoretically trivial and significant relationships. Alker suggests this cutpoint: see Alker, ibid., p. 89.

$$(7) \quad r_{CP \rightarrow RC} = .34 \quad \text{AND} \quad (8) \quad r_{CPRC \cdot NI} = .36$$


$$(9) \quad R_{FP \cdot RCNICP} = .60$$

The partials indicate that diplomatic stakes correlate highest with policy change in military situations. The single best predictor of policy change for military situations, therefore, is the national interests theory, while the preceding analysis showed the power politics theory to be the best predictor for intensity of conflict behavior. The multiple correlation coefficient of +.60 for policy change in military situations gives .36 as a coefficient of determination, which measures the strength of association between foreign policy change and all of the variables in the model. This represents an increase of only .05 over the proportion of the variance explained by the diplomatic stakes. The coefficients of determination and alienation which indicate the strength and predictability of these relationships appear below:

<u>Coefficients of</u>		<u>Square Roots of</u>	
<u>Determination</u>		<u>Coefficients of Alienation</u>	
$r_{NIFP}^2 = .31$	} .05 increase	$NI: \sqrt{1-.31} = .83$	} .03 increase
$R_{FP \cdot NICPRC}^2 = .36$		$NICPRC: \sqrt{1-.36} = .80$	

Figure 22 presents the interpretation of foreign policy change in non-military situations. It shows that diplomatic stakes and cross-pressures are additively related to policy change. Calculation of the partials and the multiple correlation coefficient shows that the original weak relationship between cross-pressures and policy change is spurious. The national interests theory alone accounts for only .24 of the variance, which indicates that an important variable has

been excluded from the model. The type of situation, non-military, may be that variable. If this is the case, the power politics model



<u>Theoretical</u>	<u>Interpretations</u>	<u>Empirical</u>
<u>Additive Predictions</u>	<u>Fit</u>	<u>Additive Results</u>
$r_{NI \rightarrow CP} = 0$	YES	$r_{NI \rightarrow CP} = .0416$
$r_{NI \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	YES	$r_{NI \rightarrow FP} = .4923$
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	NO	$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = .0205$

Figure 22. An Additive Model for Foreign Policy Change in Non-Military Situations.


may partly account for British policy change in non-military situations in the sense that the absence of military considerations indicates an inclination toward low conflict behavior.

TABLE 35. COEFFICIENTS OF BRITISH POLICY CHANGE IN NON-MILITARY SITUATIONS

<u>Partials and Multiple R</u>	<u>Coefficient of Determination</u>
$r_{NIFP \cdot CP} = .4920$	$r^2 = (.49)^2 = .24$
$r_{CPFP \cdot NI} = .0001$	<u>Square Root of the Coefficient</u>
$R_{FP \cdot NICP} = .4922$	<u>of Alienation</u>
	NI: $\sqrt{1-.24} = .87$

With the exception of policy change in military situations additive causal models, based upon simple, bivariate decision-making

theories, best explain British conflict behavior between 1931 and 1941. For military situations in the Mediterranean and Far East between 1937 and 1941, however, a developmental causal model based upon systems theory is appropriate. Figure 23 analyzes the fit between systems theory and the intensity of British conflict behavior, while Figure 24 examines systems theory and foreign policy change.



<u>Theoretical</u>	<u>Interpretations</u>	<u>Empirical</u>
<u>Additive Predictions</u>	<u>Fit</u>	<u>Additive Results</u>
$r_{NI \rightarrow CP} = 0$	YES*	$r_{NI \rightarrow CP} = .21$
$r_{NI \rightarrow RC} = 0$	YES*	$r_{NI \rightarrow RC} = .16$
$r_{NI \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	YES	$r_{NI \rightarrow FP} = .48$
$r_{CP \rightarrow RC} = 0$	NO	$r_{CP \rightarrow RC} = .76$
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	NO*	$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = .68$
$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	NO*	$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = .76$
<u>Developmental Predictions</u>	<u>Fit</u>	<u>Developmental Results</u>
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = (r_{RC \rightarrow FP})(r_{CP \rightarrow RC})$	YES	$.68 = .58$
$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = (r_{RC \rightarrow CP})(r_{CP \rightarrow FP})$	NO	$.76 = .52$

<u>Spurious Predictions</u>	<u>Fit</u>	<u>Spurious Results</u>
$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = (r_{CP \rightarrow FP})(r_{CP \rightarrow RC})$	NO	.76 = .52
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = (r_{RC \rightarrow CP})(r_{RC \rightarrow FP})$	YES**	.68 = .58

Figure 23. Alternative Causal Interpretations of the Intensity of British Conflict Behavior in Military Situations Toward Italy and Japan, 1937-1941. *See partials below for interpretation. **By definition an indirect, developmental relationship among three variables has a spurious (no direct cause) relationship between the first and third variables.

Calculation of the partials is necessary in order to see clearly the degree of fit. The original additive bivariate relationships disappear or weaken considerably while the key developmental relationship between cross-pressures and relative capabilities remains unchanged. The only exception is the increased relationship between diplomatic stakes and

TABLE 36. ZERO ORDER AND PARTIAL COEFFICIENTS OF BRITISH BEHAVIOR TOWARD ITALY AND JAPAN, 1937-1941

<u>Causal Relationships</u>					
<u>Additive</u>		<u>Developmental</u>		<u>Spurious</u>	
<u>Original</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>Original</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>Original</u>	<u>Partial</u>
$r_{NI \cdot FP} = .48$	$r_{NI \cdot FP \cdot C \cdot PR} = .55$	$r_{C \cdot P \cdot FP} = .68$	$r_{C \cdot P \cdot FP \cdot RC} = .24$	$r_{NI \cdot CP} = .21$	$r_{NI \cdot CP \cdot RC} = .14$
$r_{C \cdot P \cdot FP} = .68$	$r_{C \cdot P \cdot FP \cdot NI \cdot RC} = .20$	$r_{RC \cdot FP} = .76$	$r_{RC \cdot FP \cdot CP} = .51$	$r_{NI \cdot RC} = .16$	$r_{NI \cdot RC \cdot CP} = .0006$
$r_{RC \cdot FP} = .76$	$r_{RC \cdot FP \cdot CP \cdot NI} = .58$	$r_{C \cdot PR} = .76$	$r_{C \cdot PR \cdot NI} = .75$		

policy choice, which indicates that a hybrid model composed of national interests theory and systems theory provides the best over-all fit.

Traces of additive relationships remain between the foreign policy variable and the systems theory variables, but they are very weak with the exception of the relative capabilities/foreign policy relationship.


Its direct impact is supplemented indirectly by the cross-pressures variable, moreover; the relationship between cross-pressures and relative capabilities remains stable while the cross-pressures/foreign policy relationship weakens. The individual and joint explanatory power of the hybrid model's components appears below:

TABLE 37. BRITISH CONFLICT BEHAVIOR AND THE RELATIVE EXPLANATORY POWER OF NATIONAL INTERESTS THEORY AND SYSTEMS THEORY

<u>Intensity of Conflict Behavior</u>			
	<u>National Interests</u>	<u>Systems Theory</u>	<u>Both</u>
	<u>Theory</u>		
Coefficient of Determination	$r_{NIFP}^2 = .48^2 = .23$	$R_{FP \cdot CPROC}^2 = .78^2 = .61$	$R_{FP \cdot NICPROC}^2 = .85^2 = .72$
$\sqrt{\text{Coefficient of Alienation}}$	$\sqrt{1-.23} = .88$	$\sqrt{1-.61} = .62$	$\sqrt{1-.72} = .53$

Together the components account for .72 of the variance; individually, systems theory has greater explanatory power than national interests theory.

An examination of British policy change in the Mediterranean and Far East for the same period yields comparable results. A similar hybrid model emerges from the analysis with a slightly better fit between these cases and systems theory.



<u>Theoretical</u> <u>Additive Predictions</u>	<u>Interpretations</u> <u>Fit</u>	<u>Empirical</u> <u>Additive Results</u>
$r_{NI \rightarrow CP} = 0$	YES*	$r_{NI \rightarrow CP} = .21$
$r_{NI \rightarrow RC} = 0$	YES*	$r_{NI \rightarrow RC} = .16$
$r_{NI \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	YES	$r_{NI \rightarrow FP} = .63$
$r_{CP \rightarrow RC} = 0$	NO	$r_{CP \rightarrow RC} = .76$
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	NO*	$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = .47$
$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} \neq 0$	NO*	$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = .50$
<u>Developmental Predictions</u>	<u>Fit</u>	<u>Developmental Results</u>
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = (r_{RC \rightarrow FP})(r_{CP \rightarrow RC})$	YES	$.47 \neq .38$
$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = (r_{RC \rightarrow CP})(r_{CP \rightarrow FP})$	NO	$.50 = .36$
<u>Spurious Predictions</u>	<u>Fit</u>	<u>Spurious Results</u>
$r_{RC \rightarrow FP} = (r_{CP \rightarrow FP})(r_{CP \rightarrow RC})$	NO	$.50 = .36$
$r_{CP \rightarrow FP} = (r_{RC \rightarrow CP})(r_{RC \rightarrow FP})$	YES**	$.47 = .38$

Figure 24. Alternative Causal Interpretations of British Foreign Policy Change Toward Italy and Japan in Military Situations, 1937-1941. *See partials on following page for interpretation. **See Figure 23 for interpretation.

Calculation of the partials reveals the deterioration of most additive relationships and the maintenance of all developmental relationships; national interests/policy change, cross-pressures/relative capabilities, and relative capabilities/policy change remain strong:

TABLE 38. ZERO ORDER AND PARTIAL COEFFICIENTS OF BRITISH POLICY CHANGE TOWARD ITALY AND JAPAN, 1937-1941

<u>Causal Relationships</u>					
<u>Additive</u>		<u>Developmental</u>		<u>Spurious</u>	
<u>Original</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>Original</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>Original</u>	<u>Partial</u>
$r_{NIFP} = .63$	$r_{NIFP \cdot CPRC} = .64$	$r_{CPFP} = .47$	$r_{CPFP \cdot RC} = .16$	$r_{NICP} = .21$	$r_{NICP \cdot RC} = .14$
$r_{CPRP} = .47$	$r_{CPFP \cdot NIRC} = .09$	$r_{RCFP} = .50$	$r_{RCFP \cdot CP} = .25$	$r_{NIRC} = .16$	$r_{NIRC \cdot CP} = .0006$
$r_{RCFP} = .50$	$r_{RCFP \cdot CPNI} = .31$	$r_{CPRC} = .76$	$r_{CPRC \cdot NI} = .75$		

The individual and joint explanatory power of the hybrid model's components differs in two respects for policy change. National interests theory accounts for more of the variance than systems theory; their

TABLE 39. BRITISH POLICY CHANGE AND THE RELATIVE EXPLANATORY POWER OF NATIONAL INTERESTS THEORY AND SYSTEMS THEORY

<u>Foreign Policy Change</u>			
Coefficient of Determination	<u>National Interests Theory</u>	<u>Systems Theory</u>	<u>Both</u>
	$r_{NIFP}^2 = .63^2 = .40$	$R_{FP \cdot CPRC}^2 = .52^2 = .27$	$R_{FP \cdot NICPRC}^2 = .75^2 = .56$
$\sqrt{\text{Coefficient of Alienation}}$	$\sqrt{1 - .40} = .77$	$\sqrt{1 - .27} = .85$	$\sqrt{1 - .56} = .66$

relative potencies were reversed for the explanation of the intensity of British conflict behavior. The cumulative explanatory power of the two theories is also less for policy change than for conflict-intensity.

The foregoing statistical analysis has described the strength and predictability of various relationships displayed in the tables earlier in the chapter. The conclusion of this study reviews and relates these findings to one another in an historical interpretation of this period in British diplomatic history, then assesses their theoretical significance in terms of the levels of analysis problem.

CHAPTER VI

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS PROBLEM

British Foreign Policy in Retrospect

The findings in this study suggest that Britain did not pursue a consistent appeasement policy toward the three Axis dictatorships between 1931 and 1941.¹ Instead, British conflict behavior varied according to the decision-maker's definition of the international situation. Changing perceptions of cross-pressures, relative military capabilities, and diplomatic stakes account for variations in the intensity of British conflict behavior and its potential for rapid escalation. Moreover, the relationships among these variables differ in theoretically-acceptable ways; they fit the causal structure of either the cumulative effects theory or systems theory.

The best explanation for the intensity of British conflict behavior between 1931 and 1941 is the cumulative effects theory, an amalgam of the power politics, cross-pressures, and national interests hypotheses.

1

Other scholars who have reached a similar conclusion include Evan Luard, "Conciliation and Deterrence: A Comparison of Political Strategies in the Interwar and Postwar Periods," World Politics, XIX (January, 1967), 167-189; E.H. Carr, Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of the War (London, 1939), p. 155; A.J.P. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, op.cit., p. 278. While these analysts do describe this pattern they do not systematically account for it with the consequences of variations between "conciliation and deterrence" rather than with the causes of such fluctuations.

The power politics model provides the most powerful, single-factor interpretation. In military situations British relative military capabilities have either a restraining or a liberating effect upon the intensity of British conflict behavior, depending upon whether military capabilities are low (insufficient) or high (sufficient) for successful military action. In non-military situations (those conflict situations in which relative military capabilities are not an important component of the decision-maker's definition of the situation) the intensity of British conflict behavior tends to be low. Variations in cross-pressures and the type of diplomatic stakes also correlate with the intensity of British policy in military situations, but these relationships are much weaker than the military capabilities/policy intensity relationship. For non-military situations the cumulative impact of cross-pressures and diplomatic stakes is weak but theoretically significant.

The best single explanation for the degree of British foreign policy change between 1931 and 1941 is the national interests theory. In both military and non-military situations British conflict behavior is most likely to escalate rapidly when the stakes are high (possession goals) and exhibit an incremental pattern when the stakes are low (milieu goals). In military situations the relationships of cross-pressures and relative military capabilities to policy change conform to systems theory, but the strength of these relationships is weak. In non-military situations the cross-pressures/policy change relationship disappears; the impact of diplomatic stakes remains theoretically significant.

Systems theory best explains the intensity of British conflict


behavior toward Italy and Japan in military situations between 1937 and 1941; it also contributes significantly to an understanding of British policy change toward these targets in military situations for the same period. The theory postulates that simultaneous involvement in several conflicts generates cross-pressures upon decision makers which lower their perceptions of available military capabilities and restrain their conflict behavior. Although Britain became simultaneously involved in several conflicts between 1931 and 1936, these conflicts expanded into crises sequentially until March, 1936, when Hitler re-occupied the Rhineland during the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. Between 1937 and 1941, on the other hand, Britain had to meet explicit military challenges from two and sometimes all three Axis nations in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East. These variations in the intensity and sequence of international conflicts account for the limitation of system theory's strongest explanatory power to the period 1937-1941. Its other limitation--to Anglo-Italian and Anglo-Japanese conflicts only--is due to the tendency for Chamberlain, the principal British decision maker between 1937 and 1939, to exclude cross-pressures as a crucial determinant of his conflict behavior toward Germany. He based his German policy primarily upon British diplomatic stakes and relative military capabilities until Germany moved into Czechoslovakia in March, 1939. Chamberlain's predecessors, including Eden, also followed these guidelines in dealing with Germany between 1931 and 1937.

Figure 25 summarizes the principal findings from this analysis of British foreign policy. Are they significant contributions to the historical interpretation of British diplomacy and to international relations theory? As a historical interpretation the findings perform

both a refining and a synthesizing role. They refine existing interpretations by identifying variations in British policy within the period and systematically accounting for them. In particular, they show the impact of relative military capabilities to be crucial in explaining the intensity of British opposition to moves by the Axis nations. Since the results show that perceptions of British military capabilities depended upon French and Italian support in Europe and American support in Asia, as well as upon British rearmament policies, further clarification requires a detailed examination of Anglo-French, Anglo-Italian, and Anglo-American relations in the 1930's--a task beyond the scope of this study.


However, this interpretation does imply that British rearmament policy has probably been overemphasized as a direct determinant of British military capabilities and foreign policy. The strong correlation between military capabilities and conflict behavior also questions any historical interpretation which argues that British decision makers for domestic or personal reasons were so appeasement-minded that they would not engage in high conflict behavior. The pro-German sector of opinion among the British elite and the need for counter-depression economic policies probably affected British armament policies and thereby indirectly affected their foreign policy, but simultaneous involvement in several conflicts plus French and American policies contributed more directly to both British capabilities and behavior.

The findings, therefore, also synthesize existing interpretations in two respects. First, they begin to trace from a global perspective the interrelationships among Britain's German, Italian and Japanese policies, plus their relationships to French and American policy. The




Policy Intensity Rankings for
Military Situations, 1931-1941

$$r_{RCFP}^2 = .66 \quad R_{FP \cdot NICPRC}^2 = .70$$




Policy Intensity Rankings for
Non-Military Situations, 1931-1941

$$r_{CPFP}^2 = .08 \quad R_{FP \cdot NICP}^2 = .12$$




Policy Change Rankings for
Military Situations, 1931-1941

$$r_{NIFP}^2 = .31 \quad R_{FP \cdot NICPRC}^2 = .36$$




Policy Change Rankings for Non-
Military Situations, 1931-1941

$$r_{NIFP}^2 = .24$$



Policy Intensity Rankings in
Military Situations, 1937-1941

$$R_{FP \cdot CPRC}^2 = .61 \quad R_{FP \cdot NICPRC}^2 = .72$$



Policy Change Rankings in
Military Situations, 1937-1941

$$r_{NIFP}^2 = .40 \quad R_{FP \cdot NICPRC}^2 = .56$$

Figure 25. Correlates of British Foreign Policy Behavior in Conflict Situations

results clearly verify the need for a global perspective to better understand these policies individually and collectively. Second, the findings synthesize by implication some of the relationships between international and domestic determinants of foreign policy--specifically, the relationships among the international restraints in this study, pro-German views within the British elite, and domestic economic conditions in Britain and France.

The existence of pro-German attitudes among some members of the British elite is well-documented.² Such conciliatory attitudes may have directly but weakly influenced Britain's German policy between 1931 and 1935, when Germany was least aggressive and British military capabilities were clearly superior to Germany's. As German military capabilities and belligerence increased during 1936 and 1937, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, advocated an Anglo-French united front strategy against Germany. He apparently envisioned a strong British navy, a strong French army, and a coordinated Anglo-French air force to restrain Hitler.³ By 1938, however, the German air force was superior to the combined Anglo-French air strength, and Chamberlain had adopted a strategy of negotiations with Hitler while Britain rearmed in the air and on the ground. During the Eden-Chamberlain period when

²Margaret George, The Warped Vision, op.cit.; Gilbert and Gott, The Appeasers, op.cit.; Rowse, Appeasement, op.cit.; Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement, op.cit.; William Rock, Appeasement on Trial, op.cit.

³Eden, Dictators, op.cit., p. 355, 377-378, 534-535, 550-551. Chamberlain's strategy also included alignment with France, but his estimate of French capabilities was lower than Eden's. See the quotation in Chapter IV of this study, p. 91, from Feiling, op.cit.

German foreign policy was aggressive and British relative capabilities had decreased, the predisposition to conciliate Germany was probably weakest.

Two factors have contributed to an overemphasis upon pro-German views as determinants of British policy for the entire period. First, British policy remained at the symbolic military level or below for most of the decade. Second, pro-German views persisted until the outbreak of World War II among some members of the British elite who did not directly decide British policy. After 1936, however, conciliatory attitudes toward Germany appear to lose their potency as a direct cause, and their existence simply paralleled a low-conflict policy pursued for other reasons; the appeasement policy was based upon conciliatory attitudes in the early 1930's, but continued in the late 1930's because of increasing German military capabilities. Such attitudes can be indirectly incorporated into a causal analysis of British policy after 1936. Both Churchill and Kennedy have emphasized that at least two or three years are necessary to increase armaments levels effectively through domestic rearmament.⁴ This means that Britain would have had to begin to rearm in the early 1930's in order to increase absolute military capabilities significantly in the late 1930's. To the extent that optimism about Germany contributed to the failure to rearm in the early 1930's, such attitudes were an indirect cause of British policy in the late 1930's; they partially explain

⁴Kennedy, Why England Slept, op.cit., pp. 105-106, 116. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, op.cit., pp. 129, 336.

British relative capabilities which, in turn, primarily explain British conflict behavior.⁵

Nevertheless, even the indirect role of such attitudes as influences of British armaments levels may have been minimal. Domestic economic problems were important determinants of Britain's arms budget in the early 1930's and French arms expenditures in the late 1930's. Demands upon the MacDonald and Baldwin Governments in Britain to solve the problems created by the Depression appear to have been crucial restraints upon British armaments expenditures. Kennedy suggests that the Blum Government in France also was temporarily faced with similar demands during 1937, which permitted the Germans to spurt ahead in the arms race for air superiority.⁶ To apply such reasoning to French policy, which has never been noted for exhibiting pro-German bias, suggests that other domestic considerations than pro-German attitudes may be the most satisfactory explanation of British capability levels. This conclusion becomes even more attractive after recalling France's role in Eden's 1936-1937 strategy toward Germany. He perceived the German threat more intensely than some of his Cabinet colleagues and hoped to counter it with the aid of French arms. But his strategy would probably have been bankrupt by 1938 even if he had remained in office, since French relative military capabilities had deteriorated by then. Similar domestic factors in the two countries,

⁵George Lanyi, "The Problem of Appeasement," World Politics, XV (July, 1963), p. 319, makes a somewhat similar distinction between early (pre-1937) British appeasement policy and later (post 1937) attempts by Chamberlain. See also Lanyi, "British Foreign Policy Revisited," op.cit., pp. 7-9.

⁶Kennedy, op.cit., pp. 127, 189, 234, and Chapter VI, passim.

therefore, may have partially determined British capabilities by influencing the arms budgets of both Britain and her principal ally at crucial points during the 1930's.

The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations

This study's contribution to international relations theory must be evaluated in the context of the present stage of development which international relations theory exhibits. The most conspicuous feature of contemporary international relations theory is its variety. Relatively little agreement exists among scholars regarding fundamental theoretical assumptions: there is no consensus on (a) the unit of analysis; (b) the principal characteristics of a unit which are of theoretical importance; (c) the proper methods of systematically observing and analyzing such characteristics; (d) the theoretical and practical relevance of the research findings that do emerge. In brief, international relations scholars have not solved the levels of analysis problem.⁷ Some approaches select the individual as the level of analysis; others focus upon the nation or the international system. There is also a bewildering array of possible variables to measure and analyze; each unit has intrinsic attributes, relationships with other units, and behavior patterns.⁸

⁷J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International System (Princeton, 1961), pp. 77-92. Johan Galtung, "The Social Sciences: An Essay on Polarization and Integration," in Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau, Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, 1969), pp. 243-285. Wolfram Hanrieder, "Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy," APSR, LXI (December, 1967), 971-982.

⁸Two book-length treatments of the levels of analysis problem are Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State, and War (New York, 1959) and J. David Singer, Quantitative International Politics (New York, 1968).

The present state of international relations theory, therefore, is a "sorting-out" phase in which various approaches are being suggested, tested, and criticized as solutions to levels of analysis problem. Several criteria for evaluation of these approaches are relevant, but the most popular criteria appear to be the availability of data and the ability to use it in quantitative analysis. It is important to realize that this choice of criteria influences the answers to two theoretical questions of primary importance. They are the selection of the unit of analysis and the identification of those characteristics of the unit that are theoretically significant. If certain units have characteristics that are easily measurable, while other units do not, or if some characteristics of a particular unit are more susceptible to measurement than others of the same unit, then the components of international relations theory will tend to be those units and characteristics that are measurable. Solving the levels of analysis problem through the use of this strategy, however, does not necessarily lead directly to the construction of sound theory, although the selection of different levels of analysis partly accounts for important variations among theories. For example, a theory based upon the individual is likely to emphasize psychological variables; a theory with the nation-state as a unit may tend to employ sociological variables.⁹

⁹Waltz, ibid., Chapter's 2 and 4, contrasts psychological and sociological theories of international conflict in this fashion. Solutions to the levels of analysis problem based upon quantitative data are explored by J. David Singer, ibid.; J. David Singer, "The Incomplete Theorist: Insight Without Evidence," in Knorr and Rosenau, op.cit., pp. 62-86; Richard A. Brody, "The Study of International Politics qua Science: the Emphasis upon Methods and Techniques," in Knorr and Rosenau, op.cit., pp. 110-128.

An instructive earlier example of this strategy for solving the levels of analysis problem is the history of voting behavior. The area of voting behavior is probably the first field of political science to be influenced greatly by the behavioral/scientific style of analysis. Votes are quantified data, and elections are important components of the American political system and of democratic theory. These two features make the study of elections a methodologically susceptible and theoretically attractive topic for quantitative analysis. The early voting studies, however, also ran into problems of data availability and quantifiability. Writing in 1944, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet succinctly summarized the initial steps which students of voting behavior took to remedy these problems:¹⁰

Until relatively recently, official vote records constituted the only available material on elections. They were useful for the study of the geographical distribution of the political temper of the people and not much else. Then a group of political scientists centering around the University of Chicago introduced what might be called the ecological analysis of voting. By examining vote records for small units of a city or state for which a considerable number of background (census) data were available, they were able to isolate to some extent the effects upon vote of such factors as religion and nationality and gross economic status. Although they worked under the handicap of dealing with voters in the large--e.g., not everyone living in a predominantly Irish district was an Irishman--nevertheless they increased our understanding of some major determinants of political decisions.

This passage is taken from one of the first voting studies that did not use ecological analysis. The advent of public opinion polls and sophisticated interviewing techniques permitted a shift from the

¹⁰ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York, 1944), pp. 1-2.

precinct or district to the individual voter as the unit of analysis for electoral theory. The Lazarsfeld study at Columbia University was the first major election research to use the panel technique (repeated interviewing of the same people). Since then, the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center has refined such techniques and applied them to national samples of American voters.¹¹

The example of voting behavior's development as a scientifically-organized field of knowledge is relevant to the development of international relations theory and to this study of British foreign policy in several respects. First, the voting behavior example suggests why there appears to be a concentration upon the nation-state rather than the individual as a unit of analysis by many scholars who study international conflict: quantitative data are available on national characteristics. Second, the experience of the Chicago school of voting behavior with ecological analysis is similar to ecological studies by international relations scholars: the explanatory power of such studies is significant but relatively low.¹² Third, the switch to the individual as a unit of analysis in international relations may occur under

¹¹ The major Michigan studies are Angus Campbell, et al., The Voter Decides (Evanston, 1954); Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York, 1960); and Angus Campbell, et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York, 1966). Lazarsfeld, et al., did not use a national sample.

¹² Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Within and Between Nations, 1958-1960," Journal of Conflict Resolution, X (1966), 41-64; Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," paper presented at the May, 1968, Mid-West Political Science Association Meeting. Rudolf J. Rummel, "The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior," in J. David Singer, Quantitative International Politics (New York, 1968), pp. 187-214; Michael Haas, "Social Change and National Aggressiveness, 1900-1960," in Singer, ibid., pp. 215-244.

circumstances similar to the switch in the field of voting behavior: when quantifiable data on individual policy makers become available and techniques for analyzing them develop.

Finally, a comparison of voting studies and international relations studies suggests several interesting theoretical questions. Would a shift to the individual as a unit of analysis in foreign policy studies be accompanied by a significant increase in explanatory power, as occurred when election studies adopted the individual as a unit of analysis? Would international relations theory based upon the individual as a unit of analysis resemble voting theory based upon the individual as a unit of analysis? If there is a resemblance, does it suggest a solution to the levels of analysis problem for international relations?

The results of this study of British foreign policy suggest that focusing upon the individual increases explanatory power. The multiple correlation of $+0.70$ between perceptions of international restraints and intensity of conflict behavior appears to be much higher than correlations between the level of conflict behavior and ecological variables in the studies of international conflict behavior that use the nation as a unit of analysis.¹³ The strength of this relationship also approximates the strength of the relationship between perceptions of partisan orientations and voter behavior reported by the Michigan studies, which use the individual as the unit of analysis.¹⁴

¹³Ibid. See also Brody, op.cit., pp. 120-121.

¹⁴Campbell, The American Voter, op.cit., pp. 67-76 and 136-142.

The results of my study also suggest that foreign policy theory based upon the individual resembles electoral theory based upon the same unit of analysis. This study and the Lazarsfeld and Michigan studies all use the cumulative effects principle¹⁵ as a formal model for analyzing data. The application of the principle to voting behavior has gone through two phases. The Lazarsfeld study was the first one to apply it to elections. As Marvick and Janowitz point out, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues:¹⁶

sought to isolate a series of basic social group pressures on the individual which could be inferred from his social group memberships and affiliations. In particular, they were concerned with social class, religion, and residence as indices of political predisposition....Upper social class, Protestantism, and rural residence, taken together, were group affiliations predictive of the Republican Presidential vote; lower social class, Catholicism, and urban residence were predictive of the Democratic Presidential vote. The more the voter conformed to these ideal types, the more likely he was to vote in the predictive fashion.

Several characteristics of the Lazarsfeld study should be noted from this description. First, the independent variables are the same ones selected by the ecological analyses of the Chicago school; Lazarsfeld merely predicates them of individuals rather than precincts,

¹⁵The Lazarsfeld and Campbell studies use the cross-pressures model of voting behavior for their analyses. Their meaning of the phrase, "cross-pressures model," corresponds to my usage of the phrase, "cumulative effects theory;" they both refer to the same type of empirical phenomenon. My usage of the term, "cross-pressures" is limited to one specific empirical phenomenon, namely, perceptions of simultaneous involvement in several international conflicts.

¹⁶Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, Competitive Pressures and Democratic Consent (Ann Arbor, 1956), pp. 89-90.

using the panel interview instead of census data. Second, the selection of these variables constitutes a sociological explanation of voting behavior, i.e., reference group affiliations presumably influence political preferences such as voting choice. This "disaggregation" from an aggregate unit of analysis to its component, i.e., from the precinct to the individual in the precinct, improved the explanatory power of Lazarsfeld's study compared to earlier ones.

However, Lazarsfeld's indices of political predisposition "failed to work when applied to the national electorate in 1948," and by 1952, Marvick and Janowitz note the passage of the cumulative effects model into a second phase:

Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, in The Voter Decides, followed the same model of cross-pressures* in their analysis of presidential voting behavior in 1952. (But) Instead of using social group variables they chose "attitudinal" variables. Party identification, issue partisanship, and candidate partisanship were the three used; these are essentially patterns of attitude orientation which were seen as pressures on the individual that motivated his voting behavior. The congruence of these variables is required for effective political behavior--either Democratic or Republican--and the effectiveness of their motivating force is reduced if there is conflict between them. As in the case of the Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet model, cross-pressure was seen as leading to non-voting, political indecision, vacillation between parties, and the splitting of tickets.¹⁷

The principal differences between the Lazarsfeld study and the Campbell study stem from the type of variables selected. First, Campbell et al. select attitudinal variables rather than social group variables. Second, the attitudes selected in the Campbell study are attitudes toward political objects, i.e., issues, candidates, and parties, whereas Lazarsfeld et al. ignored an obvious political group,

¹⁷Ibid., p. 91. *i.e., cumulative effects model.

political parties, in their selection of social reference groups as independent variables.¹⁸ As a result the Campbell study constructed a psychological explanation based upon "political" variables, while the Lazarsfeld study consisted of a sociological explanation based upon "politically-relevant" variables.¹⁹ Finally, the Campbell study "postulated the independence of attitude structures from social structure, while the Lazarsfeld study...proceeds from the underlying social structure variables."²⁰

This last point suggests a comparison of the causal structure of these two models of voting behavior. The linkage between sociological and psychological variables in the Lazarsfeld model appears to be what we have called in earlier chapters a developmental model: class, religion, and residence cause attitudes which cause political behavior. But the Campbell study, which does not attempt to link attitudes to sociological variables, is an additive model with respect to these two types of variables. Campbell et al., therefore, suggest that attitudinal variables can intervene and disrupt the causal chain between social groups and political behavior.²¹

¹⁸Party identification was really a dependent variable in their study.

¹⁹Lazarsfeld, et al., were sociologists, while Campbell, et al., were political scientists and social psychologists. This difference presumably helps explain their respective selections of variables.

²⁰Marvick and Janowitz, op.cit., p. 92.

²¹Within the set of psychological variables a developmental relationship may exist among party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation. There may also be linkages between these variables and reference groups, such as the family, that Lazarsfeld did not examine. Campbell, The American Voter, op.cit., pp. 179-187 explores the first possibility; Marvick and Janowitz, ibid., pp. 92-95 explore the second possibility, as does Campbell, The American Voter, Chapter 12.

The resemblance between the voting studies and this study of British foreign policy should now be fairly obvious. The Lazarsfeld developmental model of voting behavior and the Singer and Deutsch developmental model of foreign policy behavior are similar in several respects. They are both sociological explanations of human behavior; they both assume that the attitudes of decision makers are a function of sociological variables and do not intervene in decisions in an additive fashion. This assumption appears to underestimate psychological explanations in each case, since the Campbell study of voting behavior and this study of British foreign policy qualify the efficacy of the Lazarsfeld and Singer-Deutsch models, respectively. Table 40 shows the structural similarity between the findings in the Campbell analysis of voting behavior and this analysis of conflict behavior. Both sets of findings are based upon the cumulative effects theory and attitudinal data.

When the Campbell model challenged the Lazarsfeld model in the field of voting behavior, the next phase in the evolution of electoral theory was a search for relationships between psychological/political variables and sociological/politically-relevant variables,²² followed by an exploration of the linkages between variations in aggregate voting behavior and the operation of the (American) political system.²³ The rationale for this research strategy as a solution to the levels of analysis problem comprised four steps: first, concentrate upon easily observable aspects of individual voting behavior, such as intensity

²²Ibid.

²³Campbell, Elections and the Political Order, op.cit., passim.

and direction of electoral participation; second, link them with their immediate sources; third, establish relationships between immediate (psychological/political) sources and more remote (sociological/politically-relevant) ones; finally, begin to analyze the systemic effects of voting behavior.²⁴

A comparable research strategy for international relations theory might solve the levels of analysis problem by focusing upon a small number of easily observable foreign policy variables, such as its intensity and degree of change, trace the psychological and sociological sources of variation, and analyze the effects of foreign policy behavior upon the (international) system. It is tempting, therefore, to conclude that this analysis of British foreign policy makes both an empirical and a heuristic contribution to international relations theory. It presents an empirically-based theory of foreign policy behavior in conflict situations, and the findings suggest that the

²⁴The authors of Elections and the Political Order explain their past efforts in The Voter Decides and The American Voter as necessary in order to rest their present research upon sound psychological foundations: "Many attempts to find the 'relations between collective results and the underlying individual human acts' have been made by social theorists but they have not proved altogether rewarding. The connections between the great aggregative events in which the history of society is recorded and the individual acts of which they are composed are seldom clear. Typically the line of explication has been 'downward' from the readily visible collective event to the component acts of individuals.... This has led to speculative descriptions of the psychological basis of individual behavior, of which many have remained wholly untested and some have been proved by historical events to be untenable.

The behavioral approach to the study of social behavior is now reaching a point of development which makes it possible to think of bridging the conceptual gap between the individual and society by moving 'upward' from the individual act toward the collective event.... By extending the depth and breadth of their studies, behavioral scientists have greatly increased their ability to bring data gathered from individuals to bear on the explication of the collective acts of society." Elections and the Political Order, pp. 5-6.

TABLE 40. EXPLANATIONS OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR AND VOTING BEHAVIOR BASED UPON THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS PRINCIPLE AND ATTITUDINAL DATA

Conflict Situations*

Restraints Upon Military Conflict Behavior:		(LL?)	(L?H)	(HH?)	(LLL)	(LLH)	(LHH)	(HHH)
		Two	Split	None	Three	Majority	Minority	None
Conflict Behavior	Non-Military	100%	92%	67%	100%	97%	11%	----
	Military	---	8%	33%	---	3%	89%	100%
		N = 6	N =13	N = 6	N =10	N =29	N =18	N = 3

Voting Situations**

Restrains Upon Democratic Voting Behavior	(RR?)	(R?D)	(DD?)	(RRR)	(RRD)	(RDD)	(DDD)
	Two	Split	None	Three	Majority	Minority	None
Voting	94%	52%	22%	99%	83%	31%	7%
Behavior	6%	48%	78%	1%	17%	69%	93%
	N=217	N=248	N=233	N=138	N=105	N=99	N=90

*The L's and H's refer to the absence and presence of cross-pressures, respectively, plus low and high values for the diplomatic stakes and relative capabilities variables for each conflict situation; the ?'s refer to no value for the military capabilities variable.

**The R's and D's refer to the Republican and Democratic values for the candidate, issue, and party orientation variables; the ?'s refer to no value for one of these variables. The data-source for the voting behavior is Campbell, et al., The Voter Decides, op.cit., p. 160, Table 11.2.

research strategy associated with electoral theory may be relevant for the development of international relations theory. Perhaps international relations theorists should consequently de-emphasize the ecological states-as-actors approach and thoroughly investigate a psychological individual-as-actors solution to the levels of analysis problem.

APPENDIX I

ID #	Date	Target	Decision		Anal	Stakes	Pressures	Rel. Cap's.	Primary Reasons
			Anal.	Empir.					
1101	9/31	J s/n-m	Protest		Milieu	China Terr. Integ.		Low	
1102	3/32	J s/n-m	Premature to recognize Manchukuo		Milieu	China Terr. Integ.		Low	
1103	3/33	J s/n-m	League resolution		Milieu	China Terr. Integ.		Low	
1104	3/33	J a/n-m	Arms embargo		Milieu	China Terr. Integ.		Low	
1105	4/33	J a/n-m	Non-recognition of Manchukuo		Milieu	China Terr. Integ.		Low	
1201	10/31	J s/n-m	Remind Japan of British Investments		Poss.	Br. eco. poss. in Manchuria			
1301	01/32	J s/n-m	Grave note		Milieu	Neutral Status of Shanghai		Low	
1302	01/32	J s/n-m	Call for Shanghai Neutrality		Milieu	Neutral Status of Shanghai		Low	
1303	01/32	J a/n-m	Offer to mediate		Milieu	Neutral Status of Shanghai			

Primary
Reasons

ID #	Date	Target	Decision		Anal.	Stakes		Gross- Pressures	Rel. Cap's.
			Anal	Empir.		Anal.	Empir.		
1401	02/32	J	q/m	Send ships to Shanghai	Poss.	Br. poss.	Shanghai		Low
1501	03/32	J	a/n-m	Mediate for truce	Poss.	Br. poss.	in China		
2101	01/35	I	s/n-m	Advocate negotia- tions	Milieu	Abyssinian Terr. Integ. and, indirectly, Br. colonial poss- essions		Yes	
2102	05/35	I	s/n-m	Warn of disharmony	Milieu	Abyss. Terr.	Integ.	Yes	Low
2103	6/35	I	s/n-m	Offer terr. conces- sions	Milieu	Abyss. Terr.	Integ.	Yes	Low
2104	7/35	I	a/n-m	Arms embargo	Milieu	Abyss. Terr.	Integ.		
2201	9/35	I	q/m	Send ships to Medit.	Poss.	Br. poss.	in Medit.		
2105	10/35	I	a/n-m	Economic sanctions	Milieu	Abyss. Terr.	Integ.		

ID #	Date	Target	Decision		Anal.	Stakes		Primary Reasons	Cross- Pressures	Rel. Cap's.
			Anal.	Empir.		Anal.	Empir.			
2202	11/35	I	s/m	Obtain military guarantees	Poss.	Br. poss. in Medit.				
2106	12/35	I	s/n-m	Hoare-Laval Plan	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.			Yes	Low
2107	1/36	I	a/n-m	Maintain eco. sanctions	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.				
2108	7/36	I	a/n-m	Non-recognition	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.				
2203	7/36	I	s/n-m	Return to pre- crisis force levels	Poss.	Br. poss. in Medit.				
3101	3/36	G	s/m	Will fight for France	Milieu	Fr. Terr. Integ.				
3201	3/36	G	s/n-m	Protest but will negotiate for Eur. pact	Milieu	Eur. Collective security		Yes	Low	
2301	7/36	I	s/n-m	Propose Grt. Power non-intervention	Milieu	Spn. Terr. Integ.			Yes	

Primary
Reasons

ID #	Date	Target	Decision		Anal.	Stakes		Cross-Pressures	Rel. Cap's.
			Anal.	Empir.		Anal.	Empir.		
2204	1/37	I	s/n-m	Gentlemen's Agreement	Poss.	Br. Medit. Poss.			
2109	1/37	I	a/n-m	Non-recognition	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.	Yes	High	
2302	1/37	I	s/n-m	Propose to prevent volunteers	Milieu	Spn. Terr. Integ.			
2205	8/37	I	a/m	Patrol Medit. for pirates	Poss.	Br. poss. in Medit.	Yes	High	
2206	4/38	I	s/n-m	Afro-Medit. agreement	Poss	Br. Afro-Medit. Poss.	Yes	Low	
2110	11/38	I	s/n-m	Agree to recognize Italian Abyss.	Milieu	Abyss. Terr. Integ.	Yes	Low	
3202	12/37	G	s/n-m	Offer <u>quid pro quo</u> colonial-Eur. pkg. deal	Milieu	Colonies and Eur. coll. sec.			
3203	2/38	G	s/n-m	Offer colonial-Eur. understanding	Milieu	Eur. coll. sec. and colonies		Low	

Primary
Reasons

ID #	Date	Target	Decision		Anal.	Stakes		Cross- Pressures	Rel. Cap's.
			Anal.	Empir.		Anal.	Empir.		
3301	3/31	G	s/n-m	Oppose <u>Anschluss</u> via League of Nations	Milieu	Austria	Integ.		
3302	9/34	G	s/n-m	Oppose <u>Anschluss</u> via consultations	Milieu	Austria	Integ.	High	
3303	3/38	G	s/n-m	Express concern and warn	Milieu	Austria	Integ.	Low	
3304	3/38	G	s/n-m	Protest <u>Anschluss</u>	Milieu	Austria	Integ.	Low	
3102	3/38	G	s/m	Guarantee French Terr.	Milieu	Fr. Terr.	Integ.	High	
3103	5/38	G	s/m	Will fight to pro- tect Fr.	Milieu	Fr. Terr.	Integ.	High	
3401	3/38	G	s/n-m	Publically communi- cate concern for Czech.	Milieu	Czech. Terr.	Integ.	Low	
3402	5/38	G	s/n-m	Privately ask Ger. for proposal to settle Czech.	Milieu	Czech. Terr.	Integ.	Low	

Primary
Reasons

ID #	Date	Target	Decision		Anal.	Stakes		Cross-Pressures	Rel. Cap's.
			Anal.	Empir.		Anal.	Empir.		
3403	7/38	G a/n-m	Send mediator for Czech.-Ger.		Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.		Low	Low
3104	9/38	G s/m	Threaten intervention to protect Fr.		Milieu	Fr. Terr. Integ.		High	High
3404	9/38	G a/n-m	Chamberlain goes to Hitler		Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.		Low	Low
3405	9/38	G a/n-m	Chamberlain as mediator; Offer part of Sudeten to Ger.		Milieu	Anglo-Ger. rel Czech. Terr. Integ.		Low	Low
3105	9/38	G s/m	Will fight to protect Fr.		Milieu	Fr. Terr. Integ.		High	High
3106	9/38	G q/m	Mobilize Br. Fleet		Milieu	Fr. (&Br.) Terr. Integ.		High	High
3406	9/38	G s/n-m	Offer supervised Ger. occupation of Sudeten		Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.		Low	Low

ID #	Date	Target	Decision		Anal.	Stakes		Cross-Pressures	Primary Reasons	Rel. Cap's.
			Anal.	Empir.		Anal.	Empir.			
3407	9/38	G s/n-m	Propose 4-power conf.		Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.				Low
3408	9/38	G s/n-m	Agree to Munich		Milieu	Czech. and Eur. coll. sec.				Low
3107	1/39	G s/m	Holland & Swiss are <u>causus belli</u>		Milieu	Holland & Swiss Terr. Integ.				High
3501	3/39	G s/n-m	Express concern over Czech.		Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.				Low
3502	3/39	G s/n-m	Protest Ger. act in Czech.		Milieu	Czech. Terr. Integ.				
3601	3/39	G s/m	Guarantee Poland		Milieu	Polish Terr. Integ.				High
2401	4/39	I s/n-m	Protest It. act in Alb.		Milieu	Alb. Terr. Integ.		Yes		
2402	4/39	I s/m	Guarantee Grk. & Rum.		Poss.	Rum. oil & Br. Medit. Poss.				High

Primary
Reasons

<u>ID #</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Decision</u>		<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Cross-Pressures</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
				<u>Empir.</u>			<u>Empir.</u>			
3602	5/39	G s/m		Will fight for Danzig		Milieu	Poll. Terr. Integ.			High
3204	5/39	G s/n-m		Ask about Ger. col. obj's.		Milieu	Eur. coll. sec.			
3603	6/39	G s/m		Br. will resist aggression		Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.			High
3604	8/39	G s/m		German attack would mean British intervention		Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.			High
3605	8/39	G s/m		Br. will meet her Pol. obligation		Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.			High
3606	8/39	G s/m		Br.-Pol. reciprocal guarantee		Milieu	Pol. & Fr. Terr. Integ.			High
3607	9/39	G q/m		Br. mobilize		Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.			Low
3608	9/39	G s/m		Br. ultimatum to Ger.		Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.			High

Primary
Reasons

ID #	Date	Target	<u>Decision</u>		<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Cross-Pressures</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
			<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>		<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>		
3609	9/39	G	a/m	Br. enters war	Br.	Milieu	Pol. Terr. Integ.		High
1502	12/36	J	s/n-m	Conversations with Jap.		Poss.	Br. Poss. in China	Yes	Low
1106	7/37	J	s/n-m	Express concern over fighting		Milieu	Ch. Terr. Integ.	Yes	Low
1304	8/37	J	s/n-m	Want assurances about Shanghai		Milieu	Neutral Status of Shanghai	Yes	Low
1305	8/37	J	s/n-m	Protest over Shanghai		Milieu	Neutral Status of Shanghai	Yes	Low
1503	12/37	J	s/n-m	Protest over Lady-bird		Poss.	Br. navigation rts.	Yes	Low
1504	3/38	J	s/n-m	Protest over restrictions		Poss.	Br. navigation rts.	Yes	Low
1505	5/38	J	s/n-m	Agree to deposit Maritime funds		Poss.	Br. trade rts.	Yes	Low

Primary
Reasons

ID #	Date	Target	Decision		Anal.	Stakes		Cross Pressures	Rel. Cap's.
			Anal.	Empir.		Anal.	Empir.		
1506	6/38	J s/n-m	Open conversations		Poss.	Br. poss. in China		Yes	Low
1107	6/38	J a/n-m	Offer to mediate		Milieu	Ch. Terr. Integ.		Yes	
1507	11/38	J s/n-m	Protest nav. restrictions		Poss.	Br. Yangtze River rts.		Yes	
1108	12/38	J a/n-m	Grants to China		Milieu	Ch. Terr. Integ.		Yes	
1109	2/39	J a/n-m	Govt. currency loan		Milieu	Ch. Terr. Integ.		Yes	
1508	5/39	J s/n-m	Protest Amoy landing		Poss.	Br. poss. in Amoy		Yes	
1509	5/39	J q/m	Land troops in Amoy		Poss.	Br. poss. in Amoy			High
1510	6/39	J s/n-m	Negotiate Tientsin		Poss.	Br. rts. in Tientsin		Yes	Low
1511	9/39	J s/n-m	Withdraw Amoy troops but still negotiate		Poss.	Br. poss. in Amoy		Yes	
1110	7/40	J s/n-m	Negotiate over Burma Rd.		Milieu	Ch. Terr. Integ.		Yes	Low

Primary
Reasons

ID #	Date	Target	<u>Decision</u>		<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Stakes</u>		<u>Cross-Pressures</u>	<u>Rel. Cap's.</u>
			<u>Anal.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>		<u>Empir.</u>	<u>Empir.</u>		
1111	10/40	J	a/n-m	Maintain Burma Rd.	Milieu	Ch. Terr. Integ.		Yes	Low
1601	7/41	J	a/n-m	Freeze Jap. Assets	Milieu	Indo-China			High
1402	12/41	J	a/m	Enter war against Japan	Poss.	Br. Empire			High

Data Code and Card FormatData Code

Var. #1. Target of decision

1. Japan
2. Italy
3. Germany

Var. #2. Issue and Diplomatic Stakes

- | | |
|--|-------------------------|
| 11. Chinese Terr. Integ. | 21. Abyss. Terr. Integ. |
| 12. Manch. Investments | 22. Br. Medit. Poss. |
| 13. Shanghai's neutral status | 23. Spn. Civil War |
| 14. British lives & property in Shanghai | 24. Balkans |
| 15. British investments in China | |
| 16. Indo-China's status | |
| | 31. Fr. Terr. Integ. |
| | 32. Eur. Coll. Sec. |
| | 33. <u>Anschluss</u> |
| | 34. Sudetenland |
| | 35. Czech Independence |
| | 36. Poland |

Var. #3. Decision Sequence number for issue
01 to nn...

Var. #4. Date of decision
month and year

Var. #5. Policy Choice Type

- | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. symbolic/non-military | 3. symbolic/military |
| 2. actual/non-military | 4. actual/military |

Var. #6. Policy Change

- | | |
|--------|---------|
| 1. Low | 2. High |
|--------|---------|

Var. #7. Diplomatic Stakes

- | | |
|-----------|---------------|
| 1. Milieu | 2. Possession |
|-----------|---------------|

Var. #8. Relative Capabilities

- | | |
|--------|---------|
| 1. Low | 2. High |
|--------|---------|

Var. #10. Cross-Pressures

- | | |
|-----------|------------|
| 0. Absent | 2. Present |
|-----------|------------|

Var. #11.

- | | | |
|----------|----------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Simon | 4. Chamberlain | 7. British Government |
| 2. Hoare | 5. Churchill | |
| 3. Eden | 6. Henderson | |

Card FormatColumn

- | | |
|-------|------------------------------------|
| 1-2. | ID Number |
| 3. | Target/Issue |
| 3-4. | Issue and Diplomatic Stakes |
| 5-6. | Decision Sequence number for issue |
| 7-10. | Date: month and year |
| 11. | Policy Choice Type |
| 12. | Policy Change |
| 13. | Diplomatic Stakes |
| 14. | Relative Capabilities |
| 16 | Cross-Pressures |
| 17. | Decision Maker |

CODED DECISIONS BY CARD COLUMN FORMAT

	Target	Issue	Decision	#	Date	Date	Date	Date	Policy Choice Type	Policy Change	Diplomatic Stakes	Relative Capabilities	Cross- Pressures	Decision Maker
Cols.	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	16	17
	1	1	0	1	0	9	3	1	1	1	1	1		1
	1	1	0	2	0	3	3	2	1	1	1	1		1
	1	1	0	5	0	3	3	3	1	1	1	1		1
	1	1	0	4	0	3	3	3	2	1	1	1		1
	1	1	0	5	0	5	3	3	2	1	1	1		1
	1	2	0	1	1	0	3	1	1	1	2			1
	1	3	0	1	0	1	3	2	1	1	1	1		1
	1	3	0	2	0	1	3	2	1	1	1	1		1
	1	3	0	3	0	1	3	2	2	1	1	1		1
	1	4	0	1	0	2	3	2	4	2	2	1		1
	1	5	0	1	0	3	3	2	2	1	2			1
	2	1	0	1	0	1	3	5	1	1	1		2	1
	2	1	0	2	0	5	3	5	1	1	1	1	2	1
	2	1	0	3	0	6	3	5	1	1	1	1	2	2
	2	1	0	4	0	7	3	5	2	1	1			2
	2	2	0	1	0	9	3	5	4	2	2			2
	2	1	0	5	1	0	3	5	2	1	1			2
	2	2	0	2	1	1	3	5	3	1	2			2
	2	1	0	6	1	2	3	5	1	1	1	1	2	2
	2	1	0	7	0	1	3	6	2	1	1			3
	2	1	0	8	0	7	3	6	2	1	1			3
	2	2	0	3	0	7	3	6	1	2	2			3
	3	1	0	1	0	3	3	6	3	1	1			3
	3	2	0	1	0	3	3	6	1	2	1	1	2	3
	2	3	0	1	0	7	3	6	1	1	1		2	3
	2	2	0	4	0	1	3	7	1	1	2			3

CODED DECISIONS BY CARD COLUMN FORMAT

	Target	Issue	Decision	#	Date	Date	Date	Date	Policy Choice Type	Policy Change	Diplomatic Stakes	Relative Capabilities	Cross- Pressures	Decision Maker
Cols.	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	16	17
	2	1	0	9	0	1	3	7	2	1	1	2	2	3
	2	3	0	2	0	1	3	7	1	1	1			7
	2	2	0	5	0	8	3	7	4	2	2	2	2	3
	2	2	0	6	0	4	3	8	1	2	2	1	2	4
	2	1	1	0	1	1	3	8	1	1	1	1	2	4
	3	2	0	2	1	2	3	7	1	1	1			3
	3	2	0	3	0	2	3	8	1	1	1	1		4
	3	3	0	1	0	3	3	1	1	1	1	2		6
	3	3	0	2	0	9	3	4	1	1	1	2		1
	3	3	0	3	0	3	3	8	1	1	1	1		4
	3	3	0	4	0	3	3	8	1	1	1	1		4
	3	1	0	2	0	3	3	8	3	1	1	2		4
	3	1	0	3	0	5	3	8	3	1	1	2		4
	3	4	0	1	0	3	3	8	1	1	1	1		4
	3	4	0	2	0	5	3	8	1	1	1	1		4
	3	4	0	3	0	7	3	8	2	1	1	1		4
	3	1	0	4	0	9	3	8	3	1	1	2		4
	3	4	0	4	0	9	3	8	2	1	1	1		4
	3	4	0	5	0	9	3	8	2	1	1	1		4
	3	1	0	5	0	9	3	8	3	1	1	2		4
	3	1	0	6	0	9	3	8	4	1	1	2		4
	3	4	0	6	0	9	3	8	1	1	1	1		4
	3	4	0	7	0	9	3	8	1	1	1	1		4
	3	4	0	8	0	9	3	8	1	1	1	1		4
	3	1	0	7	0	1	3	9	3	1	1	2		4
	3	5	0	1	0	3	3	9	1	1	1	1		4

CODED DECISIONS BY CARD COLUMN FORMAT

	Target	Issue	Decision	#	Date	Date	Date	Date	Policy Choice Type	Policy Change	Diplomatic Stakes	Relative Capabilities	Cross- Pressures	Decision Maker
Cols.	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	16	17
	3	5	0	2	0	3	3	9	1	1	1			4
	3	6	0	1	0	3	3	9	3	2	1	2		4
	2	4	0	1	0	4	3	9	1	1	1		2	4
	2	4	0	2	0	4	3	9	3	2	2	2		4
	3	6	0	2	0	5	3	9	3	1	1	2		4
	3	2	0	4	0	5	3	9	1	1	1			4
	3	6	0	3	0	6	3	9	3	1	1	2		4
	3	6	0	4	0	8	3	9	3	1	1	2		4
	3	6	2	5	0	8	3	9	3	1	1	2		4
	3	6	0	6	0	8	3	9	3	1	1	2		4
	3	6	0	7	0	9	3	9	4	1	1	1		4
	3	6	0	8	0	9	3	9	3	1	1	2		4
	3	6	0	9	0	9	3	9	4	2	1	2		4
	1	5	0	2	1	2	3	6	1	1	2	1	2	3
	1	1	0	6	0	7	3	7	1	1	1	1	2	3
	1	3	0	4	0	8	3	7	1	1	1	1	2	3
	1	3	0	5	0	8	3	7	1	1	1	1	2	4
	1	5	0	3	1	2	3	7	1	1	2	1	2	3
	1	5	0	4	0	3	3	8	1	1	2	1	2	4
	1	5	0	5	0	5	3	8	1	1	2	1	2	4
	1	5	0	6	0	6	3	8	1	1	2	1	2	4
	1	1	0	7	0	6	3	8	2	1	1		2	4
	1	5	0	7	1	1	3	8	1	1	2		2	4
	1	1	0	8	1	2	3	8	2	1	1		2	4
	1	1	0	9	0	2	3	9	2	1	1		2	4

CODED DECISIONS BY CARD COLUMN FORMAT

[illegible]

APPENDIX II

DUMMY VARIABLE FORMULA AND BIVARIATE TABLES WITH PEARSON'S r 's and r^2 's

In the format for the tables below the letters a, b, c, d, refer to the frequency for each cell rather than the percent. The format and formula are taken in modified form from Hayward Alker, Jr., Mathematics and Politics (New York, 1965), pp. 83, 85, 87, 88.

	Independent Variable	
Dependent Variable	a	b
	c	d

$$r = \frac{ad - bc}{(a + c)(b + d)} \sqrt{\frac{(a + c)(b + d)}{(a + b)(c + d)}}$$

The bivariate tables for military situations between 1931 and 1941 are numbered 41 to 49; the bivariate tables for non-military situations are numbered 50 to 54. Bivariate tables for military situations in the Mediterranean and the Far East between 1937 and 1941 are numbered 55 to 63.

TABLE 41. FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE BY DIPLOMATIC STAKES

	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Poss.</u>	
Low	69% (33)	58% (7)	$r = .09$
High	31% (15)	42% (5)	$r^2 = .01$

TABLE 42. FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE BY DIPLOMATIC STAKES

	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Poss.</u>	
Low	94% (45)	42% (5)	$r = .56$
High	6% (3)	58% (7)	$r^2 = .31$

TABLE 43. CROSS PRESSURES BY DIPLOMATIC STAKES

	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Poss.</u>	
Yes	23% (11)	67% (8)	$r = -.38$
No	77% (37)	33% (4)	$r^2 = .14$

TABLE 44. RELATIVE CAPABILITIES BY DIPLOMATIC STAKES

	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Poss.</u>	
Low	65% (31)	67% (8)	$r = -.02$
High	35% (17)	33% (4)	$r^2 = .0004$

TABLE 45. FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE BY CROSS PRESSURES

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
Low	95% (18)	54% (22)	$r = .41$
High	5% (1)	46% (19)	$r^2 = .17$

TABLE 46. FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE BY CROSS PRESSURES

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
Low	79% (15)	85% (35)	$r = -.04$
High	21% (4)	15% (6)	$r^2 = .0016$

TABLE 47. RELATIVE CAPABILITIES BY CROSS PRESSURES

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
Low	89% (17)	54% (22)	$r = .34$
High	11% (2)	46% (19)	$r^2 = .12$

TABLE 48. FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE BY RELATIVE CAPABILITIES

	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	
Low	95% (37)	14% (3)	$r = .81$
High	5% (2)	86% (18)	$r^2 = .66$

TABLE 49. FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE BY RELATIVE CAPABILITIES

	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	
Low	90% (35)	71% (15)	$r = .23$
High	10% (4)	29% (6)	$r^2 = .05$

TABLE 50. FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE BY DIPLOMATIC STAKES

	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Poss.</u>	
Low	94% (15)	78% (7)	$r = +.2358$
High	6% (1)	22% (2)	$r^2 = .06$

TABLE 51. FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE BY DIPLOMATIC STAKES

	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Poss.</u>	
Low	100% (16)	67% (6)	$r = .4923$
High	--- (0)	33% (3)	$r^2 = .24$

TABLE 52. CROSS PRESSURES BY DIPLOMATIC STAKES

	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Poss.</u>	
Yes	38% (6)	33% (3)	$r = .0416$
No	62% (10)	67% (6)	$r^2 = .002$

TABLE 53. FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE BY CROSS PRESSURES

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
Low	100% (9)	81% (13)	$r = +.2769$
High	--- (0)	19% (3)	$r^2 = .08$

TABLE 54. FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE BY CROSS PRESSURES

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
Low	89% (8)	88% (14)	$r = .02$
High	11% (1)	12% (2)	$r^2 = .0004$

TABLE 55. FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE BY DIPLOMATIC STAKES

	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Poss.</u>	
Low	100% (8)	60% (6)	$r = +.48$
High	--- (0)	40% (4)	$r^2 = .23$

TABLE 56. FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE BY DIPLOMATIC STAKES

	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Poss.</u>	
Low	100% (8)	40% (4)	$r = .63$
High	--- (0)	60% (6)	$r^2 = .40$

TABLE 57. CROSS PRESSURES BY DIPLOMATIC STAKES

	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Poss.</u>	
Yes	87% (7)	70% (7)	$r = .21$
No	13% (1)	30% (3)	$r^2 = .04$

TABLE 58. RELATIVE CAPABILITIES BY DIPLOMATIC STAKES

	<u>Milieu</u>	<u>Poss.</u>	
Low	75% (6)	60% (6)	$r = .16$
High	25% (2)	40% (4)	$r^2 = .03$

TABLE 59. FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE BY CROSS PRESSURES

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
Low	93% (13)	25% (1)	$r = .68$
High	7% (1)	75% (3)	$r^2 = .46$

TABLE 60. FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE BY CROSS PRESSURES

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
Low	79% (11)	25% (1)	$r = .47$
High	21% (3)	75% (3)	$r^2 = .22$

TABLE 61. RELATIVE CAPABILITIES BY CROSS PRESSURES

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
Low	86% (12)	--- (0)	$r = .76$
High	14% (2)	100% (4)	$r^2 = .58$

TABLE 62. FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE BY RELATIVE CAPABILITIES

	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	
Low	100% (12)	33% (2)	$r = .76$
High	--- (0)	67% (4)	$r^2 = .58$

TABLE 63. FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE BY RELATIVE CAPABILITIES

	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	
Low	83% (10)	33% (2)	$r = .50$
High	17% (2)	67% (4)	$r^2 = .25$

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
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Stephen George Walker was born August 12, 1942, at Jefferson, Iowa. In June, 1960, he was graduated as Salutatorian of his class from Jefferson High School. From 1960 to 1964 he attended Creighton University on an academic scholarship and received the degree of Bachelor of Arts with a major in Political Science in June, 1964. He enrolled in the Graduate School of the University of Florida in September, 1964, and in December, 1965, received the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science. From 1965 to 1968 he continued his graduate studies toward the degree of Doctor of Philosophy with the aid of an NDEA Title IV Fellowship and a University of Florida Graduate School Fellowship. For the academic year 1968-1969, Mr. Walker held the position of Interim Instructor of Political Science at the University of Florida. In September, 1969, he joined the faculty of Arizona State University as an Assistant Professor of Political Science and presently teaches international relations there.


Stephen George Walker is married to the former Sally Jane Gerhardt, and is the father of two children. He is a member of Pi Sigma Alpha, Phi Alpha Theta, and the American Political Science Association.

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
John Spanier, Chairman
Professor of Political Science

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
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
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This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Political Science in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August, 1971

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